Continuous degrees of residual claimancy: Some contractual evidence

Applied Economics Letters

Volumn 3, Issue 11, 1996, Pages 739-741

  Chisholm, Darlene C ^a  

^a LEHIGH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 5744245611     PISSN: 13504851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/135048596355790     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Allen, D.W. and Lueck, D. (1993) Transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts, Rand Journal of Economics, 24, 78-100.
2. Chisholm, D.C. (1995) Profit-sharing versus fixed-payment contracts: evidence from the motion-pictures industry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Working Paper No. 94-26, revised February 1995.
3. Holmström, B.R. (1979) Moral hazard and observability, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
4. Holmström, B.R. and Milgrom, P. (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, 24-52.
5. Joskow, P.L. (1987) Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: empirical evidence from coal markets, American Economic Review, 77, 168-85.
6. Khalil, F. and Lawarrée, J. (1995) Input versus output monitoring: who is the residual claimant? Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 139-57.
7. LaFontaine, F. (1992) Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results. Rand Journal of Economics, 23, 263-83.
8. Leffler, K.B. and Rucker, R.R. (1991) Transaction costs and the efficient organization of production: a study of timber-harvesting contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 99, 1060-87.