Poor choices: De-alignment, development and Dalit/Adivasi voting patterns in Indian states

Contemporary South Asia

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 441-464

  Thachil, Tariq ^a   Herring, Ronald ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; PARTY POLITICS; SOCIAL MOVEMENT; STRATEGIC APPROACH; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

ASIA; EURASIA; INDIA; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 56749131565     PISSN: 09584935     EISSN: 1469364X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09584930802472798     Document Type: Article

References (96)

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4. India of course follows a British first-past-the-post electoral system. Data on Indian parliamentary elections obtained from the Election Commission of India, 〈http://www.eci.gov.in/〉, accessed 1 October 2006.
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6. We employ the terms 'Dalit' and 'Adivasi' because these are the monikers with which these communities have largely self-identified in India, eschewing the more administrative labels of 'Scheduled Caste' and 'Scheduled Tribe'. These latter labels referred to these populations being identified not by themselves, but by government lists or 'schedules' of caste communities. However, we still use SC and ST terminology when discussing concepts associated with formal governance, such as the demarcation of reserved constituencies.
7. The text does not imply that ST/SC formal status corresponds to economic disadvantage; there is significant elongation and class differentiation among both categories. Nevertheless, the poverty continues to be disproportionate among ST/SC populations, as we outline later in this paper.
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25. The assumption in this line of argument is that parties have credibility, are meaningfully distinguishable on major policies affecting interests of voters, and that voters know of these differences and believe the parties will act as their agents once in power. All of these conditions are undermined by the common perception of politicians in mass publics one hears in India: 'sab chor heh' ('they are all thieves').
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53. Poor voters seem to understand this reality. One farmer laborer who supported the communists told Herring that the party did not do too much for her when in power, but in any event 'the most the government can help is Rs. 1000 (about $20 US)'; see R. Herring, 'Contesting the "great transformation": Local struggles with the market in south India', in J. C. Scott & N. Bhatt (eds) Agrarian Studies: Synthetic Work at the Cutting Edge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
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55. 47.5% of voters earning Rs. 20,000 a month or more reported their financial situation as improving, whereas only 18.5% of those earning Rs. 1000 or less said the same. Source: National Election Study, 2004, Question 31.
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61. Brass, op cit, Ref 47, p 258.
62. More unsettling is the increased presence of members of both communities in Sangh-sponsored activities, including the 2002 Gujarat pogrom. Observers of the massacre noted the involvement of Hindutva's new converts, 〈www.outlookindia.com〉. See D. Kumar, 'Poisoned edge', Outlook, 2 July 2002
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66. The number of schools run by such organizations has multiplied 500% in the past 20 years, and their influence with low-income voters has grown commensurably. For details, see 〈www.vidyabharati.org〉, accessed 5 November 2007.
67. Details from Sewa International, Economic Activities (sections on Madhya Pradesh and Orissa), 〈http://www.sewainternational.org/ economic.html〉, accessed 5 November 2007.
68. See 'Manufacturing believers', The Hindu, Sunday 10 February 2004, 〈www.hinduonnet.com〉, accessed 6 January 2008.
69. See 'Call to remove social disparities', The Hindu, 27 October 2005, 〈www.hinduonnet.com〉, accessed 6 January 2008.
70. K. Sharma, 'Communalizing relief, VHP seizes earthquake opportunity', The Statesman, 12 February 2001, accessed 7 November 2007 and 'Funds collected for quake relief benefited RSS affiliate', The Hindu, 26 February 2003, 〈www.hinduonnet.com〉, accessed 6 January 2008.
71. See Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh Report on Gujarat, 〈www.hssworld.org/seva/Gujarat/media_report.html〉, accessed 7 November 2007.
72. Indeed, many Dalits and Dalit movements have been in tension not simply with notions of caste hierarchy within Hindu nationalism, but have even had a fractious relationship with Indian nationalism more generally. Evidence of the disagreements between Gandhi and Dr B.R. Ambedkar (one of the first leaders of early Dalit movements) are evident in Ambedkar's own writings. See B.R. Ambedkar, What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables (Bombay: Thancker, 1946). For an example of recent Dalit scholarship's critique of Hinduism more generally
73. see K. Illiah, Why I am Not a Hindu (Calcutta: Samya, 1996).
74. Sewa International, op cit, Ref 53.
75. The Hindu, op cit, Ref 55.
76. A recent survey found that even though Congress governments initiated neoliberal reforms, the BJP's politicians were more vociferous supporters of pro-market policies; see Chibber, op cit, Ref 44.
77. C. Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p 323
78. and Hansen, op cit, Ref 46, p 228.
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83. also see D. Meyer, 'Protest and political opportunities', Annual Review of Sociology, Vol 30, 2004, pp 125-145.
84. See Dreze and Gazdar on Uttar Pradesh for an argument that, at comparable levels of poverty, some states reproduce 'inertia' that leaves bottom sections of the population untouched, even as equally poor states serve to redistribute opportunity to the bottom of society (e.g. Kerala); J. Dreze, J. and H. Gazdar, 'Uttar Pradesh: The burden of inertia', in J. Dreze and A. Sen (eds), Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp 33-128.
85. For an exception, see Krishna, op cit, Ref 22.
86. The literature on the variation in social policy performance across India is well developed, but has not specifically linked this performance to party politics; see J. Dreze and A. Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
87. Since educational and health policies are largely the purview of individual state governments, using this subnational level for the unit of analysis seems most appropriate.
88. Heller's take on Kerala is that class compromise was difficult for the CPM, but necessary to provide the basic conditions for economic growth by reining in union demands; see Heller, op cit, Ref 26.
89. Also see R. Mallick, Development Policy of a Communist Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
90. A. Chatterjee, 'Learning in Saffron, RSS schools in Orissa', Asian Age, 12 November 2003, 〈http://www.sacw.net/DC/ CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/anganaNov2003.html〉, accessed 2 February 2008.
91. Quote from Ravi Shankar Prasad, the party's election-in-charge of Uttarakhand; see 'Uttarakhand assembly 2007 results', Indian Express 4 March 2007.
92. Dreze and Sen, op cit, Ref 69.
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94. The term was coined by Maurice Duverger; see M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1954)
95. also see A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
96. R. Herring, op cit, Ref 18, p 405.