Revenge in international politics

Security Studies

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 685-724

  Lowenheim, Oded ^a   Heimann, Gadi ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 57649107891     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410802508055     Document Type: Article

References (272)

1. See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379-99, 394
2. Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 3-42, 29-30
3. David Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Vengeance and Intervention: Can Third Parties Bring Peace without Separation?" Security Studies 13, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 366-93
4. Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 31, 72, 169, 192
5. Vamik Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).
6. See Neta Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics," International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 116-56
7. Robert E. Harkavy, "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif," International Politics 37 (2000): 345-68
8. Jacqueline M. Gray and Margaret A. Wilson, "Understanding the 'War on Terrorism': Responses to 11 September 2001," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 23-36, 26-27
9. Peter Liberman, "Punitiveness and U.S. Elite Support for the 1991 Persian Gulf War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (February 2007): 3-32
10. Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides and Deterrence," Security Studies 16, no. 2 (April-June 2007): 163-88.
11. On the Balkans conflict, see Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
12. On the Indo-Pakistani conflict, see Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 77, 108, 118, 170.
13. On the Yom Kippur War, see Michael Brzoska and Frederic S. Pearson, Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-Escalation, and Negotiation (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 90
14. Harkavy, "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif," 348.
15. On the Iran-Iraq War, see G. Hossein Razi, "An Alternative Paradigm to State Rationality in Foreign Policy: The Iran-Iraq War," The Western Political Quarterly, 41, no. 4. (December 1988): 689-723, esp. 699.
16. On the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, see John G. Nyuot Yoh, "Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa," African Security Review12, no. 3 (September 2003): 83-93, esp. 88.
17. On the Iraq War, see Stanley Hoffman with Frederic Bozo, Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 34, 39, 136.
18. See also Michael Sherry, "Dead or Alive: American Vengeance Goes Global," in Force and Legitimacy in World Politics, ed. David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Bice Miguashca, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 245-63.
19. See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 367.
20. See also Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 317-49, 344.
21. Sung Hee Kim, "The Role of Vengeance in Conflict Escalation," in Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, ed. I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 141-62, 143.
22. On this and other moral and philosophical reasons to reject revenge, see Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge (London: Routledge, 2002).
23. See also Suzanne Uniacke, "Why is Revenge Wrong?" The Journal of Value Inquiry 34, no. 1 (March, 2000): 61-69.
24. For a similar distinction between punishment and sadism, see Kim Richard Nossal, "International Sanctions as International Punishment," International Organization 43, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 301-22, 312.
25. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 139.
26. For several recent important works in this respect, see Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics"
27. Harkavy, "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif"
28. Rose McDermott, "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science," Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 4 (December 2004): 691-706
29. Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Studies," International Organization 59, no. 1 (January 2005 : 77-106
30. Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
31. Andrew A.G. Ross, "Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (June 2006): 197-222
32. Paul Saurette, "You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics," Review of International Studies 32, no. 4 (July 2006): 495-2.
33. On the limits of airpower, see William M. Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2007).
34. On the issue of dual citizenship, see Allan Woods, "Dual Citizenship Faces Review," The National Post, 21 September 2006.
35. See Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics"
36. Ross, "Coming in From the Cold."
37. See, for example, Harkavy, "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif."
38. See, for example, McDermott, "The Feeling of Rationality"
39. Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology."
40. Ross, "Coming In From the Cold."
41. Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Theory," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (April 2004): 289-316.
42. Saurette, "You Dissin Me?"
43. Wendt, "The State as Person," 314.
44. Brent Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Identity, Social Action and the IR State (London: Routledge, 2007).
45. Saurette, "You Dissin Me?" 512.
46. See, for example, Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 23.
47. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (December 2001): 487-515, 494.
48. Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and Self," Diplomacy and Statecraft 17, no. 3 (2006): 497-522, 500 (emphasis in the original).
49. See also Alisher Faizullaev, "Individual Experiencing of States," Review of International Studies 33, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 531-54.
50. Benno Teschke, "vTheorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism," European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (March 2002): 5-48.
51. Intentional state construction of individual emotion also exists and is perhaps best observed in dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. See Mabel Berezin, Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 27-38, where she discusses the construction of communities of feeling" in fascist states. She also notes, however, that in nineteenth-century Europe, many different nation-states carefully constructed individual and popular emotions in the process of creating national identity and attachment to the state (ibid., 24). It is not inconceivable, in our view, that at certain stages of this process, state officials and agents internalized the emotions and emotional schemas they were trying to construct among the citizens. In fact, some argue that charismatic leaders are those who manage to identify with and express the emotions of their public.
52. See Thomas Scheff, Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).
53. See, for example, Lawler and Thye, "Bringing Emotions Into Social Exchange Theory," who find that corporate mergers can result from fear or anger.
54. For such an argument in organization studies, see Russ Vince, "Being Taken Over: Managers' Emotions and Rationalizations During a Company Takeover," Journal of Management Studies 43, no. 2 March 2006): 343-66.
55. Martin Albrow, "Sine Ira et Studio-Or Do Organizations Have Feelings?" Organization Studies 13, no. 3 (June 1992): 313-29, 325-26.
56. The goals of revenge are distinct from the reasons and purposes of revenge, which we discuss in the next section.
57. Nietzsche, quoted in Rebecca Comay, "Redeeming Revenge: Nietzsche, Benjamin, Heideger, and the Politics of Memory," in Nietzsche as Postmodernist, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 21-38, 21.
58. Jon Elster, "Norms of Revenge," Ethics 100, no. 4 (July 1990): 862-85.
59. William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 42.
60. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 45.
61. See Dominique J. F. de Quervain, Urs Fischbacher et al., "The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment," Science 305, no. 5688 (August 2004): 1254-58.
62. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap.
63. See also Shiping Tang, "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (January 2005): 34-62, 53.
64. Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 35.
65. Sandra L. Bloom, "Reflections on the Desire for Revenge," Journal of Emotional Abuse 2, no. 4 Winter 2001): 61-94.
66. Andreas Diekmann, "Power of Reciprocity: Fairness, Reciprocity, and Stakes in Variants of the Dictator Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 4 (August 2004): 487-505, 491.
67. Francis Bacon, The Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 11.
68. See Vamik Volkan, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ancient Fuel of a Modern Inferno," Trauma, Transmission, Transfiguration 7, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 110-17.
69. See also Kim, "The Role of Vengeance," 152.
70. John M. Darley and Thane S. Pittman, "The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice," Personality and Social Psychology Review 7, no. 4 (2003): 324-36, 333.
71. See also Lieberman, "An Eye for an Eye."
72. On the other hand, consider that "there may be no more well-established finding in the aggression literature [in psychology] than the finding that unintentional acts of harm provoke less anger and less retaliation than do intentional acts of harm." Dale T. Miller, "Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice," Annual Review of Psychology 52 (2001): 527-53, 536. In addition, the perpetrator's expression of remorse or request for forgiveness could diminish the victim's resentment and moral outrage. See Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 45-50.
73. Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 151.
74. Sally Planalp, "The Unacknowledged Role of Emotions in Theories of Close Relationships: How Do Theories Feel?" Communication Theory 13, no. 1 (February 2003): 78-99, 85.
75. Axel Honneth, "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition," Political Theory 20, no. 2 (May 1992): 187-201.
76. Loren E. Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 7.
77. Heath Wellman, "Feinberg's Two Concepts of Rights," Legal Theory 11, no. 3 (September 2005): 213-26, 214.
78. Darley and Pittman, "The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice," 330.
79. Miller, "Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice," 541.
80. See also Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), 17.
81. Adam Smith, A Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: Ball & Daldy, [1759] 1869), 139.
82. Arie Nadler and Tamar Saguy, "Reconciliation Between Nations: Overcoming Emotional Deterrents to Ending Conflicts between Groups," in The Psychology of Diplomacy, ed. Harvey Langholtz and Chris Stout (Westport, CT: Praeger 2004), 29-46, 33.
83. Deborah Willis, "'The Gnawing Vulture': Revenge, Trauma Theory, and Titus Andronicus," Shakespeare Quarterly 53, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 21-52, 33.
84. Nigel Walker, "Even More Varieties of Retribution," Philosophy 74, no. 4 (October 1999): 595-605, 602.
85. Nico H. Frijda, "Emotions and Actions," in Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium, ed. A.S.R. Manstead, N.H. Frijda, and A. Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 158-73, 167.
86. See, for example, Harkavy, "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif"
87. Miller, Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor
88. Evelin G. Lindner, "Humiliation and Human Rights: Mapping a Minefield," Human Rights Review 2, no. 2 (January 2001): 46-63.
89. Saurette, "You Dissin Me?" 506.
90. See also Evelin G. Lindner, "Healing the Cycles of Humiliation: How to Attend to the Emotional Aspects of 'Unsolvable' Conflicts and the Use of 'Humiliation Entrepreneurship,"' Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 8, no. 2 (2002): 125-39, 126.
91. Willis, "The Gnawing Vulture," 33, 41.
92. Dianne Trumbull, "Shame: An Acute Stress Response to Interpersonal Traumatization," Psychiatry 66, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 53-65.
93. Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 2.
94. Edward Westermarck, "The Essence of Revenge," Mind 7, no. 27 (July 1898), 289-310, 299.
95. Roy M. Whitman and James Alexander, "On Gloating," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 49 (1968): 732-38, 732.
96. Blema S. Steinberg, "Psychoanalytic Concepts in International Politics: The Role of Shame and Humiliation," International Review of Psycho-Analysis 18, no.1 (February 1991): 65-85, 66.
97. Neil Vidmar, "Retribution and Revenge" (working paper 2, Duke Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Duke University, April 2000).
98. See Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle, "An International 'Truth Committee': Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 36, no. 1 (2003): 209-41.
99. See also Margaret Urban Walker, "The Cycle of Violence," Journal of Human Rights 5, no. 1 (January 2006): 81-105, esp. 93-94
100. Paul van Zyl, "Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies," in Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 209-32, 214
101. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "International Recognition of Victims' Rights," Human Rights Law Review 6, no. 2 (June 2006): 203-9, 231.
102. On this logic, see David De Cremer, "Respect and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Importance of Feeling Included," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28, no. 10 (October 2002): 1335-41.
103. On the psychological reasons for this process, see Sharon Lamb, "The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and Their Symbolic Expression in Condemning and Shaming," Brooklyn Law Review 68, no. 4 (2003): 929-58.
104. It is in this light that the Victims' Rights Movement in the United States has demanded since the early 1990s that "the legal justice of the modern state be rendered more personal, more emotional." See Austin Sarat, "Vengeance, Victims and the Identities of Law," Social Legal Studies 6, no. 2 (June 1997): 163-89, 171.
105. Roman David and Susanne Y. P. Choi, "Forgiveness and Transitional Justice in the Czech Republic," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 3 (June 2006): 339-67.
106. This situation could be seen as similar to the phenomenon of second injury or re-injury that scholars in the field of victimology identify as occurring when authorities or members of the public ignore crime victims, challenge victims' credibility, treat victims' complaint as of little import, or blame victims for the harm they suffered. In such cases, victims' self-esteem is doubly injured; the injured feel abandoned, isolated, and also humiliated. See Walker, "The Cycle of Violence," 94; Uli Orth, "Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings," Social Justice Research 15, no. 4 (December 2002): 313-25, 314. Consequently, re-injury and negative societal response are likely to increase harm-receivers' desire for revenge.
107. See Karen L. Kennard, "The Victim's Veto: A Way to Increase Victim Impact on Criminal Case Dispositions," California Law Review 77, no. 2 (March 1989): 417-53
108. Diane Whiteley, "The Victim and the Justification of Punishment," Criminal Justice Ethics 17, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 42-55
109. Sarah Escholtz, Mark Reed, Elizabeth Beck, and Pamela Blume Leonard, "Offenders' Family Members' Responses to Capital Crimes," Homicide Studies 7, no. 2 (May 2003): 154-81, 172.
110. We borrow this term from Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
111. See David and Choi, "Forgiveness and Transitional Justice," 344.
112. See also Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M.Weinstein, "Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation," Human Rights Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2002): 573-639, 587, note 39.
113. See also Robert Sloane, "The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment," (working paper 06100, Columbia Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, New York, 2006), 37, note 145, where he argues that even indicting, investigating, and prosecuting leaders suspected in crimes against humanity can stigmatize and delegitimize victims.
114. Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 20.
115. Thomas M. Tripp, Robert J. Bies, and Karl Aquino, "A Vigilante Model of Justice: Revenge, Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and Avoidance," Social Justice Research 20, no. 1 (March, 2007): 10-34.
116. See also Rudolph, "Constructing an Atrocities Regime," 662-63
117. Ulrich Orth, "Does Perpetrator Punishment Satisfy Victims' Feelings of Revenge?" Aggressive Behavior 30, no. 1 (January 2004): 62-70. 73 Feinberg, quoted in Sloan, "The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment," 39 (emphasis added).
118. Ibid.
119. See also Anthony F. Lang, "Crime and Punishment: Holding States Accountable," Ethics and International Affairs 21, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 239-59.
120. Importantly, however, Hans Kelsen, the renowned international lawyer, considers that as long as a war is just (that is, defensive or responsive), it is a legal sanction that states carry out as organs of the international legal community even if no international institution authorized that war. Danilo Zolo, "Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law," European Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (June 1998): 306-24, 313.
121. Ian Hurd, "The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992-2003," International Organization 59, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 495-526.
122. Nossal, "International Sanctions as International Punishment."
123. Paul Eder, Karl Aquino, Carl Turner, and Americus Reed, "Punishing Those Responsible for the Prison Abuses at Abu Ghraib: The Influence of the Negative Reciprocity Norm (NRN)," Political Psychology 27, no. 6 (December 2006): 807-21, 809.
124. This is apparent in the practice of feuding. In many tribal or nonstate societies, feuds are limited and restricted by various norms, codes, and traditions. Transgressing these limitations on retaliatory violence often results in social condemnation, shaming rituals, exile from the community, or even collective punishment. See, for example, Christopher Boehm, Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987).
125. See Human Rights Watch, Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah's Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War, http://hrw.org/reports/2007/ iopt0807/iopt0807web.pdf (accessed 6 December 2007).
126. Partial Report of the Winograd Committee, http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/reports.html, in Hebrew. For transcripts of the testimonies, access http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/statements.html, in Hebrew. The final report deals mainly with various operational aspects of the war and not with the decision-making processes that took place in the crucial first days of the campaign. For extensive discussion of the decision making,
127. see Partial Report.
128. See "Celebrations in the streets of Lebanon's refugee camps," Ynet News, 12 July 2006, www.ynet.co.il/articles/ 0,7340,L-3274403,00.html, in Hebrew (accessed 23 November 2007).
129. Amir Rappoport, HowWe Failed Ourselves in the Second LebanonWar (Tel Aviv: Maariv Publishers, 2007, in Hebrew), 21.
130. Partial Report, 101.
131. For Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres' estimation that the kidnapped soldiers would not be released by military means, see Partial Report 78. Defense Minister Peretz also knew that the military offensive would not result in the release of the abducted soldiers (ibid., 70). Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni shared this estimation (ibid., 80).
132. Peres, quoted in A Partial Report, 78. Ruth Gavison, member of the Winograd Committee, summarizes the words of Minister Shaul Mofaz in his testimony before the Winograd Committee, 27.
133. Testimony of Major General Amos Malka before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 25.
134. Amos Harel and Avi Yissascharoff, "The Northern Command Ran Out of Targets," Haaretz, 2 April 2007, in Hebrew.
135. On 11 August 2006, both sides accepted a UN-brokered cease-fire, effective 14 August.
136. See Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli PM faces censure over 'pointless' deaths in Lebanon," Sunday Times, 18 November 2007.
137. See also, Testimony of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, transcript, 72. To the question of why he decided to order that operation, Olmert replied with a question: "How could Israel live with the sense of defeat?"
138. Minister Peretz, quoted in Partial Report, 83.
139. David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, Lessons and Implications of the Israel-HizballahWar: A Preliminary Assessment, policy focus 60 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2006), 23, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus60.pdf (accessed 6 December 2007).
140. Hizbullah's active fighters numbered only several thousand, but the organization relied on a complex web of hundred of thousands of supporting Shiite civilians. Many could easily have been recruited after the end of the war (as indeed happened). See Testimony of the Minister Raffi Eitan before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 11. Similarly, in a cabinet meeting on 17 July, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz said that because Hizbullah is an ideological movement, it cannot be destroyed. "There will always remain people that will ideologically support this cause [Hizbullah], and when the current leadership will [be removed] there will be others who will fill the ranks." Dan Halutz, quoted in Rappoport, How We Failed Ourselves, 134. Similar words were spoken by former defense minister Shaul Mofaz, who was also IDF'S former chief of staff and who during the war served in the Olmert Cabinet as minister of transportation.
141. See Testimony of Minister Shaul Mofaz before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 9.
142. Gideon Alon and Yoav Stern, "A Senior in IDF Intelligence: Hizbullah Managed to Recover," Haaretz, 19 February 2007, in Hebrew.
143. Testimony of Minister Avi Dichter before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 7.
144. On Hizbullah's guerilla warfare, see Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 87-123, 103.
145. On the attempted kidnappings, see Testimony of Minister Shaul Mofaz, transcript, 14.
146. Weisglass was summoned to testify, according to Winograd, because the committee could not speak with Sharon himself as he was in coma. See Testimony of Attorney Dov Weissglass before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 1, 20.
147. Testimony of Lt. General Dan Halutz before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 69-70.
148. Partial Report, 78.
149. Committee member Yeheskel Dror, quoted in Testimony of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 26.
150. Amir Lupovici, "Discourse, Identity, and Security: Israeli Deterrence in the Second Lebanon War," Politika 17, no.1 (February 2008, in Hebrew): 73-96.
151. Shmuel Gordon, "Deterrence in the Limited Conflict with the Palestinians," in The Limited Conflict, ed. Hayim Golan and Shmuel Shai (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing, 2005, in Hebrew), 189-200.
152. See Lupovici, "Discourse, Identity, and Security."
153. See also Yossi Melman, "Once Assassinations Were the Last Resort. Today They Are Done on a Wholesale Basis," Haaretz, 24 March 2004, in Hebrew. Melman could not be said to be a critical writer toward the IDF and the Israeli security establishment.
154. Dan Meridor, interview by authors, 5 December 2007.
155. Minister Yitzhak Herzog, quoted in Partial Report, 30.
156. Dan Halutz, quoted in Arkin, Divining Victory, 152.
157. Defense Minister Amir Peretz, quoted in Partial Report, 71.
158. Prime Minister Olmert, quoted in Partial Report, 81.
159. Former deputy chief of staff Major General Matan Vilnai, as Member of the Knesset (Labor Party), remarked that the war aims were obscure and stemmed from emotional factors. Partial Report, 87.
160. Ibid., 90.
161. Testimony of Chaim Ramon before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 42.
162. Offer Shelach and Michael Limor, Captives in Lebanon: The Truth on the Second Lebanon War Tel Aviv: Yedioth Books, 2007, in Hebrew), 52.
163. Partial Report, 94.
164. Ruth Gavison, quoted in Testimony of Lt. General Dan Halutz before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 61. Amiram Levin, a retired IDF major general, called the Israeli response on 12 July, "the Zidan Effect," referring to the notorious attack, which occurred that week, of French football star Zinadin Zidan an Italian football player who insulted him during a match. Shelach and Limor, Captives in Lebanon 24.
165. Meridor, interview. Dan Meridor served in Israeli cabinets for more than two decades. Under Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, he served as government secretary; he was chair of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee; and during the 1990s and early 2000s, he was minister of justice and then minister of finance. Under Ariel Sharon, he served, de facto, as the minister in charge of the intelligence community. In this capacity he headed a team that wrote a report that was to serve as a basis for Israel's national security strategy. The report, however, was never officially adopted and, according to Meridor, not internalized by the security establishment.
166. For a detailed account and specifics of the actual use of force by Israel, see Arkin, Divining Victory, 55-74.
167. Shelach and Limor, Captives in Lebanon, 97-98.
168. Amir Mizroch, "IDF Warns 'Lebanon Can be Shut Down for Years."' The Jerusalem Post, 16 July 2006. The naval blockade was removed only many weeks after the cease-fire.
169. Bint Jbeil's military significance is according to IDF deputy chief of staff, Major General Moshe Kaplinski. See Shelach and Limor, Captives in Lebanon, 266.
170. Rappoport, How We Failed Ourselves, 161.
171. Ibid., 260.
172. Halutz even said that in his next speech, Nasrallah would phrase his words much more carefully. "Halutz: In his next speech, Nasrallah would carefully think about what he says," Ynet News, 24 July 2006, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3280528,00.html, in Hebrew (accessed 18 November 2007).
173. Rappoport, How We Failed Ourselves, 174.
174. On the historical use of triumphant processions to humiliate captive enemies, see Miranda Aldhouse-Green, "Chaining and Shaming: Images of Defeat, from Lynn Cerrig Bach to Sarmitzegetusa," Oxford Journal of Archaeology 23, no. 2 (2004): 319-40.
175. See also Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999), 168.
176. Gideon Levy, "Dark Days," Haaretz, 30 July 2006, in Hebrew.
177. Partial Report, 71.
178. On the destruction in Bint Jbeil, see Human Rights Watch, Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War (New York: Human Rights Watch, 6 September 2007), 4, http://hrw.org/reports/2007/ lebanon0907/lebanon0907web.pdf (accessed 20 November 2007).
179. On Peretz's actions, see Shelach and Limor, Captives in Lebanon, 207.
180. Arkin, Divining Victory, xxii.
181. Human Rights Watch, Why They Died, 7.
182. Ibid., 4.
183. "Statements by Israeli officials strongly suggest that the massive IDF attacks in southern Beirut were carried out not against Hezbollah military targets, as required by the laws of war, but rather against entire neighborhoods because they were seen as pro-Hezbollah."
184. Ibid., 10 (emphasis added).
185. See Amos Harel and Avi Yissascharoff, "The Northern Command Ran Out of Targets," Haaretz, 2 April 2007, in Hebrew. In one meeting, Olmert said that one cannot talk of hundreds of Hizbullah rockets hitting Israel and expect miracles in terms of civilian casualties. Testimony of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 76. Minister Yitzhak Herzog said that perhaps in Israel "harm to civilians is considered as force majeure." Testimony of Minister Yitzhak Herzog before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 29.
186. Hizbullah argued that the Israeli occupation in Lebanon did not end after the withdrawal because Israel continued to hold the Sha'ba Farms. Israel rejected these claims and averred that this area of twenty-five square kilometers had been occupied by Syria during the Six Days War and therefore did not belong to Lebanon. The Lebanese government also did not recognize the "blue line" as the final border between the two states, and it argued that the Sha'ba Farms were Lebanese - and not Syrian - territory.
187. Prime Minister Olmert, quoted in Partial Report, 69.
188. See, for example, Testimony of Chaim Ramon before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 41.
189. See also "Ambassador Gilerman to the Lebanese Ambassador: If We Win, You Will Gain Too," Ynet News, 14 July 2006, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3275706,00.html, in Hebrew (accessed 26 November 2007).
190. Dan Halutz, quoted in Partial Report, 77.
191. Major General Udi Adam, chief of the Northern Command, quoted in Partial Report, 47.
192. See Arkin, Divining Victory, 75.
193. Prime Minister Olmert, quoted in Partial Report, 95.
194. Testimony of Chaim Ramon before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 41. See also Testimony of Minister Avi Dichter before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 7.
195. Prime Minister Olmert, quoted in A Partial Report, 101.
196. Testimony of Chaim Ramon before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 32.
197. Knesset Member Chaim Oron (Meretz Party), speech before the Knesset, 17 July 2006, http://www.knesset.gov.il/plenum/data/04127006.doc, in Hebrew (accessed 9 December 2007).
198. Prime Minister Olmert, speech before the Knesset, 14 August 2006, www.pmo.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/33456C76-37D4-4645-95A9-38F73AB3EDCB/0/ kness140806.doc (accessed 2 December 2007).
199. "The IDF High Command was insulted, embarrassed, and shocked by the kidnapping," Report of Major General Udi Shani on the Conduct of the Northern Command and the High Command During the War, quoted in Amos Harel and Avi Yissascharoff, "The Northern Command Ran Out of Targets," Haaretz, 2 April 2007, in Hebrew.
200. Dov Waxman, "Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hizballah," TheWashington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006-7), 27-43, 30.
201. Shelach and Limor, Captives in Lebanon, 25.
202. Emanual Rosen, quoted in Keshev, the Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel, War Until the Last Moment: Israeli Media in the Second Lebanon War (Jerusalem: Keshev, July 2007), 26, http://www.keshev.org.il/Site/FullNews.asp?NewsID=148&CategoryID=9 (accessed 19 November 2007).
203. "Do you remember the first TV speech of Nasrallah, arrogant, scornful, and self-assured in his victory?" Prime Minister Olmert's speech in Haifa in front of mayors in the North, August 28, 2006. www.pmo.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/5D834B3C-053E-4E70-ACA7-2FB8B242C087/0/ haifa280806.doc (accessed 2 December 2007).
204. Jack Levy, quoted in Keshev, War Until the Last Moment, 70.
205. Upon visiting an Israeli Air Force base, Olmert noticed a missile on which soldiers wrote, "Nassrallah, here I come." "The PM saw and enjoyed," Yedioth Aharonoth, 21 July 2006, http://news.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=454611&TypeID= 1&sid=126, in Hebrew (accessed 2 December 2007).
206. Partial Report, 11.
207. Testimony of Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 8.
208. Ibid., 4.
209. Partial Report, 48.
210. Amos Harel and Avi Yissascharoff, "The High Command's Discussions During the War," Haaretz, 23 January 2007, in Hebrew.
211. See, for example, Major General Gabi Ashkenazi's words in August 2000, quoted in A Partial Report, 47.
212. See Testimony of Minister Avi Dichter before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 7.
213. See also Testimony of Minister Eli Yishai before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 7.
214. Tzipi Livny, quoted in A Partial Report, 80.
215. On kidnapping/assassinations and Israeli deterrence, see Tom Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose," Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 2 (June 2007): 155-79, 164.
216. See also William V. O'Brien, "Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defence in Counterterror Operations," Virginia Journal of International Law 30, no. 2 (Winter 1990): 421-79, 430, 435.
217. See Ministers Gideon Ezra and Offir Pinnes, quoted in A Partial Report, 79.
218. See also the Committee's comment that Olmert decided to retaliate to the kidnapping, in part, to avoid sending a message of Israeli weakness and incapacity
219. (ibid., 130).
220. Major General Adam to Lt. General Halutz, quoted in Rappoport, How We Failed Ourselves, 183.
221. Testimony of Minister Amir Peretz before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 51.
222. Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, quoted in Partial Report, 96, 97.
223. CNN, "Nasrallah: Soldiers' Abductions a Mistake," CNN.com, 27 August 2006 http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/ 08/27/mideast.nasrallah/index.html (accessed 26 November 2007).
224. "A Senior in IDF Intelligence Spoke of Hizbullah's Recovery, and Had to Take Back His Words," Ynet News, 19 February 2007, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3366889,00.html, in Hebrew (accessed 3 December 2007). The officer, Brigadier General Yossi Beidatz, had to take back his words because of strong pressure from Defense Minister Peretz. In June 2007, however, Beidatz repeated his assessment and added that Hamas continued to plan kidnapping Israelis, despite the "example" made of Hizbullah in the summer of 2006.
225. See Shahar Ilan, "Head of Research in IDF Intelligence: Hizbullah is Recuperating South of the Litany, Despite of the International Force," Haaretz, 4 June 2007, in Hebrew.
226. See A Partial Report, 11
227. Major General (ret.) Yitzhak Ben Yisrael, The First Missile War: Israel-Hizbullah (working paper 05/2007, University of Tel Aviv Security Studies Program's Working Papers Series, Tel Aviv, May 2007), 31-32, http://spirit.tau.ac.il/government/downloads/ YitzakBIMissiles.pdf, in Hebrew (accessed 26 November 2007).
228. Ruth Gavison, quoted in Testimony of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 32.
229. Ibid., 33.
230. Testimony of Defense Minister Amir Peretz before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 63.
231. See the G8 statement, G8 Russia website, http://en.g8russia.ru/ docs/21.html (accessed 28 November 2007).
232. See Yitzhak Ben Yisrael, "The First Missile War," 28.
233. On the importance of former senior IDF officers in Israel's political system, see Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, "Israel's 'Security Network' and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach," International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 2 (May 2006): 235-61.
234. Testimony of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 27-28.
235. See also Testimony of Chaim Ramon before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 41.
236. Testimony of Minister Yitzhak Herzog before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 46. Interestingly, after pointing out the strong intimacy with the United States, Herzog went on to say that the EU is also a very important partner, but the rest of the sentence is censored. One can only wonder if Herzog accused specific EU countries of hypocrisy.
237. See also Testimony of Dov Weisglass before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 27. Weisglass noted that for Israel, the world is divided into two camps: The United States and the rest of the world.
238. Testimony of Minister Yitzhak Herzog before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 10.
239. Testimony of Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 8-9.
240. Testimony of Foreign Minister Tzipi Livny before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 39.
241. Testimony of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 48.
242. See Lang, "Crime and Punishment."
243. Arie J. Kochavi, "Israel and the International Legal Arena," The Journal of Israeli History 25, no. 1 (March 2006): 223-44.
244. Eytan Gilboa, "Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel's Foreign Policy," Israel Affairs 12, no. 4 (October 2006): 715-47, 724.
245. Israel argued that the Court had no jurisdiction on this issue. Christine Gray, "The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," The Cambridge Law Journal 63, no. 3 (November 2004): 527-32.
246. Shimon Peres, "The Lessons of War with Hezbollah," New Perspectives Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 23-26, 23.
247. The idea of an international force, preferably NATO and not UN , was first discussed with the United States on 30 July. See Testimony of (Prime Minister Olmert's) Chief of Staff Yoram Turbovich before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 37.
248. Hizbullah's deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassemon on 15 August declared, "Nobody can impose terms on us, or commit us to anything we do not believe in. Let me be clear: Israel won't get through politics what it didn't get through war, even if the UN resolution gave this to Israel." Naim Qassemon, quoted in Arkin, Divining Victory, iii.
249. Testimony of Defense Minister Amir Peretz before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 69.
250. See also Testimony of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 75.
251. See Shahar Ilan, "Olmert: The Blood Toll Was Not for Nothing. Netanyahu: Our Deterrence Capability Was Badly Injured," Haaretz, 29 May 2007, in Hebrew.
252. "Savage restraint" is a term used by James Ron to characterize Israeli practices of repression in the first Palestinian Intifada. James Ron, "Savage Restraint: Israel, Palestine and the Dialectics of Legal Repression," Social Problems 47, no. 4 (November 2000): 445-72.
253. Edward W. Said and David Barsamian, Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward W. Said (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2003), 45.
254. On Israel's efforts to "reform" its international image, see David Gertner, "Place Branding: Dilemma or Reconciliation Between Political Ideology and Economic Pragmatism?" Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 3, no. 1 (January 2007), 3-7, esp. 5.
255. Michael Kelley, "Time Warp to 1945-Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-defense in International Law," Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 13, no. 1 (2003): 1-0.
256. For the various legal debates on how to define "self-defense," see Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 2001).
257. See Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force," Michigan Law Review 82, no.5/6 (April-May 1984): 1620-46, 1638.
258. In his Winograd testimony, Minister Herzog, who served as one of Israel's leading spokespersons in the foreign media during the war, noted that Israeli speakers should possess knowledge of international law to make sure their statements are compatible with such law. In this context, he lamented the extreme damages that "irresponsible" statements might cause Israel. Testimony of Minister Yitzhak Herzog before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 34.
259. Andrew Linklater, "Norbert Elias, The 'Civilizing Process' and the Sociology of International Relations," International Politics 41, no. 1 (March 2004): 3-35, 21 (emphasis added).
260. See also Colin H. Kahl, "In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq," International Security, 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 7-46.
261. Still, it could be argued that characterizing only certain weapons as causing unnecessary suffering is subjective and hypocritical. See Burrus M. Carnahan and Marjorie Robertson, "The Protocol on 'Blinding Laser Weapons': A New Direction for International Humanitarian Law," American Journal of International Law 90, no. 3 (July 1996): 484-90, 485.
262. Partial Report, 75, 89, 90.
263. Ibid., 75.
264. Testimony of Minister Yitzhak Herzog before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 12.
265. Ibid., 19.
266. Testimony of Attorney General Meni Mazuz before the Winograd Committee, transcript, 4.
267. Ibid., 6.
268. We derive this claim from the logic of Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 491-542.
269. See also Eric Ringmar, "The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West," Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 2 (June 2002): 115-36.
270. This argument is an interpretation of the thesis of Roy F. Baumeister, Laura Smart, and Joseph M. Boden, "Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem," Psychological Review 103, no. 1 (1996): 5-33.
271. Oded Löwenheim, Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2007), chap. 2.
272. On the national identity of hegemonic states, see Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).