Scalar properties, binary judgments

Journal of Applied Philosophy

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 85-104

  Alexander, Larry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749126641     PISSN: 02643758     EISSN: 14685930     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2008.00401.x     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. See Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 855.
2. Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): p. 859.
3. Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): p. 860.
4. Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): pp. 861–62.
5. See Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): pp. 861–62.
6. See Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): pp. 862–63.
7. See Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): p. 863.
8. See Anthony Ellis, ‘Deontology, incommensurability and the arbitrary’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): p. 863.
9. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 724.
10. Ellis A General Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) p. 866.
11. Ellis A General Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 869 (emphasis mine).
12. Ellis A General Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 869–70.
13. See e.g. Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
14. Keith Horton, ‘International aid: the fair shares factor’, Social Theory & Practice 30 (2004): 161.
15. Richard W. Miller, ‘Beneficience, duty and distance’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 358.
16. Peter Singer, ‘Famine, affluence and morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972): 241.
17. An often-used one to be sure. Bart Streumer, ‘Book review’, Ratio 17 (2004): 357, 359
18. James Rachels, ‘Killing and starving to death’, Philosophy 54 (1979): 159, 162–63
19. Shelly Kagan, ‘Replies to my critics’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 919, 924–25.
20. Connie S. Rosati, ‘Persons, perspectives, and full information accounts of the good’, Ethics 105 (1995): 296.
21. Robert E. Goodin, ‘Volenti goes to market’, Journal of Ethics 10 (2006): 53.
22. Larry Alexander, ‘The moral magic of consent (II)’, Legal Theory 2 (1996): 165, 173.
23. Larry Alexander, ‘Illiberalism all the way down: illiberal groups and two conceptions of liberalism’, Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 12 (2002): 625, 629.
24. Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986).
25. Tom L. Beauchamp, ‘Who deserves autonomy, and whose autonomy deserves respect?’, in J. S. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 310–29, 316–17.
26. Richard J. Arneson, ‘Equality’, in R. L. Simon (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 85–105, 103.
27. Richard J. Arneson, ‘Equality’, in R. L. Simon (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002) at pp. 103–4.
28. Tim Mulgan, ‘Critical notice of Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margin of Life’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2004): 443, 459
29. See e.g. Daniel Wikler, ‘Paternalism and the mildly mentally retarded’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 8 (1979): 377.
30. See also Stephen Kershnar, Justice for the Past (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 107
31. Stephen Kershnar, ‘Why equal opportunity is not a valuable goal’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2004): 159, 167 (same).
32. See Mulgan ‘Why equal opportunity is not a valuable goal’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2004): 159, 167 (same).
33. Mulgan ‘Why equal opportunity is not a valuable goal’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2004): 159,., p. 458.
34. Mulgan ‘Why equal opportunity is not a valuable goal’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2004): 159,., p. 458.