Evolution, teamwork and collective action: Production targets in the private provision of public goods

Economic Journal

Volumn 119, Issue 534, 2009, Pages 61-90

  Myatt, David P ^a   Wallace, Chris ^b  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 57749110373     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02206.x     Document Type: Article

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