Mill on quality and quantity

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 53, Issue 210, 2003, Pages 102-104

  Schmidt Petri, Christoph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 56749167294     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00301     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Cf., e.g., 'Mill thinks that the higher activities have value that is infinitely or lexically greater than that of mere pleasures, because he claims that their value cannot be outweighed by any quantity of lower pleasures', D. Brink, 'Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), pp. 67-103, at p. 92
2. '[for Mill] one unit of a higher kind is preferable to any finite number of a lower kind', J. Riley, 'On Quantities and Qualities of Pleasure', Utilitas, 5 (1993), PP. 291-300, at p. 293
3. similarly Riley, 'Is Qualitative Hedonism Incoherent?', Utilitas, 11 (1999), pp. 347-58, at p. 351
4. cf. G. Scarre: 'Donner and Riley on Qualitative Hedonism', Utilitas, 9 (1997), pp. 351-60
5. 'Mill's claim, then, is that some pleasures are so valuable that they will be preferred, by those who have experienced both, to any amount of certain other pleasures', R. Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London, Routledge, 1997), p. 29
6. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), in Collected Works, ed. J. Robson (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1969), Vol. x, p. 211