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Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 21-41

Transport construction, corruption and developing countries

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY; CORRUPTION; DEVELOPING WORLD; GOVERNMENT; INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PARTNERSHIP APPROACH; TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE;

EID: 57149086877     PISSN: 01441647     EISSN: 14645327     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01441640802075760     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (69)

References (29)
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