NGO involvement in the WTO: A comparative perspective

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 717-749

  Van Den Bossche, Peter ^a,b  

^a Department of International Economic Law ^*

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 56749170898     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: 14643758     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/jgn032     Document Type: Review

References (152)

1. Kal Raustiala, "The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental Law', 21 Harvard Environmental Law Review 537 (1997), at 539.
2. See Karsten Nowrot, 'Symposium, the Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization: Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations under International Law', 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 579 (1999), at 586-87.
3. Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, We the People, Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance (Cardoso Report), A/58/817, dated 11 June 2004, para 13, http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/pdf/N0437641.pdf? OpenElement (visited 15 August 2005).
4. Guy de Jonquières, "The WTO's Capacity to Arouse Controversy Highlights a Growing Public Awareness of its Role', Financial Times, 24 September 1999.
5. See Daniel Esty, 'Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion', 1 Journal of International Economic Law 136 (1998).
6. See Markus Krajewski, 'Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law', 35 Journal of World Trade 167 (2001), at 167-86.
7. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 'The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO', 1 Journal of International Economic Law 437 (1998).
8. Gary P. Sampson (ed.), The Rols of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2001) 11.
9. UN System and Civil Society: An Inventory and Analysis of Practices, Background Paper for the Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Relations with Civil Society, Introduction, May 2003, http://www.un-ngls.org/ecosoc%20HL%20Panel%20- %20Background%20paper%20by%20Secretariat.doc (visited 29 September 2008).
10. Ibid.
11. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal Texts (Geneva 2003), 3.
12. For a detailed discussion of NGOs and the UN, see, Kerstin Martens, NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005).
13. For an appreciation of NGOs generally in international law, see, Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press 2005).
14. See Article III:5 of the WTO Agreement.
15. Both the World Bank and the IMF take the position that engagement with NGOs is permissible as long as the general provisions of their Articles of Agreement are observed.
16. See Article 87(2) of the Havana Charter on the ITO.
17. See for a detailed analysis in this regard, Steve Charnovitz, 'Opening the WTO to Non-Governmental Interests', 24 Fordham International Law Journal 173 (2000). Charnovitz points out that it was only the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) that participated (and that too occasionally) in the GATT organs. No other NGO seems to have had any role during the early days of the GATT.
18. See also, Changrok Soh, 'The Role of NGOs in International Economic Organizations: Critical Theory Perspectives', 28, http://www.koreagsis.ac.kr/ research/joumal/vol7/7-02-Changrok%20Soh.pdf (visited 4 September 2008) (noting that the '... the GATT [] failed to establish any formal linkages with NGOs or social movements in its forty-seven-year history...').
19. NGOs as such were not invited to Marrakesh; those NGOs present were registered as members of the press.
20. Decision by the General Council, 'Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations', WT/L/162, Adopted on 23 July 1996.
21. Ibid, paras II and IV.
22. Ibid, paras IV and V.
23. Ibid, para VI.
24. Ibid.
25. Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement: '.. .make appropriate arrangements for consultations and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters...'; and Article 71 of the UN Charter: 'may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters...'.
26. United Nations, Economic and Social Council of 5 July 1996 on the 'Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations', E/1996/31, http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996- 31.htm (visited 5 July 1996). Resolution 1996/31 updated the arrangements previously set out in Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968.
27. The 'Roster' is a list of NGOs which have neither general nor special consultative status but with which ECOSOC neverdieless maintains a relationship.
28. Ibid, paras 27 and 28.
29. Ibid, para 32 (b).
30. Ibid, paras 29 and 35.
31. Ibid, para 30.
32. Ibid, para 32 (a).
33. They are informed of the provisional agenda of the Council (Ibid, para 27);
34. they may sit as observers at public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies (Ibid, paras 29 and 35);
35. and they may submit written statements with a maximum of 500 words for circulation to the Members of the Council [Ibid, para 31 (e)].
36. Ibid, para 38 (a).
37. See above n 30.
38. Ibid, paras 27 and 29.
39. Ibid, para 24.
40. Such consultations may be conducted upon the request of the NGO or upon the request of the Secretary-General (Ibid, para 65). Also, the UN Secretary-General may request an accredited NGO to carry out specific studies or prepare specific papers (Ibid, para 66).
41. Ibid, para 67.
42. See Reference document on the participation of civil society in United Nations conferences and special sessions of the General Assembly during the 1990s, version 1 August 2001, prepared by the Office of the President of the Millennium Assembly, 55th session of the United Nations General Assembly, http://www.un.org/ga/president/55/speech/civilsocietyl.htm, paras 13-20 (visited 17 August 2008).
43. See WTO, 'NGO Participation in Ministerial Conference was Largest Ever', 6 October 2003, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news03-e/ngo-minconf-6oct03-e. htm (visited 8 February 2004); WTO, 'NGO Attendance to the WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference', http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05-e/list-ngo- hk05-e.pdf (visited 12 October 2006).
44. For the latest of these decisions, see WTO Ministerial Conference, 'Procedures Regarding Registration and Attendance of Non-Governmental Organizations at the Sixth Session of the Ministerial Conference', WT/MIN(05)/INF/6, Adopted on 1 June 2005.
45. The NGOs were provided with an entire floor with support staff and copying equipment, a computer room, and about 10 meeting rooms for purposes of their lobbying activities and meetings. NGOs were also provided with an information hall, where the WTO proceedings and briefings as well as the daily NGO meetings programme were on video display throughout the day, and where relevant NGO literature could be displayed and made available on a continuous basis. The information hall was visited by hundreds of delegates during the conference proceedings. See Esmé D. du Plessis, Co-Chair Committee Q94, Report to AIPPI (February 2006), 7, http://www.aippi.org/reports/q94/ report-wto-6th-ministerial conf.pdf (visited 18 October 2006).
46. At any other moment, the regular visitor procedure applies. The explicit terms and conditions upon which a badge will be granted, as well as the access rights and obligations associated with the badge, can be found in the registration form. In principle, no more than 3 badges per organization are issued.
47. See WTO, 'Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society', http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/intro-e.htm (visited 1 November 2005).
48. See S. Charnovitz, above n 16, at 191, 214; Gabrielle Marceau and Peter N. Pedersen, 'The World Trade Organization and Civil Society', 33 Journal of World Trade 5 (1999), at 18.
49. Pascal Lamy, 'Keynote Address to the WTO Public Forum', 4 October 2007, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppLe/sppl73-e.htm (visited 10 February 2008).
50. Alex Lofthouse and Florencia Jubany, Report for International Trade Canada on WTO Public Symposium 'Multilateralism at the Crossroads' (June 2004), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/WTO-NGO-en.asp (visited 1 November 2005).
51. See WTO, 'WTO Public Forum 2006', http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ public-forum-e/forum06-e.htm (visited 16 October 2006). Note that 1,396 participants registered on-line for the 2006 Public Forum. An 136 additional people were registered manually after the expiry date of the on-line registration.
52. See WTO, 'WTO Public Forum 2007', http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ public-forum2007-e/programme-e.htm (visited 20 November 2007).
53. See WTO, 'Lamy: Civil Society is Influencing the WTO Agenda', 4 October 2007, www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppLe/sppl73-e.htm (visited 4 October 2007).
54. See WTO, 'WTO Public Forum 2008: "Trading into the Future'", http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/forum08-background-e.htm (visited 17 August 2008).
55. Decision of the General Council, 'Procedures for the Circulation and De-restriction of WTO Documents', WT/L/452, Adopted on 16 May 2002. For a breezy discussion of the timelines for de-restriction of documents, such as submissions by Members, Secretariat documents, Accession Working Party documents, minutes of meetings, and Schedules Renegotiation documents, see, 'Explanatory Report of Old and New Procedures', http://www.wto.org/english/ forums-e/ngo-e/derestr-explane-e.htm (visited 17 August 2008).
56. Ibid.
57. The WTO does not provide an official list of the NGOs who are invited to these meetings. However, an exhaustive list of NGOs based in Geneva is available at http://hec-executive.ch/iomba/www/?pid=316 (visited 17 August 2008).
58. Having satisfied itself that it is indeed an NGO, the External Relations Division includes the applicant into the list of participants.
59. Hetty Kovach, Caroline Neligan, and Simon Burall, Power Without Accountability: The Global Accountability Report 2003 (London: One World Trust 2003) 15.
60. See Robert Lloyd, Jeffrey Oatham, and Michael Hammer, 2007 Global Accountability Report (London: Oneworld Trust 2007), http://www. oneworldtrust.org/documents/OWT-GAR-07-colour-lo-res.pdf (visited 17 August 2008).
61. See WTO, 'For NGOs', http://www.wto.org/english/fbrums-e/ngo-e/ngo-e.htm (visited 17 August 2008).
62. Newsletters, brochures, and announcements will not be included in the list.
63. For a complete list of all NGO position papers made available and posted by the WTO Secretariat to date, see http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/ pospap-e.htm (visited 17 August 2008).
64. See WTO, 'First Series of Issue-specific Dialogues with Civil Society Organized by the WTO Secretariat', http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/ ngo-dialogue-e.htm (visited 20 November 2007).
65. To form the Informal NGO Advisory Body, the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi selected, on a discretionary basis, those NGOs that he considered to be influential and broadly representative, and seeking, where possible, to maintain regional balance and balance between NGOs from developed and developing countries. Interestingly, some NGOs, including Friends of the Earth International and Oxfam International, rejected their invitations to become members, arguably fearing criticism from their peers and potential bad publicity. Perhaps for the same reason, the NGOs that agreed to participate asked the Director-General to abstain from publicizing the existence of the Advisory Body. That is why the WTO website did not include any information on the composition or the activities of the Informal NGO Advisory Body. Members of the informal NGO Advisory Body included Consumers International, Consumer Unity and Trust Society, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) International, Third World Network, Christian Aid, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Public Services International, the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, and the International Institute for Sustainable Development. See WTO Reporter, 17 June 2003, http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?refID=18358 (visited 17 February 2008).
66. See, United States - Standards for Reformulated & Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), WT/DS2;
67. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), WT/DS58;
68. Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres (Brazil-Retreaded Tyres), WT/DS332;
69. European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Hormones (EC - Hormones), WT/DS26;
70. European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos & Asbestos-Containing Products (EC - Asbestos), WT/DS135;
71. European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC - Approval & Marketing of Biotech Products), WT/DS291;
72. Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (Canada - Continued Suspension), WT/DS321;
73. United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), WT/DS320;
74. European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale & Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27;
75. and European Communities Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246.
76. See, for instance, Article 46 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which states: 'The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted';
77. and Article 26(2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which states: 'The hearing shall be public, unless the Tribunal decides otherwise or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted'.
78. Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (the 'Sutherland Report'), (WTO, 2004), para 261 (emphasis omitted).
79. Ibid, para 262. See also Warwick Commission, The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward?, Report of the First Warwick Commission (Warwick: University of Warwick 2007) 34.
80. Note that in 1999 in United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead & Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (US - Lead and Bismuth II), a dispute involving the United States and the European Communities, the United States requested that the Panel allow observers into the Panel meetings. In response to this request, the Panel held: 'Since it is up to each party to decide whether or not it chooses to forego its right to confidentiality for its written and oral submissions to a panel, we are obliged to seek the agreement of each party before implementing Working Procedures that might undermine the confidentiality of a party's written and oral submissions. By its 14 June response to the US request of 11 June 1999, the EC effectively withheld such agreement. As a result, we are not in a position to develop any Working Procedures that might jeopardize the confidentiality of the EC written and oral submissions to the Panel. Accordingly, we are unable to grant the US request to open this meeting to observers.'
81. See Panel Report, US - Lead and Bismuth II, WT/DS138/R and Corr. 2, adopted 7 June 2000, para 6.2. Note also that, in the ongoing negotiations on DSU reform, both the EC and Canada have proposed allowing panel and Appellate Body meetings to be open to the public, provided that the parties to the dispute agree, in order to enhance the transparency of the dispute settlement system. See Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, Adopted on 13 March 2003, 6; and Communication from Canada, TN/DS/W/42, Adopted on 24 January 2003, 5.
82. These cases were brought by the European Communities to secure the lifting of retaliation measures applied by the United States and Canada in the EC - Hormones dispute.
83. The meeting with the experts took place on 27-28 September and with the parties on 2-3 October 2006. See Communication from the Chairman of the Panels, EC - Hormones (Article 21.5) II, WT/DS320/8, WT/DS321/8, Adopted on 2 August 2005. See also WTO, 'Hormones Panels to open Proceedings with Parties to the Public', 4 August 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news05-e/news05-e. htm (visited 8 August 2007).
84. See WTO, ibid.
85. See also Francis Williams, 'WTO Opens Hearing to Public', Financial Times, 13 September 2005.
86. See United States Trade Representative, 'Notice of Public Meeting in the WTO Dispute: European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (DS316)', www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade- Agreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/WTO-Airbus-Case/asset-upload-file81-13158.pdf (visited 24 November 2007). The delayed broadcasting allowed the Panel to verify that no business confidential information would be inadvertently disclosed in showing the videotape.
87. WTO News Items, 'WTO Hearings on Banana Dispute Opened to the Public', 29 October 2007.
88. See WTO, 'WTO hearings on apple dispute opened to the public', 11 August 2008, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news08-e/hearing-11aug08-e.htm (visited 17 August 2008).
89. See for example, Panel Report, EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5 - US), above n 62, para 1.11;
90. Panel Report, Canada - Continued Suspension, above n 62, paras 7.1-7.52.
91. Note that in Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) requested the Panel to allow the webcasting of the first meeting of the Panel with the parties. After consultations with the parties (Brazil and the European Communities) and in light of the views expressed by them, the Panel informed CIEL that its meetings with the parties would be held in closed sessions in accordance with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel at the beginning of the proceedings.
92. See Panel Report, Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, para 1.9.
93. According to M. Jeffords, in the period between 1998 and 2003, more than 70 NGOs have submitted amicus curiae briefs either to panels or the Appellate Body. See, Maura Jeffords, 'Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective Consultation between The WTO and NGOs', 28 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 937 (2003), at 961. A further 22 amicus briefs have been received in by panels or the Appellate Body since 2003. Note that this count does not include briefs considered by the Appellate Body that were already before the Panel. Such briefs have only been counted once.
94. Lise Johnson and Elisabeth Tuerk, 'CIEL's Experience in WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges and Complexities from a Practical Point of View', in Tullio Treves, Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, Attila Tanzi, Alessandro Fodella, Cesare Pitea, Chiara Ragni (eds), Civil Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies (T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague 2005) 243-60, at 249.
95. Steve Charnovitz, 'Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization', 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 331 (1996), at 353.
96. Article 13 of the DSU states in relevant part: 'Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate.' Article 12.1 of the DSU states: 'Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute.' Article 11 of the DSU provides that it is the function of panels to make an objective assessment of the matter before them.
97. See Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, Adopted on 6 November 1998, paras 104-06.
98. Note that the acceptance and consideration of amicus curiae briefs attached to the submissions of parties and third parties to the panel or the Appellate Body are not controversial (anymore). These briefs are considered to be an integral part of the submissions they are attached to.
99. Article 17.9 of the DSU states: 'Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the Members for their information.' Rule 16.1 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, to which the Appellate Body in US - Lead and Bismuth II, referred only in footnote, states in relevant part: 'In the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of an appeal, where a procedural question arises that is not covered by these Rules, a division may adopt an appropriate procedure for the purposes of that appeal only, provided that it is not inconsistent with the DSU, the other covered agreements and these Rules.'
100. WTO Appellate Body Report, US - Lead and Bismuth II, WT/DS138/AB/R, Adopted on 7 June 2000, paras 39 and 42.
101. See Appellate Body Report, EC - Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, Adopted on 5 April 2001, paras 51 and 52.
102. Ibid.
103. In response to the form-letter rejections, several NGOs issued a critical press statement. The statement complained that the Appellate Body gave no reason for the rejections. Among the signatories to the statement were two large environmental NGOs, the WWF, and Greenpeace International. See S. Charnovitz, above n 16, at 189.
104. Emphasis added. See Minutes of the General Council Meeting of 22 November 2000, WT/GC/M/60, Adopted on 23 January 2001, para 120.
105. The Warwick Commission, above n 65, 33.
106. See above nn 65 and 88.
107. See Article 34 (on the participation of international organizations) and Article 62 (on third party interventions) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and Rules 62 and 63 (on expert evidence) of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice.
108. Practice Direction XII, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1= 4& p2=4& p3=0 (as amended on 6 December 2006).
109. The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS/8), as amended on 15 March and 21 September 2001, provide that the Tribunal can request further documents from the parties and expert opinions (Rules 77-81), and the Tribunal can also request additional information from 'intergovernmental organizations' (Rule 82).
110. See also Article 40 of the Statute of the European Court of Justice (March 2008), http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/txtdocfr/index.htm.
111. As for international criminal courts and tribunals, see, for instance, Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court;
112. Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;
113. Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
114. Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone.
115. As for regional human rights courts, see Rule 44(2) on third party intervention of the Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights (July 2007), which provides that 'any member State which is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is not the applicant may submit written comments or, in exceptional cases, take part in a hearing'. Finally, consider Rule 63(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.9 (2003), which stipulates that '[t]he President [of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights] may invite or authorize any interested party to submit a written opinion on the issues covered by the request'.
116. On the relation of international courts and tribunals with civil society, see also Tullio Treves, Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, Attila Tanzi, Alessandro Fodella, Cesare Pitea, and Chiara Ragni (eds), Civil Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004) 338.
117. See, Rule 4(1) of the Rules of Conduct.
118. See Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas III, above n 62, para 10. The ruling in EC - Bananas III concerned only the freedom of parties to decide on the composition of their delegations at hearings of the Appellate Body. However, the reasoning underlying this ruling also applied to the composition of delegations at panel meetings. The latter was explicitly stated by the Panel in Indonesia - Autos.
119. See Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, and Corr.1, 2, 3, and 4, Adopted on 23 July 1998, para 14.1.
120. See WTO Panel Report, Korea - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Korea (Korea - Certain Paper), WT/DS312/R, Adopted on 28 November 2005, paras 7.10 and 7.11.
121. United Nations, above n 24, at para 1.
122. Ibid, paras 3 and 8.
123. Ibid, para 2. This requirement may be used to exclude NGOs that advocate violence, racial discrimination, or disrespect for human rights.
124. Ibid, para 9.
125. Ibid, para 10.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid, para 12.
128. Ibid, para 11.
129. Ibid, para 13. This requirement may be waived if an NGO provides a satisfactory explanation in accordance with para 13.
130. Ibid, para 61 (h).
131. Ibid, para 20.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid, para 5.
134. Ibid, para 60.
135. At its Session in January 2006, the NGO Committee considered applications for consultative status from 99 NGOs. It recommended that 60 were put on List 1 and 39 on List 2.
136. In many instances, these questions have little to do with the compliance of the NGO with the established accreditation criteria, but have to do more with political sensitivities of particular UN Member States. To give just one example, at the January 2006 Session of the NGO Committee, Cuba posed an NGO that focused on human rights violations 'in the Global South' the question whether this NGO considered that there were no human rights violations 'in the Global North'. Although this NGO eventually was granted special consultative status, the example is illustrative.
137. Ibid, para 61 (c) Under 'exceptional circumstances', the NGO Committee can ask for a report between the regular reporting dates. The Committee may ask for such special report when it is informed of an act or a pattern of acts of the NGO concerned which could lead to suspension or withdrawal of the consultative status.
138. There are three cases in which the consultative status of an NGO may be suspended for up to three years or withdrawn:
139. if an NGO clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against Member States of the United Nations incompatible with Charter's purposes and principles;
140. if there exists substantiated evidence of influence from proceeds resulting from internationally recognized criminal activities, such as illicit drugs trade, money-laundering, or illegal arms trade;
141. if, within the preceding three years an organization did not make any positive or effective contributions to the work of the United Nations and, in particular, to the work of ECOSOC or its subsidiary organs (Ibid, para 57).
142. It has been suggested that such examination was beyond the resources of the WTO Secretariat.
143. To prove its non-profit character, an NGO is required to produce registration documents or a charter pointing to the aims of the organization. If these are not available, the WTO requires at least production of documents that would prove that the organization formally exists. Strictly speaking, the non-profit character is not a criterion for selection among NGOs, but rather a feature characteristic of all NGOs that distinguishes them from other types of organizations.
144. Note that for the Hong Kong Session of the Ministerial Conference the accreditation procedure was waived for those NGOs that were duly registered for at least two previous Sessions of the Ministerial Conference. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Procedures Regarding Registration and Attendance of Non-Governmental Organizations at the Sixth Session of the Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(05)/INF/6, Adopted on 1 June 2005.
145. Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, 'The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium' (Sutherland Report), January 2005, para 207, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/10anniv-e/10anniv-e.htm#future (visited 7 June 2005).
146. Ibid, para 208. The Report did, however, suggest formalizing the 'criteria to be employed in selecting those civil society organisations with which the Secretariat might develop more systematic and in-depth relations'.
147. Decision by the General Council, 'Guidelines for arrangements on relations with Non-Governmental Organizations', para VI.
148. Sutherland Report, above n 118, para 212.
149. Ibid, paras 186 and 212.
150. Ibid, paras 179 and 206.
151. Ibid, para 212.
152. Such activities could arguably include joint WTO Secretariat-NGO research projects and NGO involvement in WTO training and technical assistance programmes.