How Americans feel about Asian countries and why

Journal of East Asian Studies

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 29-59

  Page, Benjamin I ^a   Rabinovich, Julia ^a   Tully, David G ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capitalism; Education; Foreign policy (US); Information; Internationalism; Isolationism; Poverty; Public opinion (US); World markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 57049130953     PISSN: 15982408     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1598240800005087     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Benjamin I. Page with Marshall M. Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), ch. 4-6, gives many examples of the effects of individuals' feelings toward particular countries on their policy preferences related to those countries.
2. For example, Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994);
3. Arthur Lupia, "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections," American Political Science Review 88, no. 1 (1994): 63-76;
4. Richard Lau and David P. Redlawsk, "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 (2001): 951-971.
5. See David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), especially ch. 6 ("The Psychology of Emotion and Politics" by George E. Marcus), ch. 12 ("Political Impressions: Formation and Management" by Kathleen M. McGraw), and ch. 13 ("Information Processing and Public Opinion" by Charles S. Taber).
6. Thomas E. Nelson and Donald R. Kinder, "Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion," Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (1996): 1055-1078;
7. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter;
8. Mary R. Jackman and Marie Crane, "'Some of My Best Friends Are Black...': Interracial Friendship and Whites' Racial Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1986): 459-486;
9. Rupert Brown, Anja Eller, Sarah Leeds, and Kim Stace, "Intergroup Contact and Intergroup Attitudes: A Longitudinal Study," European Journal of Social Psychology 37, no. 4 (2006): 692-703, DOI: 10.1002/ ejsp.384.
10. Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
11. Paul R. Brewer, "National Interest Frames and Public Opinion About World Affairs," Harvard International Journal of Press/ Politics 11, no. 4 (2006).
12. Michael A. Maggiotto and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "American Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 4 (1981): 601-631;
13. Eugene R. Wittkopf, "On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence," International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 (1986): 425-445.
14. William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs," International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 3 (1995): 313-331.
15. Alvin Richman, Eloise Malone, and David Nolle, "Testing Foreign Policy Belief Structures of the American Public in the Post-Cold War Period: Gross Validations from Two National Surveys," Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1997): 939-955.
16. Page with Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect, ch. 2.
17. Richard K. Herrmann, Paul E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser, "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework," American Political Science Review 93, no. 3 (1999): 553-573.
18. , American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 1099-1120.
19. Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz, "International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs: Public Response to Changing Soviet-US Relations," American Journal of Political Science 36, no. 2 (1992): 431.
20. Page with Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect, especially p. 15.
21. Ibid., pp, 125-128; 134-135; 145-146; 151-152, 188-189; 195-197.
22. Stanley Feldman, "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values," American Journal of Political Science 32, no. 2 (1988): 416-440;
23. Clyde Wilcox, Lee Sigelman, and Elizabeth Cook, "Some Like It Hot: Individual Differences in Responses to Group Feeling Thermometers," Public Opinion Quarterly 53, no. 2 (1989): 246-257;
24. Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations," Journal of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 858-882.
25. When feeling thermometer scores are used as dependent variables in regression analyses, the proportion of variance accounted for (as indicated by adjusted R-squared values) is seldom very large. This suggests that the scores include substantial noise or measurement error - that different individuals may use the 100-point scale in different ways. Still, the differentiation in mean scores signals that respondents collectively make significant distinctions between countries, and the significant regression coefficients indicate that there are meaningful patterns in individuals' responses.
26. The standard deviations of thermometer ratings in 2002 were North Korea, 23.4; Japan 21.7; India 21.6; China 22.9, Taiwan 21.8; South Korea 22.2; Pakistan 23.8; Afghanistan 25.5.
27. In 2002, the standard errors of all means were less than 1 degree, ranging from .66 (Japan) to .96 (Afghanistan.) Thus, differences in mean ratings of 2 or 3 degrees are generally statistically significant at a high level of confidence.
28. All the CCGA surveys involve highly representative samples of the US adult population, but the 1978-1998 surveys were conducted (by Gallup) in person; the 2002 survey (by Harris Interactive) was largely by telephone; and the 2004 and 2006 surveys (by Knowledge Networks) were Web-based. Comparison of responses to questions asked at the same time using different survey modes indicates that the CCGA's mean Web-based thermometer ratings were roughly 6 or 7 percentage points lower than the in-person or telephone ratings. For a detailed discussion, see Page with Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect, ch. 3.
29. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992);
30. Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
31. In 2002, the proportion of respondents rating Asian countries at the exactly neutral, 50-degree point ranged from a low of 16 percent for Pakistan and Afghanistan to a high of 32 percent for India and South Korea.
32. Average ratings of India between 1978 and 2002 were 49, 48, 48, 48, 46, and 46 degrees. The similar 46-degree rating in 2006, presumably depressed by the Web-based mode of that survey, probably represents a significant warming of feelings from the telephone-based 2002 survey.
33. Average ratings of South Korea were 49 degrees in Web-based 2004 and 44 degrees in Web-based 2006.
34. Average thermometer ratings of Taiwan between 1978 and 2002 were 51, 49, 52, 48, 48, 51, and 50 degrees. They were not elicited in 2004 or 2006.
35. Indonesia's average thermometer rating in the Web-based 2006 survey was 41 degrees. If the mode effect depresses ratings by some 6 or 7 degrees, as it appears to do, feelings toward Indonesia in 2006 were quite similar to those toward India in the 1978-2002 period, though significantly cooler than feelings toward India in 2006.
36. The average rating of Japan in the 2006 Web-based survey was 58 degrees, suggesting that there may have been a small rise since the 60-degree rating in the telephone-based survey of 2002.
37. In the Web-based 2006 survey, Australia's average thermometer rating of 69 degrees was very nearly the same as Great Britain's 71 degrees and well above Japan's 58 degrees.
38. In the Web-based 2004 survey, North Korea's average thermometer rating was 28 degrees; in Web-based 2006 it was just 23 degrees.
39. The 2004 CCGA data are too sparse to be useful here. The 2006 data include more thermometer scores and more relevant independent variables than in 2004, but they omit several crucial independent variables-including all four goals used in the capitalism and markets index that, as we will see, is an important determinant of feelings toward Asian countries. Hence our primary reliance on 2002 data. We also did extensive analyses for 2006, however, with generally similar results; some are noted below.
40. After rescaling, for example, the six-category education variable takes on values of 0, .20, .40, .60, .80, and 1.00.
41. Multicollinearity may depress significance levels for unemployment and other SES variables, so that the slightly negative estimated effects of unemployment on feelings may be real. Multicollinearity is not a problem elsewhere, and in any case it reduces the precision of estimates bat does not bias them up or down.
42. See Benjamin I. Page and Julia Rabinovich, "Twisting the Lion's Tail: Americans' Ethnic and Religious Ties to Foreign Countries," unpubl. paper, Northwestern University. June 2005: Page with Bouton. The Foreign Policy Disconnect, ch. 3.
43. When the information index was added to demographic regressions, estimated coefficients for education dropped as follows: for Afghanistan, from 19.21** to 11.10 Taiwan, 13.49** to 7.59+; South Korea, 14.24** to 9.36*; Pakistan, 22.26** to 18.43**; India, 17.39** to 14.53··; and Japan, 14.37** to 11.30**.
44. See Page with Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect, ch. 2, and appendix.
45. The four goals included in our capitalism and world markets index may seem heterogeneous, but in fact they cluster together rather closely in Americans' minds. Correlations between all six pairs of these goals fall in the r = .30 to .41 range. (The maximum and minimum correlations are r = .41 for financial stability with international law and r = .30 for financial stability with promotion of markets abroad. See Page with Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect, p. 248.)
46. In 2006, being a strong Democrat (compared to a strong Republican) led to more negative feelings toward South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and Indonesia, by about 5, 6, 6, and 7 degrees, respectively. We also found a small negative impact of liberalism on feelings toward Indonesia and a small positive effect for North Korea in 2006.
47. In 2006, "active part" internationalism had similarly positive estimated effects, in the 5- to 10-degree range, on feelings toward China, South Korea, Indonesia, India, and (especially) Japan.
48. For 2006, our information index could include answers to an Asia-specific question, "Do you think the United States loans more money to China or that China loans more money to the United States?" as well as the earlier euro and UN secretary-general items. Estimated effects of having the highest rather than lowest levels of information, in regressions roughly analogous to those of Table 3, were feelings approximately 21 degrees warmer toward South Korea, 19 warmer toward Japan, 12 warmer toward India, 8 warmer toward Indonesia, and 13 colder toward North Korea, but no significant effect for China.
49. Our previous finding (reported at the Seoul conference) that support for using US troops abroad has affected feelings toward South Korea was probably mistaken. It was based on the relationship between thermometer scores and various policy preference questions concerning troop use, which are more subject to reciprocal causation (influence by, rather than influence on, feelings) than the basic goals and attitudes used here.
50. See Page with Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect, p. 189.
51. Using the 2006 data, regression analyses analogous to those for Table 3 (but necessarily excluding the capitalism, world markets, and the defending others indexes) reveal effects similar to those in 2002. Domestic concerns led to significant and substantively cooler feelings toward all countries but Japan, particularly India, where going from one end of the scale to the other produced movement of a full 25 thermometer degrees. Antipoverty goals had positive and significant effects on feelings toward countries with a large number of citizens living in poverty (North Korea, China, India), but no significant effects for more affluent Japan or South Korea. Concern over defending the United States led to more positive assessments of South Korea and more negative assessments of North Korea, but no other significant effects. The main 2006 tables and the syntax used to produce them are available from one of the authors (d-tullyνorthwestern.edu) on request. Note that omission of the important capitalism and world markets variable may lead to upward biases in other coefficients.
52. The coefficient for the effect of antipoverty goals on feelings toward Mexico is only significant at p < .10.