On background: Using two-argument chance

Synthese

Volumn 166, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 165-186

  Nelson, Kevin ^a  

^a NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditional probability; Direct inference; Objective Bayesianism; Principal principle

Indexed keywords

EID: 57249094163     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9271-9     Document Type: Article

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