Tortuous road toward countercyclical fiscal policy: Lessons from democratized sub-Saharan Africa

Journal of Policy Modeling

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 36-50

  Diallo, Oumar ^a  

^a NONE   (Ethiopia)

Author keywords

Business cycles; Fiscal policy; Panel data; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 57649171678     PISSN: 01618938     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2008.03.004     Document Type: Article

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