The myth of the European concert: The realist-institutionalist debate and great power behavior in the Eastern question, 1821-41

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 1-57

  Kagan, Korina ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 5644269044     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429341     Document Type: Article

References (545)

1. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
2. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
3. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
4. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
5. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
6. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
7. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
8. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
9. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
10. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
11. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
12. On the realist position in this debate, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Oganizration 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; and Susan Strange,'"Cavel Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-54. For the institutionalist position, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder Westview, 1989); Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security 16, no. 4 (spring 1992): 143-78; Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 377-403; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 39-51. For useful overviews related to this debate see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organisation 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 491-517; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 3 (April 1996): 177-228.
13. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 16.
14. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
15. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
16. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
17. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
18. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
19. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
20. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
21. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
22. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
23. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
24. See Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16; Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62; Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," South Atlantic Quarterly 82, no. 1 (winter 1983): 1-18; Schroeder, "The 19th-century International System: Changes in the Structure," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 1-26; Schroeder, "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" Review of International Studies, 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 135-53; Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 684-706; Schroeder, "The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848," in Coping with Complexity in the International System, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 47-70; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Schroeder, "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 745-54. For critical appraisals of Schroeder's work, see the special issues of American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992); and International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994).
25. Apart from Schroeder's work, I relied on the following sources on the European Concert Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159-74; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Managng U.S. - Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder Westview, 1983), 31-64; Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 357-78; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58-79; K. J. Holsti, "Governance Without Government Poly- archy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30-57; William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping with Complexity, 71-105.
26. Apart from Schroeder's work, I relied on the following sources on the European Concert Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159-74; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Managng U.S. - Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder Westview, 1983), 31-64; Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 357-78; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58-79; K. J. Holsti, "Governance Without Government Poly- archy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30-57; William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping with Complexity, 71-105.
27. Apart from Schroeder's work, I relied on the following sources on the European Concert Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159-74; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Managng U.S. - Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder Westview, 1983), 31-64; Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 357-78; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58-79; K. J. Holsti, "Governance Without Government Poly- archy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30-57; William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping with Complexity, 71-105.
28. Apart from Schroeder's work, I relied on the following sources on the European Concert Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159-74; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Managng U.S. - Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder Westview, 1983), 31-64; Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 357-78; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58-79; K. J. Holsti, "Governance Without Government Poly- archy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30-57; William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping with Complexity, 71-105.
29. Apart from Schroeder's work, I relied on the following sources on the European Concert Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159-74; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Managng U.S. - Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder Westview, 1983), 31-64; Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 357-78; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58-79; K. J. Holsti, "Governance Without Government Poly- archy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30-57; William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping with Complexity, 71-105.
30. Apart from Schroeder's work, I relied on the following sources on the European Concert Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159-74; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Managng U.S. - Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder Westview, 1983), 31-64; Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 357-78; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58-79; K. J. Holsti, "Governance Without Government Poly- archy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30-57; William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping with Complexity, 71-105.
31. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
32. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
33. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
34. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
35. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
36. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
37. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
38. See John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; James E. Goodby, "A New European Concert," Arms Control Today 21 (1991); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival 34, no. 2 (summer 1992): 12-30; Richard N. Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (spring 1992): 64-82; Corall Bell, "Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Powers?" in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, ed. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder Westview, 1993), 110-20; Richard Leaver, "Sharing the Burdens of Victory: Principles and Problems of a Concert of Powers," in Leaver and Richardson, Charting the Post-Cold War Order, 121-33; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts," Review of International Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 327-48.
39. There is to date no detailed realist critique of the institutionalist thesis with regard to the Concert of Europe. A study that is often cited as a realist interpretation of the post-1815 period is Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955). Yet, this study concerns only the immediate peace settlement after the Napoleonic Wars and, moreover, it interprets the balance of power in a manner that makes it indistinguishable from institutionalism.
40. Schroeder, "Changes in the Structure," 6.
41. In 1829; 1833; 1840; 1853-54 (escalating to the Crimean War); 1877-78; 1908-9; 1912-13; and July 1914 (escalating to the First World War).
42. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
43. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the
44. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
45. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
46. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
47. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
48. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
49. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
50. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
51. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
52. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
53. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
54. On the Eastern Question see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966); and J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politic, René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). On British policy in the Eastern Question see Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971); and H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longman, 1936). On Russian policy see Matthew Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41," in Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (London: Macmillan, 1979), 79-97; Barbara B. Jelavich, A. Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For book-length treatments of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Egyptian conflicts, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Frederick Stanley Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russian, 1832-1841 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924).
55. Schroeder, "Changes in the Structure," 3, 24; Destruction of the European Concert, 406; Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 165-66; Daugherty, "System Management," 72.
56. Schroeder, "Changes in the Structure," 3, 24; Destruction of the European Concert, 406; Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 165-66; Daugherty, "System Management," 72.
57. Schroeder, "Changes in the Structure," 3, 24; Destruction of the European Concert, 406; Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 165-66; Daugherty, "System Management," 72.
58. Schroeder, "Changes in the Structure," 3, 24; Destruction of the European Concert, 406; Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 165-66; Daugherty, "System Management," 72.
59. Quoted in John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization 46 (1992): 579; see also Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 49.
60. Quoted in John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization 46 (1992): 579; see also Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 49.
61. Ideally, a complete test of the influence of the European Concert on great power cooperation should include all the other local conflicts in which they were involved, notably in Belgium, the Iberian peninsula, and Central Europe. Such a task, however, is beyond the scope of a journal article.
62. For examples of recent empirical studies that explicitly test realist versus institutionalist claims in the security area, see Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3 (1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," Review of International Studies 20 (1994): 369-88; and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: Realism, Institutionalism and Regime Robustness," Cooperation and Conflict 29 (1994): 115-48.
63. For examples of recent empirical studies that explicitly test realist versus institutionalist claims in the security area, see Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3 (1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," Review of International Studies 20 (1994): 369-88; and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: Realism, Institutionalism and Regime Robustness," Cooperation and Conflict 29 (1994): 115-48.
64. For examples of recent empirical studies that explicitly test realist versus institutionalist claims in the security area, see Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3 (1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," Review of International Studies 20 (1994): 369-88; and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: Realism, Institutionalism and Regime Robustness," Cooperation and Conflict 29 (1994): 115-48.
65. The core element of an international institution, shared by all definitions of the term, is a set of injunctions (or norms and rules) regulating state behavior in specific issue-areas, that is, prescribing legitimate, and proscribing illegitimate, behavior. This definition subsumes both formal international organizations and less formal international regimes. For slightly varying definitions of institutions or regimes see Keohane, International Institutions and State Paver, 3-4, 163-66; Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, 2; Young, International Cooperation, 5-6, 12-18, 32; Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 8. For the purposes of this article, the terms "norms" and "rules" are used interchangeably in the sense of behavioral prescriptions. On these concepts, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
66. The core element of an international institution, shared by all definitions of the term, is a set of injunctions (or norms and rules) regulating state behavior in specific issue-areas, that is, prescribing legitimate, and proscribing illegitimate, behavior. This definition subsumes both formal international organizations and less formal international regimes. For slightly varying definitions of institutions or regimes see Keohane, International Institutions and State Paver, 3-4, 163-66; Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, 2; Young, International Cooperation, 5-6, 12-18, 32; Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 8. For the purposes of this article, the terms "norms" and "rules" are used interchangeably in the sense of behavioral prescriptions. On these concepts, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
67. The core element of an international institution, shared by all definitions of the term, is a set of injunctions (or norms and rules) regulating state behavior in specific issue-areas, that is, prescribing legitimate, and proscribing illegitimate, behavior. This definition subsumes both formal international organizations and less formal international regimes. For slightly varying definitions of institutions or regimes see Keohane, International Institutions and State Paver, 3-4, 163-66; Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, 2; Young, International Cooperation, 5-6, 12-18, 32; Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 8. For the purposes of this article, the terms "norms" and "rules" are used interchangeably in the sense of behavioral prescriptions. On these concepts, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
68. The core element of an international institution, shared by all definitions of the term, is a set of injunctions (or norms and rules) regulating state behavior in specific issue-areas, that is, prescribing legitimate, and proscribing illegitimate, behavior. This definition subsumes both formal international organizations and less formal international regimes. For slightly varying definitions of institutions or regimes see Keohane, International Institutions and State Paver, 3-4, 163-66; Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, 2; Young, International Cooperation, 5-6, 12-18, 32; Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 8. For the purposes of this article, the terms "norms" and "rules" are used interchangeably in the sense of behavioral prescriptions. On these concepts, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
69. The core element of an international institution, shared by all definitions of the term, is a set of injunctions (or norms and rules) regulating state behavior in specific issue-areas, that is, prescribing legitimate, and proscribing illegitimate, behavior. This definition subsumes both formal international organizations and less formal international regimes. For slightly varying definitions of institutions or regimes see Keohane, International Institutions and State Paver, 3-4, 163-66; Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, 2; Young, International Cooperation, 5-6, 12-18, 32; Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 8. For the purposes of this article, the terms "norms" and "rules" are used interchangeably in the sense of behavioral prescriptions. On these concepts, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
70. David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 5; Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," 116, 119. For a dissenting realist view, see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self Help," Security Studies 5 (1996): 122-63.
71. David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 5; Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," 116, 119. For a dissenting realist view, see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self Help," Security Studies 5 (1996): 122-63.
72. David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 5; Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," 116, 119. For a dissenting realist view, see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self Help," Security Studies 5 (1996): 122-63.
73. On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. On the relative gains problem see Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation"; articles in Baldwin, Ncorealism and NeoEberalism; and "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," a symposium in American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 729-43.
74. On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. On the relative gains problem see Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation"; articles in Baldwin, Ncorealism and NeoEberalism; and "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," a symposium in American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 729-43.
75. On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. On the relative gains problem see Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation"; articles in Baldwin, Ncorealism and NeoEberalism; and "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," a symposium in American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 729-43.
76. On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. On the relative gains problem see Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation"; articles in Baldwin, Ncorealism and NeoEberalism; and "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," a symposium in American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 729-43.
77. For this definition of cooperation, see Keohane, After Hegemony, 51-4.
78. The two variants of this argument (benevolent and coercive) are discussed in Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability," International Organization 39, no. 4 (autumn 1985): 579-614.
79. On hegemonic stability theory see Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 3; Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 74-100; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 500-4.
80. On hegemonic stability theory see Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 3; Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 74-100; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 500-4.
81. On hegemonic stability theory see Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 3; Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 74-100; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 500-4.
82. On imposed cooperation see Young, International Cooperation, 88-89, and Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation," 469-70.
83. On imposed cooperation see Young, International Cooperation, 88-89, and Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation," 469-70.
84. On balance-of-threat theory see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
85. The realist explanation of cooperation as a response to a common threat is based on a conception of the balance of power as the "automatic," unintended outcome of states' short-term self-interests that does not depend on norms and rules which explicitly call for maintaining a balance. For such a conception see Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 60-61. An alternative conception of the balance of power regards it as an institution in its own right, comprised of explicit norms and rules that guide state behavior. See, for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power. Such a conception should be regarded as belonging in the institutionalist rather than the realist camp. A classical distinction between these two conceptions of the balance of power was made by Inis L Claude, Power and International Relations (New York Random House, 1962).
86. The realist explanation of cooperation as a response to a common threat is based on a conception of the balance of power as the "automatic," unintended outcome of states' short-term self-interests that does not depend on norms and rules which explicitly call for maintaining a balance. For such a conception see Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 60-61. An alternative conception of the balance of power regards it as an institution in its own right, comprised of explicit norms and rules that guide state behavior. See, for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power. Such a conception should be regarded as belonging in the institutionalist rather than the realist camp. A classical distinction between these two conceptions of the balance of power was made by Inis L Claude, Power and International Relations (New York Random House, 1962).
87. The realist explanation of cooperation as a response to a common threat is based on a conception of the balance of power as the "automatic," unintended outcome of states' short-term self-interests that does not depend on norms and rules which explicitly call for maintaining a balance. For such a conception see Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 60-61. An alternative conception of the balance of power regards it as an institution in its own right, comprised of explicit norms and rules that guide state behavior. See, for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power. Such a conception should be regarded as belonging in the institutionalist rather than the realist camp. A classical distinction between these two conceptions of the balance of power was made by Inis L Claude, Power and International Relations (New York Random House, 1962).
88. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
89. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, 499-500. This is the major theme of Keohane, After Hegemony, which discusses the persistence of post-1945 international economic regimes built by the United States after the decline of U.S. hegemony.
90. Robert Axelrode and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy. Strategies and Institutions," in Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, 226-54.
91. For a classical statement of this distinction see Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," and "Regimes and the Limits of Realism." In view of the centrality of this point in the realist-institutionalist debate, it is perplexing to read Keohane's and Martin's recent statement that "the difference between realism and liberal institutionalism does not lie in whether institutions are independent or dependent variables" (Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 48). In fact, this is precisely where the difference lies. In a recent article, Schweller and Priess reformulate the realist position in the institutions debate by drawing on the insights of classical realism. See Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mersbon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 1-32. Their reformulated realist position, however, is contradictory. On the one hand, they seem to recognize that institutions are dependent or, at most, intervening variables (and their proposed model discusses, in true realist fashion, the kinds of institutions that are created under different international structures). On the other hand, they also accord independent effects to institutions - a formulation that renders their version of realism virtually indistinguishable from institutionalism, and thus blurs, rather than advances, a major theoretical debate.
92. For a classical statement of this distinction see Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," and "Regimes and the Limits of Realism." In view of the centrality of this point in the realist-institutionalist debate, it is perplexing to read Keohane's and Martin's recent statement that "the difference between realism and liberal institutionalism does not lie in whether institutions are independent or dependent variables" (Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 48). In fact, this is precisely where the difference lies. In a recent article, Schweller and Priess reformulate the realist position in the institutions debate by drawing on the insights of classical realism. See Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mersbon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 1-32. Their reformulated realist position, however, is contradictory. On the one hand, they seem to recognize that institutions are dependent or, at most, intervening variables (and their proposed model discusses, in true realist fashion, the kinds of institutions that are created under different international structures). On the other hand, they also accord independent effects to institutions - a formulation that renders their version of realism virtually indistinguishable from institutionalism, and thus blurs, rather than advances, a major theoretical debate.
93. For a classical statement of this distinction see Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," and "Regimes and the Limits of Realism." In view of the centrality of this point in the realist-institutionalist debate, it is perplexing to read Keohane's and Martin's recent statement that "the difference between realism and liberal institutionalism does not lie in whether institutions are independent or dependent variables" (Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 48). In fact, this is precisely where the difference lies. In a recent article, Schweller and Priess reformulate the realist position in the institutions debate by drawing on the insights of classical realism. See Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mersbon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 1-32. Their reformulated realist position, however, is contradictory. On the one hand, they seem to recognize that institutions are dependent or, at most, intervening variables (and their proposed model discusses, in true realist fashion, the kinds of institutions that are created under different international structures). On the other hand, they also accord independent effects to institutions - a formulation that renders their version of realism virtually indistinguishable from institutionalism, and thus blurs, rather than advances, a major theoretical debate.
94. For a classical statement of this distinction see Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," and "Regimes and the Limits of Realism." In view of the centrality of this point in the realist-institutionalist debate, it is perplexing to read Keohane's and Martin's recent statement that "the difference between realism and liberal institutionalism does not lie in whether institutions are independent or dependent variables" (Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 48). In fact, this is precisely where the difference lies. In a recent article, Schweller and Priess reformulate the realist position in the institutions debate by drawing on the insights of classical realism. See Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mersbon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 1-32. Their reformulated realist position, however, is contradictory. On the one hand, they seem to recognize that institutions are dependent or, at most, intervening variables (and their proposed model discusses, in true realist fashion, the kinds of institutions that are created under different international structures). On the other hand, they also accord independent effects to institutions - a formulation that renders their version of realism virtually indistinguishable from institutionalism, and thus blurs, rather than advances, a major theoretical debate.
95. See Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 158-79. Keohane uses the term "reflective" for what is called here the constructivist approach. Others term it "cognitivist" (Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes"; and Hasenclever et al., "Interests, Power, Knowledge"). The most widely accepted term for this perspective to date, however, is "constructivist."
96. See Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 158-79. Keohane uses the term "reflective" for what is called here the constructivist approach. Others term it "cognitivist" (Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes"; and Hasenclever et al., "Interests, Power, Knowledge"). The most widely accepted term for this perspective to date, however, is "constructivist."
97. See Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 158-79. Keohane uses the term "reflective" for what is called here the constructivist approach. Others term it "cognitivist" (Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes"; and Hasenclever et al., "Interests, Power, Knowledge"). The most widely accepted term for this perspective to date, however, is "constructivist."
98. On the functional theory of regimes, and the functions of providing information and reducing transaction costs, see Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 5-6; Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 101-31; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 506-9. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," emphasizes tactical issue-linkages. Keohane now terms the functional theory of regimes "contractual" (see Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Program," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], 35-38). Realists readily accept that institutions serve the purposes of providing information, reducing transaction costs, and facilitating tactical issue-linkages. Indeed, this is what states construct them for. In contrast to liberal institutionalists, however, realists do not regard these functions as sufficiently important to outlive the basic situational factors that brought the institutions into being, and to acquire an independent impact on state behavior. In other words, realists do not dispute the usefulness of institutions, but only their independent effects.
99. On the functional theory of regimes, and the functions of providing information and reducing transaction costs, see Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 5-6; Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 101-31; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 506-9. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," emphasizes tactical issue-linkages. Keohane now terms the functional theory of regimes "contractual" (see Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Program," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], 35-38). Realists readily accept that institutions serve the purposes of providing information, reducing transaction costs, and facilitating tactical issue-linkages. Indeed, this is what states construct them for. In contrast to liberal institutionalists, however, realists do not regard these functions as sufficiently important to outlive the basic situational factors that brought the institutions into being, and to acquire an independent impact on state behavior. In other words, realists do not dispute the usefulness of institutions, but only their independent effects.
100. On the functional theory of regimes, and the functions of providing information and reducing transaction costs, see Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 5-6; Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 101-31; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 506-9. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," emphasizes tactical issue-linkages. Keohane now terms the functional theory of regimes "contractual" (see Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Program," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], 35-38). Realists readily accept that institutions serve the purposes of providing information, reducing transaction costs, and facilitating tactical issue-linkages. Indeed, this is what states construct them for. In contrast to liberal institutionalists, however, realists do not regard these functions as sufficiently important to outlive the basic situational factors that brought the institutions into being, and to acquire an independent impact on state behavior. In other words, realists do not dispute the usefulness of institutions, but only their independent effects.
101. On the functional theory of regimes, and the functions of providing information and reducing transaction costs, see Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 5-6; Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 101-31; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 506-9. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," emphasizes tactical issue-linkages. Keohane now terms the functional theory of regimes "contractual" (see Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Program," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], 35-38). Realists readily accept that institutions serve the purposes of providing information, reducing transaction costs, and facilitating tactical issue-linkages. Indeed, this is what states construct them for. In contrast to liberal institutionalists, however, realists do not regard these functions as sufficiently important to outlive the basic situational factors that brought the institutions into being, and to acquire an independent impact on state behavior. In other words, realists do not dispute the usefulness of institutions, but only their independent effects.
102. On the functional theory of regimes, and the functions of providing information and reducing transaction costs, see Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 5-6; Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 101-31; and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 506-9. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," emphasizes tactical issue-linkages. Keohane now terms the functional theory of regimes "contractual" (see Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Program," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], 35-38). Realists readily accept that institutions serve the purposes of providing information, reducing transaction costs, and facilitating tactical issue-linkages. Indeed, this is what states construct them for. In contrast to liberal institutionalists, however, realists do not regard these functions as sufficiently important to outlive the basic situational factors that brought the institutions into being, and to acquire an independent impact on state behavior. In other words, realists do not dispute the usefulness of institutions, but only their independent effects.
103. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
104. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
105. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
106. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
107. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as
108. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
109. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
110. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
111. Constructivist studies include Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995); Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 451-78; Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275-318; Peter J. KatzenStein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a recent review of constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63. The discussion of constructivism in this article may be criticized on the grounds that this approach is not necessarily associated with "positive" international outcomes such as cooperation. Indeed, as constructivism does not specify in what direction states' interests and identities are likely to change in the process of interaction, this approach is indeterminate, and can accommodate any sort of international outcome, from genocide to the formation of security communities. On this major problem of the constructivist approach, see Finnemore, National Interests, 130-31. In this article I advance a possible constructivist argument with regard to the beneficial influence of institutions on cooperation.
112. On the importance of knowledge, see Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power. Three Modes of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). The difference between the liberal-institutionalist and the constructivist conceptions of knowledge is expressed in the constructivist emphasis on "substantive issue-linkages," in contrast to the liberal-institutionalist focus on tactical issue-linkages.
113. See ibid., 77-78, and
114. Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate: Issue-Linkages and International Regimes," World Politics 32, no. 3 (April 1980): 357-402.
115. On simple learning (adaptation) versus complex learning see Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 3; and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization 41, no. 3 (summer 1987), 380. On learning see also Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312.
116. On simple learning (adaptation) versus complex learning see Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 3; and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization 41, no. 3 (summer 1987), 380. On learning see also Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312.
117. On simple learning (adaptation) versus complex learning see Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 3; and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization 41, no. 3 (summer 1987), 380. On learning see also Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312.
118. See Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations As Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," International Organization 47, no. 4 (autumn 1993): 565-97. On cognitive evolution see Emanuel Adler, "Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress," in Progress in Postwar International Relations, ed. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (New York Columbia University Press, 1991), 43-88.
119. See Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations As Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," International Organization 47, no. 4 (autumn 1993): 565-97. On cognitive evolution see Emanuel Adler, "Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress," in Progress in Postwar International Relations, ed. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (New York Columbia University Press, 1991), 43-88.
120. In the following section, I will not test these two variants against each other, but rather both against realism.
121. See Thomas J. Biersteker, "Constructing Historical Counterfactuals to Assess the Consequences of International Regimes: The Global Debt Regime and the Course of the Debt Crisis of the 1980s," in Rittberger, Regime Theory, 317. On counterfactuals in general, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politia 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 169-95; and Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logcal, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
122. See Thomas J. Biersteker, "Constructing Historical Counterfactuals to Assess the Consequences of International Regimes: The Global Debt Regime and the Course of the Debt Crisis of the 1980s," in Rittberger, Regime Theory, 317. On counterfactuals in general, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politia 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 169-95; and Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logcal, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
123. See Thomas J. Biersteker, "Constructing Historical Counterfactuals to Assess the Consequences of International Regimes: The Global Debt Regime and the Course of the Debt Crisis of the 1980s," in Rittberger, Regime Theory, 317. On counterfactuals in general, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politia 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 169-95; and Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logcal, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
124. Keohane, "Analysis of International Regimes," 33.
125. Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables," in Rosenau and Czempiel, Governance Without Government, 161, 164-66. See also Young, International Cooperation, 208-9.
126. Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables," in Rosenau and Czempiel, Governance Without Government, 161, 164-66. See also Young, International Cooperation, 208-9.
127. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 357-58, 371. See also Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," 187; Nye, "Nuclear Learning," 399, 401.
128. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 357-58, 371. See also Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," 187; Nye, "Nuclear Learning," 399, 401.
129. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 357-58, 371. See also Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," 187; Nye, "Nuclear Learning," 399, 401.
130. Mearsheimer ("False Promise," 24) put it well: "Although there is much evidence of cooperation among states, this alone does not constitute support for liberal institutionalism. What is needed is evidence of cooperation that would not have occurred in the absence of institutions." This accords with the general methodological requirement of ruling out alternative explanations for the phenomenon under study. For a similar test of the autonomous influence of ideas on state behavior, namely, that the behavior in question present anomalies for an interest-based realist explanation, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Ideal and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, ed. Judith S. Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3-30. A standard constructivist objection to the juxtaposition of interests and norms (or ideas) is that interests are not objective entities determined by material conditions, but rather are intersubjective ideational understandings, similar to norms and shaped by them. Yet, accepting that interests are ideational constructs serves only to rephrase the question rather than provide an answer. In other words, the important question is not whether states are guided in their behavior by ideational constructs, but which constructs (more selfish or more cooperative ones) prevail. Realism claims that the pressure of the anarchical international system serves to favor a narrowly selfish conception of state interests over other possible conceptions.
131. On the difficulties of cooperation in security versus economic or environmental issues, see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 60-84; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 232-33, 235-36; Jervis, "Security Regimes," 358-60; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 15-16, 18-19. Two leading examples of the institutionalist tendency to focus on economic and environmental issues are respectively Keohane, After Hegemony, and Young, International Cooperation.
132. On the difficulties of cooperation in security versus economic or environmental issues, see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 60-84; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 232-33, 235-36; Jervis, "Security Regimes," 358-60; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 15-16, 18-19. Two leading examples of the institutionalist tendency to focus on economic and environmental issues are respectively Keohane, After Hegemony, and Young, International Cooperation.
133. On the difficulties of cooperation in security versus economic or environmental issues, see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 60-84; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 232-33, 235-36; Jervis, "Security Regimes," 358-60; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 15-16, 18-19. Two leading examples of the institutionalist tendency to focus on economic and environmental issues are respectively Keohane, After Hegemony, and Young, International Cooperation.
134. On the difficulties of cooperation in security versus economic or environmental issues, see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 60-84; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 232-33, 235-36; Jervis, "Security Regimes," 358-60; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 15-16, 18-19. Two leading examples of the institutionalist tendency to focus on economic and environmental issues are respectively Keohane, After Hegemony, and Young, International Cooperation.
135. On the difficulties of cooperation in security versus economic or environmental issues, see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 60-84; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 232-33, 235-36; Jervis, "Security Regimes," 358-60; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 15-16, 18-19. Two leading examples of the institutionalist tendency to focus on economic and environmental issues are respectively Keohane, After Hegemony, and Young, International Cooperation.
136. On the difficulties of cooperation in security versus economic or environmental issues, see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 60-84; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 232-33, 235-36; Jervis, "Security Regimes," 358-60; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 15-16, 18-19. Two leading examples of the institutionalist tendency to focus on economic and environmental issues are respectively Keohane, After Hegemony, and Young, International Cooperation.
137. Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 44. See also Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 14-15. Indeed, numerous studies have applied institutional theory to security issues. See, among others, Jervis, "Security Regimes" and "From Balance to Concert"; Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; and the studies cited in n. 13 above.
138. Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 44. See also Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 14-15. Indeed, numerous studies have applied institutional theory to security issues. See, among others, Jervis, "Security Regimes" and "From Balance to Concert"; Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; and the studies cited in n. 13 above.
139. Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 44. See also Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 14-15. Indeed, numerous studies have applied institutional theory to security issues. See, among others, Jervis, "Security Regimes" and "From Balance to Concert"; Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; and the studies cited in n. 13 above.
140. Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 44. See also Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 14-15. Indeed, numerous studies have applied institutional theory to security issues. See, among others, Jervis, "Security Regimes" and "From Balance to Concert"; Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; and the studies cited in n. 13 above.
141. Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 44. See also Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 14-15. Indeed, numerous studies have applied institutional theory to security issues. See, among others, Jervis, "Security Regimes" and "From Balance to Concert"; Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; and the studies cited in n. 13 above.
142. Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 59.
143. On this point see Holsti, "Governance Without Government"; and Daugherty, "System Management."
144. On this point see Holsti, "Governance Without Government"; and Daugherty, "System Management."
145. Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 33.
146. Keohane, After Hegemony, 7; Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts."
147. Keohane, After Hegemony, 7; Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts."
148. Schroeder, "Vienna Settlement," 699; "Changes in the Structure," 4.
149. Schroeder, "Vienna Settlement," 699; "Changes in the Structure," 4.
150. For a comparison of the Concert and the cold war eras in terms of great power security cooperation, see Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
151. For such an explanation of the emergence of a concert (as opposed to its endurance once in place), see Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 60; see also Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 35-36.
152. For such an explanation of the emergence of a concert (as opposed to its endurance once in place), see Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 60; see also Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 35-36.
153. See Roy Bridge, "Allied Diplomacy in Peacetime: the Failure of the Congress 'System', 1815-23," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 34-53.
154. On this point see especially Daugherty, "System Management."
155. See, for example, Lauren, "Crisis Prevention"; and Holsti, "Governance Without Government."
156. See, for example, Lauren, "Crisis Prevention"; and Holsti, "Governance Without Government."
157. The fear of revolution explanation is highlighted, for example, by Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts." See also Alan Sked, "Metternich's Enemies or the Threat from Below," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 164-89. It may be argued that an explanation which relies on a domestic-level factor such as a fear of internal revolution may not be classed as realist Yet, the recent tendency in the realist school has been away from an exclu-sive focus on systemic explanatory factors, characteristic of Waltzian neorealism, and toward an incorporation of domestic variables into realist theory. Thus, Walt (Origins of Alliances) includes state intentions in balance-of-threat theory, and Schweller ("Bandwagoning for Profit") incorporates state motivations (status quo or revisionist). Another realist work that is based on a synthesis of systemic and domestic variables is Miller, When Opponents Cooperate. For a comprehensive review of this recent realist tendency, which dubs it "neoclassical realism" and cites, in addition to those already mentioned, such realist scholars as Friedberg, Christensen, Wohlforth, and Zakaria, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.). For a discussion of why realism is compatible with domestic variables, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1(March 1997): 1-15.
158. The fear of revolution explanation is highlighted, for example, by Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts." See also Alan Sked, "Metternich's Enemies or the Threat from Below," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 164-89. It may be argued that an explanation which relies on a domestic-level factor such as a fear of internal revolution may not be classed as realist Yet, the recent tendency in the realist school has been away from an exclu-sive focus on systemic explanatory factors, characteristic of Waltzian neorealism, and toward an incorporation of domestic variables into realist theory. Thus, Walt (Origins of Alliances) includes state intentions in balance-of-threat theory, and Schweller ("Bandwagoning for Profit") incorporates state motivations (status quo or revisionist). Another realist work that is based on a synthesis of systemic and domestic variables is Miller, When Opponents Cooperate. For a comprehensive review of this recent realist tendency, which dubs it "neoclassical realism" and cites, in addition to those already mentioned, such realist scholars as Friedberg, Christensen, Wohlforth, and Zakaria, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.). For a discussion of why realism is compatible with domestic variables, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1(March 1997): 1-15.
159. The fear of revolution explanation is highlighted, for example, by Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts." See also Alan Sked, "Metternich's Enemies or the Threat from Below," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 164-89. It may be argued that an explanation which relies on a domestic-level factor such as a fear of internal revolution may not be classed as realist Yet, the recent tendency in the realist school has been away from an exclu-sive focus on systemic explanatory factors, characteristic of Waltzian neorealism, and toward an incorporation of domestic variables into realist theory. Thus, Walt (Origins of Alliances) includes state intentions in balance-of-threat theory, and Schweller ("Bandwagoning for Profit") incorporates state motivations (status quo or revisionist). Another realist work that is based on a synthesis of systemic and domestic variables is Miller, When Opponents Cooperate. For a comprehensive review of this recent realist tendency, which dubs it "neoclassical realism" and cites, in addition to those already mentioned, such realist scholars as Friedberg, Christensen, Wohlforth, and Zakaria, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.). For a discussion of why realism is compatible with domestic variables, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1(March 1997): 1-15.
160. The fear of revolution explanation is highlighted, for example, by Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts." See also Alan Sked, "Metternich's Enemies or the Threat from Below," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 164-89. It may be argued that an explanation which relies on a domestic-level factor such as a fear of internal revolution may not be classed as realist Yet, the recent tendency in the realist school has been away from an exclu-sive focus on systemic explanatory factors, characteristic of Waltzian neorealism, and toward an incorporation of domestic variables into realist theory. Thus, Walt (Origins of Alliances) includes state intentions in balance-of-threat theory, and Schweller ("Bandwagoning for Profit") incorporates state motivations (status quo or revisionist). Another realist work that is based on a synthesis of systemic and domestic variables is Miller, When Opponents Cooperate. For a comprehensive review of this recent realist tendency, which dubs it "neoclassical realism" and cites, in addition to those already mentioned, such realist scholars as Friedberg, Christensen, Wohlforth, and Zakaria, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.). For a discussion of why realism is compatible with domestic variables, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1(March 1997): 1-15.
161. The fear of revolution explanation is highlighted, for example, by Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts." See also Alan Sked, "Metternich's Enemies or the Threat from Below," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 164-89. It may be argued that an explanation which relies on a domestic-level factor such as a fear of internal revolution may not be classed as realist Yet, the recent tendency in the realist school has been away from an exclu-sive focus on systemic explanatory factors, characteristic of Waltzian neorealism, and toward an incorporation of domestic variables into realist theory. Thus, Walt (Origins of Alliances) includes state intentions in balance-of-threat theory, and Schweller ("Bandwagoning for Profit") incorporates state motivations (status quo or revisionist). Another realist work that is based on a synthesis of systemic and domestic variables is Miller, When Opponents Cooperate. For a comprehensive review of this recent realist tendency, which dubs it "neoclassical realism" and cites, in addition to those already mentioned, such realist scholars as Friedberg, Christensen, Wohlforth, and Zakaria, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.). For a discussion of why realism is compatible with domestic variables, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1(March 1997): 1-15.
162. The fear of revolution explanation is highlighted, for example, by Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts." See also Alan Sked, "Metternich's Enemies or the Threat from Below," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 164-89. It may be argued that an explanation which relies on a domestic-level factor such as a fear of internal revolution may not be classed as realist Yet, the recent tendency in the realist school has been away from an exclu-sive focus on systemic explanatory factors, characteristic of Waltzian neorealism, and toward an incorporation of domestic variables into realist theory. Thus, Walt (Origins of Alliances) includes state intentions in balance-of-threat theory, and Schweller ("Bandwagoning for Profit") incorporates state motivations (status quo or revisionist). Another realist work that is based on a synthesis of systemic and domestic variables is Miller, When Opponents Cooperate. For a comprehensive review of this recent realist tendency, which dubs it "neoclassical realism" and cites, in addition to those already mentioned, such realist scholars as Friedberg, Christensen, Wohlforth, and Zakaria, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.). For a discussion of why realism is compatible with domestic variables, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1(March 1997): 1-15.
163. The fear of revolution explanation is highlighted, for example, by Miller, "Emergence of Great Power Concerts." See also Alan Sked, "Metternich's Enemies or the Threat from Below," in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, 164-89. It may be argued that an explanation which relies on a domestic-level factor such as a fear of internal revolution may not be classed as realist Yet, the recent tendency in the realist school has been away from an exclu-sive focus on systemic explanatory factors, characteristic of Waltzian neorealism, and toward an incorporation of domestic variables into realist theory. Thus, Walt (Origins of Alliances) includes state intentions in balance-of-threat theory, and Schweller ("Bandwagoning for Profit") incorporates state motivations (status quo or revisionist). Another realist work that is based on a synthesis of systemic and domestic variables is Miller, When Opponents Cooperate. For a comprehensive review of this recent realist tendency, which dubs it "neoclassical realism" and cites, in addition to those already mentioned, such realist scholars as Friedberg, Christensen, Wohlforth, and Zakaria, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.). For a discussion of why realism is compatible with domestic variables, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1(March 1997): 1-15.
164. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 362; "From Balance to Concert," 59.
165. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 362; "From Balance to Concert," 59.
166. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 365-67.
167. Jervis, "From Balance to Concert."
168. Jack Levy regards Schroeder as a liberal institutionalist (see Jack S. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," International History Review 16, no. 4 [November 1994]). Yet Schroeder's emphasis on cognitive evolution, complex learning, and the impact of ideas on conceptions of identities and interests is in accord with the constructivist school. Jervis similarly argues that Schroeder's account of the effects of the Concert on the great powers involves more profound changes than those of cost-benefit calculations, and cannot be encompassed by any perspective that regards interests as conslant. See Robert Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992), 722-24. For Schroeder's explicitly constructivist definition of an international system as constituted of collective rules, understandings and shared practices that both restrain and empower actors, see Transformation of European Politics, XII-XIII. For another discussion of the Concert in a constructivist vein, see Daugherty, "System Management," who calls his approach "sociological."
169. Jack Levy regards Schroeder as a liberal institutionalist (see Jack S. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," International History Review 16, no. 4 [November 1994]). Yet Schroeder's emphasis on cognitive evolution, complex learning, and the impact of ideas on conceptions of identities and interests is in accord with the constructivist school. Jervis similarly argues that Schroeder's account of the effects of the Concert on the great powers involves more profound changes than those of cost-benefit calculations, and cannot be encompassed by any perspective that regards interests as conslant. See Robert Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992), 722-24. For Schroeder's explicitly constructivist definition of an international system as constituted of collective rules, understandings and shared practices that both restrain and empower actors, see Transformation of European Politics, XII-XIII. For another discussion of the Concert in a constructivist vein, see Daugherty, "System Management," who calls his approach "sociological."
170. Jack Levy regards Schroeder as a liberal institutionalist (see Jack S. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," International History Review 16, no. 4 [November 1994]). Yet Schroeder's emphasis on cognitive evolution, complex learning, and the impact of ideas on conceptions of identities and interests is in accord with the constructivist school. Jervis similarly argues that Schroeder's account of the effects of the Concert on the great powers involves more profound changes than those of cost-benefit calculations, and cannot be encompassed by any perspective that regards interests as conslant. See Robert Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992), 722-24. For Schroeder's explicitly constructivist definition of an international system as constituted of collective rules, understandings and shared practices that both restrain and empower actors, see Transformation of European Politics, XII-XIII. For another discussion of the Concert in a constructivist vein, see Daugherty, "System Management," who calls his approach "sociological."
171. Jack Levy regards Schroeder as a liberal institutionalist (see Jack S. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," International History Review 16, no. 4 [November 1994]). Yet Schroeder's emphasis on cognitive evolution, complex learning, and the impact of ideas on conceptions of identities and interests is in accord with the constructivist school. Jervis similarly argues that Schroeder's account of the effects of the Concert on the great powers involves more profound changes than those of cost-benefit calculations, and cannot be encompassed by any perspective that regards interests as conslant. See Robert Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992), 722-24. For Schroeder's explicitly constructivist definition of an international system as constituted of collective rules, understandings and shared practices that both restrain and empower actors, see Transformation of European Politics, XII-XIII. For another discussion of the Concert in a constructivist vein, see Daugherty, "System Management," who calls his approach "sociological."
172. Schroeder, "Transformation of Political Thinking," 47.
173. Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert, 404.
174. See also Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 35-36, 41-42, 43-44.
175. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, VIII-IX; "Vienna Settlement," 705.
176. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, VIII-IX; "Vienna Settlement," 705.
177. Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 163, 168.
178. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 362; "From Balance to Concert," 59; "Political Science Perspective." See also Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 160.
179. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 362; "From Balance to Concert," 59; "Political Science Perspective." See also Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 160.
180. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 362; "From Balance to Concert," 59; "Political Science Perspective." See also Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 160.
181. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 362; "From Balance to Concert," 59; "Political Science Perspective." See also Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 160.
182. Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 43.
183. Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style," 7, 9; "Vienna Settlement," 699; Destrurtion of the European Concert, XII, 410.
184. Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style," 7, 9; "Vienna Settlement," 699; Destrurtion of the European Concert, XII, 410.
185. Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style," 7, 9; "Vienna Settlement," 699; Destrurtion of the European Concert, XII, 410.
186. Schroeder, Distruction of tin European Concert, 405, 409.
187. Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?"
188. Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 162, 164; see also Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 35-37.
189. Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 162, 164; see also Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 35-37.
190. Ruggie, "Multilateralism," 578-80.
191. Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" 145; "Alliances," esp. 231; Transformation of European Politics, 727. Thus, rather than regarding balancing against a threatening power as a norm of the Concert, as do some other scholars (for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power), Schroeder considers it to be incompatible with Concert norms. A pact of restraint should be distinguished from bandwagoning, which also involves aligning with a threatening power, but from different motives-fear or profit, rather than a wish to restrain it. While in bandwagoning (especially in the offensive mode) the alignment is likely to be directed against other states, a pact of restraint should be open to all other interested powers. On bandwagoning see Walt, Origins of Alliances, and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
192. Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" 145; "Alliances," esp. 231; Transformation of European Politics, 727. Thus, rather than regarding balancing against a threatening power as a norm of the Concert, as do some other scholars (for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power), Schroeder considers it to be incompatible with Concert norms. A pact of restraint should be distinguished from bandwagoning, which also involves aligning with a threatening power, but from different motives-fear or profit, rather than a wish to restrain it. While in bandwagoning (especially in the offensive mode) the alignment is likely to be directed against other states, a pact of restraint should be open to all other interested powers. On bandwagoning see Walt, Origins of Alliances, and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
193. Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" 145; "Alliances," esp. 231; Transformation of European Politics, 727. Thus, rather than regarding balancing against a threatening power as a norm of the Concert, as do some other scholars (for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power), Schroeder considers it to be incompatible with Concert norms. A pact of restraint should be distinguished from bandwagoning, which also involves aligning with a threatening power, but from different motives-fear or profit, rather than a wish to restrain it. While in bandwagoning (especially in the offensive mode) the alignment is likely to be directed against other states, a pact of restraint should be open to all other interested powers. On bandwagoning see Walt, Origins of Alliances, and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
194. Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" 145; "Alliances," esp. 231; Transformation of European Politics, 727. Thus, rather than regarding balancing against a threatening power as a norm of the Concert, as do some other scholars (for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power), Schroeder considers it to be incompatible with Concert norms. A pact of restraint should be distinguished from bandwagoning, which also involves aligning with a threatening power, but from different motives-fear or profit, rather than a wish to restrain it. While in bandwagoning (especially in the offensive mode) the alignment is likely to be directed against other states, a pact of restraint should be open to all other interested powers. On bandwagoning see Walt, Origins of Alliances, and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
195. Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" 145; "Alliances," esp. 231; Transformation of European Politics, 727. Thus, rather than regarding balancing against a threatening power as a norm of the Concert, as do some other scholars (for example, Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power), Schroeder considers it to be incompatible with Concert norms. A pact of restraint should be distinguished from bandwagoning, which also involves aligning with a threatening power, but from different motives-fear or profit, rather than a wish to restrain it. While in bandwagoning (especially in the offensive mode) the alignment is likely to be directed against other states, a pact of restraint should be open to all other interested powers. On bandwagoning see Walt, Origins of Alliances, and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
196. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 363.
197. Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert, 406; Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 160, 163; Holsri, "Governance Without Government," 47, 50.
198. Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert, 406; Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 160, 163; Holsri, "Governance Without Government," 47, 50.
199. Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert, 406; Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 160, 163; Holsri, "Governance Without Government," 47, 50.
200. Elrod, "Concert of Europe," 170, 173.
201. Keohane, After Hegemony, 14, 102; "Demand for International Regimes," 120; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," 20.
202. Keohane, After Hegemony, 14, 102; "Demand for International Regimes," 120; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," 20.
203. Keohane, After Hegemony, 14, 102; "Demand for International Regimes," 120; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," 20.
204. For a somewhat similar question, see T. C. W. Blanning, "Paul W. Schroeder's Conceit of Europe," International History Review 16, no. 4 (November 1994), 711-13.
205. See, for example, Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 61-62; Daugherty, "System Management," 94-95.
206. See, for example, Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 61-62; Daugherty, "System Management," 94-95.
207. For summaries of the interests of the great powers in the Eastern Question, see Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 225-29; Marriott, Eastern Question, 1-20; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 40-43; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 9-36, 70-73; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 53-61; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 24-41.
208. For summaries of the interests of the great powers in the Eastern Question, see Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 225-29; Marriott, Eastern Question, 1-20; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 40-43; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 9-36, 70-73; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 53-61; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 24-41.
209. For summaries of the interests of the great powers in the Eastern Question, see Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 225-29; Marriott, Eastern Question, 1-20; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 40-43; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 9-36, 70-73; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 53-61; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 24-41.
210. For summaries of the interests of the great powers in the Eastern Question, see Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 225-29; Marriott, Eastern Question, 1-20; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 40-43; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 9-36, 70-73; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 53-61; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 24-41.
211. For summaries of the interests of the great powers in the Eastern Question, see Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 225-29; Marriott, Eastern Question, 1-20; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 40-43; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 9-36, 70-73; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 53-61; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 24-41.
212. For summaries of the interests of the great powers in the Eastern Question, see Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 225-29; Marriott, Eastern Question, 1-20; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 40-43; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 9-36, 70-73; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 53-61; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 24-41.
213. See Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 79.
214. On the difference in Russia's policy toward Turkey in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, see Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style," 4-6, and "Vienna Settlement," 701, who explains it as the result of a Russian commitment to Concert norms in the nineteenth century. The limitations to this explanation are discussed below.
215. On the difference in Russia's policy toward Turkey in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, see Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style," 4-6, and "Vienna Settlement," 701, who explains it as the result of a Russian commitment to Concert norms in the nineteenth century. The limitations to this explanation are discussed below.
216. See Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 3-4, 39-41. The ethnic connection with the Balkan Slavs became important in the second half of the nineteenth century, parallel to the growth of the pan-Slav movement in Russia. See Michael B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).
217. See Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 3-4, 39-41. The ethnic connection with the Balkan Slavs became important in the second half of the nineteenth century, parallel to the growth of the pan-Slav movement in Russia. See Michael B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).
218. On the British preoccupation with the safety of its short routes to India, see Halford Lancaster Hoskins, British Routes to India (New York Longmans, Green, 1928). See also Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-95; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-79; and C. W. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-40," Cambridge Historical Journal 3, no. 1 (1929), 69-71.
219. On the British preoccupation with the safety of its short routes to India, see Halford Lancaster Hoskins, British Routes to India (New York Longmans, Green, 1928). See also Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-95; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-79; and C. W. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-40," Cambridge Historical Journal 3, no. 1 (1929), 69-71.
220. On the British preoccupation with the safety of its short routes to India, see Halford Lancaster Hoskins, British Routes to India (New York Longmans, Green, 1928). See also Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-95; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-79; and C. W. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-40," Cambridge Historical Journal 3, no. 1 (1929), 69-71.
221. On the British preoccupation with the safety of its short routes to India, see Halford Lancaster Hoskins, British Routes to India (New York Longmans, Green, 1928). See also Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-95; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-79; and C. W. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-40," Cambridge Historical Journal 3, no. 1 (1929), 69-71.
222. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 28; Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 55-56.
223. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 28; Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 55-56.
224. See J. C. Hurewitz, "Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem," World Politics 14, no. 4 (July 1962): 605-32; and Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 11-12, 27, 34-35.
225. See J. C. Hurewitz, "Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem," World Politics 14, no. 4 (July 1962): 605-32; and Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 11-12, 27, 34-35.
226. Jelavich, Century ef Russian Foreign Policy, 57; see also 92.
227. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 89. On this point see also Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 55-57, 60; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 28-29, 37; and G. H. Bolsover, "Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey," Slavonic Review 27 (1948-49), 115, 145.
228. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 89. On this point see also Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 55-57, 60; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 28-29, 37; and G. H. Bolsover, "Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey," Slavonic Review 27 (1948-49), 115, 145.
229. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 89. On this point see also Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 55-57, 60; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 28-29, 37; and G. H. Bolsover, "Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey," Slavonic Review 27 (1948-49), 115, 145.
230. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 89. On this point see also Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 55-57, 60; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 28-29, 37; and G. H. Bolsover, "Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey," Slavonic Review 27 (1948-49), 115, 145.
231. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 178.
232. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 10.
233. See Keohane, After Hegemony, 51-55, 67, 247; Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 166; and Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 88-89. According to the constructivist perspective, since institutions can reshape state interests, they should be able to transform even a zero-sum situation into one more conducive to cooperation.
234. See Keohane, After Hegemony, 51-55, 67, 247; Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 166; and Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 88-89. According to the constructivist perspective, since institutions can reshape state interests, they should be able to transform even a zero-sum situation into one more conducive to cooperation.
235. See Keohane, After Hegemony, 51-55, 67, 247; Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 166; and Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 88-89. According to the constructivist perspective, since institutions can reshape state interests, they should be able to transform even a zero-sum situation into one more conducive to cooperation.
236. Daugherty, "System Management," 89.
237. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 288.
238. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 58-59, 62; Anderson,
239. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 58-59, 62; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 80; Anderson, Easlern Question, 61; Patricia Kennedy Grimstead, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitude and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 262-63.
240. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 58-59, 62; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 80; Anderson, Easlern Question, 61; Patricia Kennedy Grimstead, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitude and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 262-63.
241. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 58-59, 62; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 80; Anderson, Easlern Question, 61; Patricia Kennedy Grimstead, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitude and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 262-63.
242. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 621; see also Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 43-44.
243. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 621; see also Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 43-44.
244. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 82. See also Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 42, 44, 60-61.
245. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 82. See also Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 42, 44, 60-61.
246. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 83; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 62. For additional statements by Tsar Alexander in the same vein, see Anderson, Eastem Question, 61; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 81; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 53-54, 68.
247. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 83; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 62. For additional statements by Tsar Alexander in the same vein, see Anderson, Eastem Question, 61; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 81; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 53-54, 68.
248. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 83; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 62. For additional statements by Tsar Alexander in the same vein, see Anderson, Eastem Question, 61; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 81; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 53-54, 68.
249. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 83; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 62. For additional statements by Tsar Alexander in the same vein, see Anderson, Eastem Question, 61; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 81; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 53-54, 68.
250. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 83; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 62. For additional statements by Tsar Alexander in the same vein, see Anderson, Eastem Question, 61; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 81; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 53-54, 68.
251. See Grimstead, Foreign Ministers of Alexander, 252-53, 260, 264.
252. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 61; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 142-43; Daugherty, "System Management," 85-86.
253. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 61; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 142-43; Daugherty, "System Management," 85-86.
254. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 61; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 142-43; Daugherty, "System Management," 85-86.
255. Jelavich, Century cf Russian Foreign Policy, 68.
256. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 637, 641; "A Mild Rejoinder," American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992), 734.
257. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 637, 641; "A Mild Rejoinder," American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992), 734.
258. Loyal Cowles, "The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the Greek Question, 1825-1827," International History Review 12, no. 4 (November 1990), 699; see also 691, 693-94, 697; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 638-39, 640-41; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 154-55.
259. Loyal Cowles, "The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the Greek Question, 1825-1827," International History Review 12, no. 4 (November 1990), 699; see also 691, 693-94, 697; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 638-39, 640-41; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 154-55.
260. Loyal Cowles, "The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the Greek Question, 1825-1827," International History Review 12, no. 4 (November 1990), 699; see also 691, 693-94, 697; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 638-39, 640-41; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 154-55.
261. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 700; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 100-101; Anderson, Eastern Question, 62; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 61, 66-67, 69. On the predominant Russian influence in the Danubian principalities, see ibid., 2-8, 41.
262. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 700; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 100-101; Anderson, Eastern Question, 62; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 61, 66-67, 69. On the predominant Russian influence in the Danubian principalities, see ibid., 2-8, 41.
263. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 700; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 100-101; Anderson, Eastern Question, 62; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 61, 66-67, 69. On the predominant Russian influence in the Danubian principalities, see ibid., 2-8, 41.
264. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 700; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 100-101; Anderson, Eastern Question, 62; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 61, 66-67, 69. On the predominant Russian influence in the Danubian principalities, see ibid., 2-8, 41.
265. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 700; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 100-101; Anderson, Eastern Question, 62; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 61, 66-67, 69. On the predominant Russian influence in the Danubian principalities, see ibid., 2-8, 41.
266. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 692-93.
267. Anderson, Eastern Question, 63; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 49.
268. Anderson, Eastern Question, 63; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 49.
269. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 703; Steven Schwarteberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1: British Policy Toward the 'Greek Question', 1821-32," Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 2 (April 1988), 156-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 108; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 177-78. See also the 1825 report of the British ambassador to Russia in Grimstead, Foreign Ministers of Alexander, 284-85.
270. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 703; Steven Schwarteberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1: British Policy Toward the 'Greek Question', 1821-32," Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 2 (April 1988), 156-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 108; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 177-78. See also the 1825 report of the British ambassador to Russia in Grimstead, Foreign Ministers of Alexander, 284-85.
271. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 703; Steven Schwarteberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1: British Policy Toward the 'Greek Question', 1821-32," Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 2 (April 1988), 156-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 108; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 177-78. See also the 1825 report of the British ambassador to Russia in Grimstead, Foreign Ministers of Alexander, 284-85.
272. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 703; Steven Schwarteberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1: British Policy Toward the 'Greek Question', 1821-32," Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 2 (April 1988), 156-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 108; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 177-78. See also the 1825 report of the British ambassador to Russia in Grimstead, Foreign Ministers of Alexander, 284-85.
273. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 703; Steven Schwarteberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1: British Policy Toward the 'Greek Question', 1821-32," Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 2 (April 1988), 156-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 108; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 177-78. See also the 1825 report of the British ambassador to Russia in Grimstead, Foreign Ministers of Alexander, 284-85.
274. Anderson, Eastern Question, 63.
275. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 109-10, 118; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 43, 49, 53; Schroeder, "Alliances," 233.
276. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 109-10, 118; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 43, 49, 53; Schroeder, "Alliances," 233.
277. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 109-10, 118; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 43, 49, 53; Schroeder, "Alliances," 233.
278. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," and Steven Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 3 (July 1988): 287-311.
279. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," and Steven Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 3 (July 1988): 287-311.
280. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia"; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643.
281. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia"; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643.
282. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 112-13, 114-15; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643-44; Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 711.
283. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 112-13, 114-15; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643-44; Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 711.
284. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 112-13, 114-15; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643-44; Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 711.
285. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 640; see also 661.
286. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 719-20.
287. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643-44, 648; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 84; Anderson, Eastern Question, 64.
288. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643-44, 648; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 84; Anderson, Eastern Question, 64.
289. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 643-44, 648; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 84; Anderson, Eastern Question, 64.
290. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 644-45; see also 643, where he argues that Russia's "hope and aim" was "to use a British connection to nullify the European resistance to Russia's plans"; and Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 701-2.
291. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 644-45; see also 643, where he argues that Russia's "hope and aim" was "to use a British connection to nullify the European resistance to Russia's plans"; and Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 701-2.
292. Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 181-82.
293. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 649-50.
294. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 57-58; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 81; Schroeder, "Alliances," 233.
295. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 57-58; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 81; Schroeder, "Alliances," 233.
296. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 57-58; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 81; Schroeder, "Alliances," 233.
297. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 63, 69, 75, 82; Anderson, Eastern Question, 64; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 50, 52.
298. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 63, 69, 75, 82; Anderson, Eastern Question, 64; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 50, 52.
299. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 63, 69, 75, 82; Anderson, Eastern Question, 64; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 50, 52.
300. Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 252.
301. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 707.
302. Ibid., 707-8.
303. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 645, 649; Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 700, 704-5, 710-12.
304. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 645, 649; Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 700, 704-5, 710-12.
305. Marriott, Eastern Question, 221; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 289; Temperley quoted in Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 306-7; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 125-27.
306. Marriott, Eastern Question, 221; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 289; Temperley quoted in Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 306-7; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 125-27.
307. Marriott, Eastern Question, 221; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 289; Temperley quoted in Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 306-7; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 125-27.
308. Marriott, Eastern Question, 221; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 289; Temperley quoted in Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 306-7; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 125-27.
309. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 646; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 84; Anderson, Eastern Question, 65; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 74.
310. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 646; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 84; Anderson, Eastern Question, 65; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 74.
311. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 646; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 84; Anderson, Eastern Question, 65; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 74.
312. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 646; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 84; Anderson, Eastern Question, 65; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 74.
313. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 84.
314. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia."
315. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 293.
316. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 655-57, 660, 661-62; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 131.
317. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 655-57, 660, 661-62; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 131.
318. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 660.
319. Clayton, Britain and tbt Eastern Question, 55; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 46; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 273.
320. Clayton, Britain and tbt Eastern Question, 55; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 46; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 273.
321. Clayton, Britain and tbt Eastern Question, 55; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 46; Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence, 273.
322. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 85; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 85; Anderson, Eastern Question, 69.
323. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 85; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 85; Anderson, Eastern Question, 69.
324. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 85; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 85; Anderson, Eastern Question, 69.
325. On this committee and its importance in charting Russian policy toward Turkey, see Robert J. Kerner, "Russia's New Policy in the Near East After the Peace of Adrianople," Cambridge Historical Journal 5, no. 3 (1937): 280-86.
326. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 76; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 47.
327. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 76; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 47.
328. See Schroeder, "Vienna Settlement," 699; and
329. "Containment Nineteenth Century Style."
330. Jervis, "Security Regimes," 369-70.
331. Kerner, "Russia's New Policy," 283; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 290. Indeed, the Tsar said that he could not imagine more convenient neighbors than the Turks (Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 139).
332. Kerner, "Russia's New Policy," 283; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 290. Indeed, the Tsar said that he could not imagine more convenient neighbors than the Turks (Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 139).
333. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 86;
334. Kerner, "Russia's New Policy," 283-84.
335. For similar Russian formulations, see Nesselrode's memorandum to the committee in Kerner, "Russia's New Policy," 281, his letter in Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 134-35, and his secret circular of 1830 in
336. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 86-87.
337. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 55; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 76-78; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 658; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 134.
338. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 55; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 76-78; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 658; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 134.
339. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 55; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 76-78; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 658; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 134.
340. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 55; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 76-78; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 658; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 134.
341. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 134.
342. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 89; see also Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 60.
343. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 89; see also Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 60.
344. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 141.
345. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 294, 309-10; see also Anderson, Eastem Question, 67.
346. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 294, 309-10; see also Anderson, Eastem Question, 67.
347. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 653.
348. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 55-56.
349. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 300-1; Anderson, Eastern Question, 74-75; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 56-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 137,140.
350. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 300-1; Anderson, Eastern Question, 74-75; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 56-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 137,140.
351. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 300-1; Anderson, Eastern Question, 74-75; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 56-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 137,140.
352. Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-2," 300-1; Anderson, Eastern Question, 74-75; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 56-57; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 137,140.
353. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 75-76; Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," 150; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 291; Dakin, Greek Struggle far Independence, 197-98. On the self-denying clause in the London agreement, see Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 46; Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 47; and Daugherty, "System Management," 88-89, 104.
354. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 75-76; Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," 150; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 291; Dakin, Greek Struggle far Independence, 197-98. On the self-denying clause in the London agreement, see Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 46; Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 47; and Daugherty, "System Management," 88-89, 104.
355. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 75-76; Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," 150; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 291; Dakin, Greek Struggle far Independence, 197-98. On the self-denying clause in the London agreement, see Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 46; Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 47; and Daugherty, "System Management," 88-89, 104.
356. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 75-76; Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," 150; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 291; Dakin, Greek Struggle far Independence, 197-98. On the self-denying clause in the London agreement, see Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 46; Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 47; and Daugherty, "System Management," 88-89, 104.
357. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 75-76; Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," 150; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 291; Dakin, Greek Struggle far Independence, 197-98. On the self-denying clause in the London agreement, see Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 46; Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 47; and Daugherty, "System Management," 88-89, 104.
358. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 75-76; Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," 150; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 291; Dakin, Greek Struggle far Independence, 197-98. On the self-denying clause in the London agreement, see Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 46; Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 47; and Daugherty, "System Management," 88-89, 104.
359. Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 75-76; Schwartzberg, "The Lion and the Phoenix-1," 150; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 291; Dakin, Greek Struggle far Independence, 197-98. On the self-denying clause in the London agreement, see Holsti, "Governance Without Government," 46; Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," 47; and Daugherty, "System Management," 88-89, 104.
360. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 655-56; Marriott, Eastern Question, 221-22.
361. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 655-56; Marriott, Eastern Question, 221-22.
362. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 655-56; Marriott, Eastern Question, 221-22.
363. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 617-18, 650, 653, 658-60; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 138-39.
364. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 617-18, 650, 653, 658-60; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 138-39.
365. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 659.
366. Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 51.
367. Marriott, Eastern Question, 233-34; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 300.
368. Marriott, Eastern Question, 233-34; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 300.
369. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-78; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations," 69-71.
370. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-78; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations," 69-71.
371. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-78; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations," 69-71.
372. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 309; M. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," Journal of Modern History 24, no. 2 (June 1952), 149; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 269.
373. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 309; M. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," Journal of Modern History 24, no. 2 (June 1952), 149; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 269.
374. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 309; M. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," Journal of Modern History 24, no. 2 (June 1952), 149; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 269.
375. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 309; M. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," Journal of Modern History 24, no. 2 (June 1952), 149; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 269.
376. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 178; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 268.
377. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 178; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 268.
378. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 727, 728-31.
379. Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841: Britain, The Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question, vol. 1 (London: Bell and Sons, 1969), 290-91.
380. This is the main theme in C. K. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture on History: Palmerston, Metternich, and the European System 1830-1841," Proceedings of the British Academy 20 (1934): 125-58. See also Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 300.
381. This is the main theme in C. K. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture on History: Palmerston, Metternich, and the European System 1830-1841," Proceedings of the British Academy 20 (1934): 125-58. See also Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 300.
382. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 292-93, 311.
383. Anderson, Eastern Question; 79: Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 281-82, 302.
384. Anderson, Eastern Question; 79: Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 281-82, 302.
385. Anderson, Eastern Question; 79: Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 281-82, 302.
386. Anderson, Eastern Question; 79: Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 281-82, 302.
387. Anderson, Eastern Question, 79; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 88; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65.
388. Anderson, Eastern Question, 79; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 88; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65.
389. Anderson, Eastern Question, 79; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 88; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65.
390. Anderson, Eastern Question, 79; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 88; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 65.
391. T. V. Eremeeva, "The Concluding Phase of the Egyptian Crisis of 1831-1833 and the Great Powers," Ucbenye Zapiski po Novoj i Novejshej Islorii. 2 (1956), 507-10 (in Russian); Marriott, Eastern Question, 236-37; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175-76; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-458.
392. T. V. Eremeeva, "The Concluding Phase of the Egyptian Crisis of 1831-1833 and the Great Powers," Ucbenye Zapiski po Novoj i Novejshej Islorii. 2 (1956), 507-10 (in Russian); Marriott, Eastern Question, 236-37; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175-76; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-458.
393. T. V. Eremeeva, "The Concluding Phase of the Egyptian Crisis of 1831-1833 and the Great Powers," Ucbenye Zapiski po Novoj i Novejshej Islorii. 2 (1956), 507-10 (in Russian); Marriott, Eastern Question, 236-37; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175-76; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-458.
394. T. V. Eremeeva, "The Concluding Phase of the Egyptian Crisis of 1831-1833 and the Great Powers," Ucbenye Zapiski po Novoj i Novejshej Islorii. 2 (1956), 507-10 (in Russian); Marriott, Eastern Question, 236-37; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 175-76; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-458.
395. On Metternich's surprise and consternation at being "duped" by Russia when he heard of the treaty, see Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 136.
396. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Anderson, Eastern Question, 84-85; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 307; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90-91; Hurewitz, "Russia and the Straits," 631.
397. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Anderson, Eastern Question, 84-85; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 307; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90-91; Hurewitz, "Russia and the Straits," 631.
398. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Anderson, Eastern Question, 84-85; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 307; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90-91; Hurewitz, "Russia and the Straits," 631.
399. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Anderson, Eastern Question, 84-85; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 307; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90-91; Hurewitz, "Russia and the Straits," 631.
400. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Anderson, Eastern Question, 84-85; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 307; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90-91; Hurewitz, "Russia and the Straits," 631.
401. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90, 91-92; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-68; Anderson, Eastern Question, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 304-5; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
402. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90, 91-92; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-68; Anderson, Eastern Question, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 304-5; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
403. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90, 91-92; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-68; Anderson, Eastern Question, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 304-5; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
404. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90, 91-92; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-68; Anderson, Eastern Question, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 304-5; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
405. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90, 91-92; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-68; Anderson, Eastern Question, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 304-5; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
406. Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 90, 91-92; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 67-68; Anderson, Eastern Question, 85; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 730; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 304-5; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
407. See J. H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, 1815-41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 146-49, 157; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations"; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 308-9; Anderson, Eastern Question, 86-87; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 74.
408. See J. H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, 1815-41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 146-49, 157; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations"; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 308-9; Anderson, Eastern Question, 86-87; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 74.
409. See J. H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, 1815-41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 146-49, 157; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations"; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 308-9; Anderson, Eastern Question, 86-87; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 74.
410. See J. H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, 1815-41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 146-49, 157; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations"; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 308-9; Anderson, Eastern Question, 86-87; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 74.
411. See J. H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, 1815-41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 146-49, 157; Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations"; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 308-9; Anderson, Eastern Question, 86-87; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 74.
412. For such a benign Concert interpretation of Russia's motives in the Munchengratz convention, see Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 92.
413. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 731-33.
414. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 308.
415. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 729, 732; Anderson, Eastern Question, 89; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 193; Marriott, Eastern Question, 237; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310.
416. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 729, 732; Anderson, Eastern Question, 89; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 193; Marriott, Eastern Question, 237; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310.
417. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 729, 732; Anderson, Eastern Question, 89; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 193; Marriott, Eastern Question, 237; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310.
418. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 729, 732; Anderson, Eastern Question, 89; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 193; Marriott, Eastern Question, 237; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310.
419. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 729, 732; Anderson, Eastern Question, 89; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 193; Marriott, Eastern Question, 237; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310.
420. See Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizol and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone, 1974), 17-18.
421. See Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 582-95.
422. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 733-35, 736-37. According to Webster, the distinction between Britain's and Austria's positions in this respect was not as clear-cut as presented by Schroeder. Britain also attempted both in 1833 and in 1838 to construct a broad five-power coalition to uphold Turkey, and failed because of Russia's refusal to participate. See Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 294; vol. 2, 590-95; Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 147-49; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 194-95. Webster stresses instead the other two above-mentioned reasons for the Austro-British nonce-operation.
423. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 733-35, 736-37. According to Webster, the distinction between Britain's and Austria's positions in this respect was not as clear-cut as presented by Schroeder. Britain also attempted both in 1833 and in 1838 to construct a broad five-power coalition to uphold Turkey, and failed because of Russia's refusal to participate. See Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 294; vol. 2, 590-95; Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 147-49; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 194-95. Webster stresses instead the other two above-mentioned reasons for the Austro-British nonce-operation.
424. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 733-35, 736-37. According to Webster, the distinction between Britain's and Austria's positions in this respect was not as clear-cut as presented by Schroeder. Britain also attempted both in 1833 and in 1838 to construct a broad five-power coalition to uphold Turkey, and failed because of Russia's refusal to participate. See Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 294; vol. 2, 590-95; Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 147-49; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 194-95. Webster stresses instead the other two above-mentioned reasons for the Austro-British nonce-operation.
425. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 733-35, 736-37. According to Webster, the distinction between Britain's and Austria's positions in this respect was not as clear-cut as presented by Schroeder. Britain also attempted both in 1833 and in 1838 to construct a broad five-power coalition to uphold Turkey, and failed because of Russia's refusal to participate. See Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 294; vol. 2, 590-95; Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 147-49; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 194-95. Webster stresses instead the other two above-mentioned reasons for the Austro-British nonce-operation.
426. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 733-35, 736-37. According to Webster, the distinction between Britain's and Austria's positions in this respect was not as clear-cut as presented by Schroeder. Britain also attempted both in 1833 and in 1838 to construct a broad five-power coalition to uphold Turkey, and failed because of Russia's refusal to participate. See Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 294; vol. 2, 590-95; Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 147-49; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 194-95. Webster stresses instead the other two above-mentioned reasons for the Austro-British nonce-operation.
427. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 137-38.
428. For this British policy see Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41," Journal of Modern History, pt. 1, 1, no. 4 (December 1929): 570-93; and pt. 2, 2, no. 2 (June 1930): 193-225; see also Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 73-79. On external versus internal balancing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 168.
429. For this British policy see Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41," Journal of Modern History, pt. 1, 1, no. 4 (December 1929): 570-93; and pt. 2, 2, no. 2 (June 1930): 193-225; see also Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 73-79. On external versus internal balancing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 168.
430. For this British policy see Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41," Journal of Modern History, pt. 1, 1, no. 4 (December 1929): 570-93; and pt. 2, 2, no. 2 (June 1930): 193-225; see also Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 73-79. On external versus internal balancing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 168.
431. For this British policy see Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41," Journal of Modern History, pt. 1, 1, no. 4 (December 1929): 570-93; and pt. 2, 2, no. 2 (June 1930): 193-225; see also Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 73-79. On external versus internal balancing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 168.
432. Anderson, Eastern Question, 94; Marriott, Eastern Question, 238; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 79.
433. Anderson, Eastern Question, 94; Marriott, Eastern Question, 238; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 79.
434. Anderson, Eastern Question, 94; Marriott, Eastern Question, 238; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 79.
435. Anderson, Eastern Question, 77-78; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 305; Eremeeva, "Egyptian Crisis," 486-87.
436. Anderson, Eastern Question, 77-78; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 305; Eremeeva, "Egyptian Crisis," 486-87.
437. Anderson, Eastern Question, 77-78; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 305; Eremeeva, "Egyptian Crisis," 486-87.
438. Marriott, Eastern Question, 227-30; Anderson, Eastern Question, 78, 97; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-93, 197; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 268-69.
439. Marriott, Eastern Question, 227-30; Anderson, Eastern Question, 78, 97; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-93, 197; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 268-69.
440. Marriott, Eastern Question, 227-30; Anderson, Eastern Question, 78, 97; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-93, 197; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 268-69.
441. Marriott, Eastern Question, 227-30; Anderson, Eastern Question, 78, 97; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 192-93, 197; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 268-69.
442. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 77-78.
443. Anderson, Eastern Question, 100; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 197, 199, 200, 204.
444. Anderson, Eastern Question, 100; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 197, 199, 200, 204.
445. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 204-5, 208; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 53-54; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 312-13; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
446. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 204-5, 208; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 53-54; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 312-13; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
447. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 204-5, 208; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 53-54; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 312-13; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
448. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 204-5, 208; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 53-54; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 312-13; Jelavich, Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 91.
449. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 739, 745-46; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 206-7, 208-9, 211-12.
450. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 739, 745-46; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 206-7, 208-9, 211-12.
451. For a benign interpretation of Russian policy in this vein, see Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 94-96, and Harold N. Ingle, Nesselnde and the Russian Rapprochement With Britain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
452. For a benign interpretation of Russian policy in this vein, see Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," 94-96, and Harold N. Ingle, Nesselnde and the Russian Rapprochement With Britain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
453. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 737-38, 753-54; Anderson, Eastern Question, 106-7; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 311-12.
454. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 737-38, 753-54; Anderson, Eastern Question, 106-7; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 311-12.
455. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 737-38, 753-54; Anderson, Eastern Question, 106-7; Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 311-12.
456. Rodkey, "Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," 588-89; Anderson, Eastern Question, 92-93, 94-95.
457. Rodkey, "Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," 588-89; Anderson, Eastern Question, 92-93, 94-95.
458. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 737, 753-54.
459. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 593;
460. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 148-49;
461. Rodkey, "Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," 573-74 n. 6.
462. Anderson, Eastern Question, 98; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 197. 184. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 747, 751, 754; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 203.
463. Anderson, Eastern Question, 98; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 197. 184. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 747, 751, 754; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 203.
464. Anderson, Eastern Question, 98; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 197. 184. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 747, 751, 754; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 203.
465. Anderson, Eastern Question, 98; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 197. 184. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 747, 751, 754; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 203.
466. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 157-78; F. S. Rodkey, "Anglo-Russian Negotiations About a "Permanent" Quadruple Alliance 1840-1," American Historical Review 37, no. 2 (January 1931): 343-49; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 773-74.
467. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 157-78; F. S. Rodkey, "Anglo-Russian Negotiations About a "Permanent" Quadruple Alliance 1840-1," American Historical Review 37, no. 2 (January 1931): 343-49; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 773-74.
468. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 157-78; F. S. Rodkey, "Anglo-Russian Negotiations About a "Permanent" Quadruple Alliance 1840-1," American Historical Review 37, no. 2 (January 1931): 343-49; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 773-74.
469. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations," 58; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 207; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 757.
470. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations," 58; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 207; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 757.
471. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations," 58; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 207; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 757.
472. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 769-70.
473. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 152; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 738; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 198.
474. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 152; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 738; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 198.
475. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 152; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 738; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 198.
476. Anderson, Eastern Question, 98.
477. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 737.
478. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 744. Marriott, Eastern Question, 253-54, similarly says that by this convention, "Lord Palmerston had elbowed France out of the Concert" (see also 242).
479. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 744. Marriott, Eastern Question, 253-54, similarly says that by this convention, "Lord Palmerston had elbowed France out of the Concert" (see also 242).
480. Schroeder, Transformation of Europtan Politics, 739-40, 741, 743-44, 745, 750-51; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 207, 211-13, 217-18, 220-22; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 775-76.
481. Schroeder, Transformation of Europtan Politics, 739-40, 741, 743-44, 745, 750-51; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 207, 211-13, 217-18, 220-22; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 775-76.
482. Schroeder, Transformation of Europtan Politics, 739-40, 741, 743-44, 745, 750-51; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 207, 211-13, 217-18, 220-22; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 775-76.
483. Marriott, Eastern Question, 239, 241, 254; See also Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310, 313; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 205; Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis,"
484. Marriott, Eastern Question, 239, 241, 254; See also Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310, 313; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 205; Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis,"
485. Marriott, Eastern Question, 239, 241, 254; See also Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310, 313; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 205; Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis,"
486. Marriott, Eastern Question, 239, 241, 254; See also Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 310, 313; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 205; Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis,"
487. 150; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 64, 78, 95-96; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 277-78.
488. 150; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 64, 78, 95-96; Hoskins, British Routes to India, 277-78.
489. See Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot, 8-10.
490. Ibid., 19.
491. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 96, notes that "clearly, even by 1856 Britain had not finally decided whether Russia or France was her ultimate enemy in Europe and the Middle East Ideally, she would evidently keep her options open and ally indiscriminately with one against the other as the need arose." This policy accords with Palmerston's famous dictum that Britain has no permanent friends or foes, but only permanent interests.
492. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 595, 784-85, 789-92. Webster's conception of Palmerston as a Concert statesman dedicated to multilateral cooperation accords neither with Palmerston's provocative confrontational behavior toward France in 1840-41, nor with his similar policy toward Russia during the 1853-54 crisis when, according to Schroeder, he was more responsible than any other European statesman for the final destruction of the Concert (see Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert ). It seems that another conception of Palmerston provides a better due to his policy, that of a realist statesman putting the interests of his country first. See Donald Southgate, The Most English Minister: Tee Policies and Politics of Palmerston (New York 1966); and Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830-48," in Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? ed. Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 61-100.
493. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 595, 784-85, 789-92. Webster's conception of Palmerston as a Concert statesman dedicated to multilateral cooperation accords neither with Palmerston's provocative confrontational behavior toward France in 1840-41, nor with his similar policy toward Russia during the 1853-54 crisis when, according to Schroeder, he was more responsible than any other European statesman for the final destruction of the Concert (see Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert ). It seems that another conception of Palmerston provides a better due to his policy, that of a realist statesman putting the interests of his country first. See Donald Southgate, The Most English Minister: Tee Policies and Politics of Palmerston (New York 1966); and Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830-48," in Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? ed. Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 61-100.
494. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 595, 784-85, 789-92. Webster's conception of Palmerston as a Concert statesman dedicated to multilateral cooperation accords neither with Palmerston's provocative confrontational behavior toward France in 1840-41, nor with his similar policy toward Russia during the 1853-54 crisis when, according to Schroeder, he was more responsible than any other European statesman for the final destruction of the Concert (see Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert ). It seems that another conception of Palmerston provides a better due to his policy, that of a realist statesman putting the interests of his country first. See Donald Southgate, The Most English Minister: Tee Policies and Politics of Palmerston (New York 1966); and Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830-48," in Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? ed. Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 61-100.
495. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 595, 784-85, 789-92. Webster's conception of Palmerston as a Concert statesman dedicated to multilateral cooperation accords neither with Palmerston's provocative confrontational behavior toward France in 1840-41, nor with his similar policy toward Russia during the 1853-54 crisis when, according to Schroeder, he was more responsible than any other European statesman for the final destruction of the Concert (see Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert ). It seems that another conception of Palmerston provides a better due to his policy, that of a realist statesman putting the interests of his country first. See Donald Southgate, The Most English Minister: Tee Policies and Politics of Palmerston (New York 1966); and Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830-48," in Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? ed. Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 61-100.
496. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 157.
497. Ibid.
498. Schroeder, Transformaition of European Politics, 751-51, 754-55; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 772.
499. Schroeder, Transformaition of European Politics, 751-51, 754-55; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 772.
500. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 156; Foreign Poliy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 775. Another reason for the British refusal was its disbelief in the
501. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 156; Foreign Poliy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 775. Another reason for the British refusal was its disbelief in the autonomous efficacy of such Concert arrangements: if either France or Russia wished to encroach on Turkey, they would be able to find some pretext for doing so regardless of treaty stipulations. See Rodkey, "Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," pt. 2, 218.
502. Webster, "Raleigh Lecture," 156; Foreign Poliy of Palmerston, vol. 2, 775. Another reason for the British refusal was its disbelief in the autonomous efficacy of such Concert arrangements: if either France or Russia wished to encroach on Turkey, they would be able to find some pretext for doing so regardless of treaty stipulations. See Rodkey, "Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," pt. 2, 218.
503. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 746 (emphasis added).
504. Ibid., 650.
505. Ibid., 744; Marriott, Eastern Question, 242.
506. Ibid., 744; Marriott, Eastern Question, 242.
507. Schroeder, "Vienna Settlement," 692.
508. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 198.
509. Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style," and "Vienna Settlement"; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," esp. 97.
510. Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style," and "Vienna Settlement"; Anderson, "Russia and the Eastern Question," esp. 97.
511. For a similar view see Enno E. Kraehe, "A Bipolar Balance of Power," American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 712, who argues that "Russia's vacillating preference for preserving the Ottoman empire was less an example of benevolent restraint than a practical calculation that indirect Russian preponderance in the whole was better than the annexation of a part."
512. Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style"; and "Vienna Settlement," 699.
513. Schroeder, "Containment Nineteenth Century Style"; and "Vienna Settlement," 699.
514. Cowles, "Failure to Restrain Russia," 719.
515. On the general theoretical argument that stronger powers tend to pursue unilateral-exclusionary policies, while weaker and more vulnerable powers prefer multilateral-cooperative policies, see Benjamin Miller, "Great Powers and Regional Peacemaking: Patterns in the Middle East and Beyond," Journal of Strategic Studies 20, no. 1 (March 1997): 103-42. See also Thomas J. Christensen, "Conclusion: System Stability and the Security of the Most Vulnerable Significant Actor," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping With Complexity, 347-50
516. On the general theoretical argument that stronger powers tend to pursue unilateral-exclusionary policies, while weaker and more vulnerable powers prefer multilateral-cooperative policies, see Benjamin Miller, "Great Powers and Regional Peacemaking: Patterns in the Middle East and Beyond," Journal of Strategic Studies 20, no. 1 (March 1997): 103-42. See also Thomas J. Christensen, "Conclusion: System Stability and the Security of the Most Vulnerable Significant Actor," in Snyder and Jervis, Coping With Complexity, 347-50
517. Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert, 412, 425. On Austria's vulnerability see also Transformation of European Politics, 54-55, 56-60, 65-67; and "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," 747-48.
518. Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert, 412, 425. On Austria's vulnerability see also Transformation of European Politics, 54-55, 56-60, 65-67; and "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," 747-48.
519. Schroeder, Destruction of the European Concert, 412, 425. On Austria's vulnerability see also Transformation of European Politics, 54-55, 56-60, 65-67; and "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," 747-48.
520. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 746.
521. See A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York Knopf, 1955), 167; and Edward Crankshaw, Bismarck (London: Macmillan, 1981), 352.
522. See A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York Knopf, 1955), 167; and Edward Crankshaw, Bismarck (London: Macmillan, 1981), 352.
523. See Gleason, Genesis of Rnssophobia; and Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations."
524. See Gleason, Genesis of Rnssophobia; and Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations."
525. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics. For a similar realist criticism that Schroeder's analysis of the benign treatment of defeated France and the Saxon-Polish crisis at the Congress of Vienna does not accord with historical reality, see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710-11. For a related point that, despite Schroeder's claims, his interpretation of international history presents no challenge to realism, see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 182-93.
526. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics. For a similar realist criticism that Schroeder's analysis of the benign treatment of defeated France and the Saxon-Polish crisis at the Congress of Vienna does not accord with historical reality, see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710-11. For a related point that, despite Schroeder's claims, his interpretation of international history presents no challenge to realism, see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 182-93.
527. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics. For a similar realist criticism that Schroeder's analysis of the benign treatment of defeated France and the Saxon-Polish crisis at the Congress of Vienna does not accord with historical reality, see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710-11. For a related point that, despite Schroeder's claims, his interpretation of international history presents no challenge to realism, see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 182-93.
528. W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe (London: Athlone 1956), 18. See also Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 24, who similarly argues that "the Concert "worked' well only as long as the great powers' disagreements were minor. When consensus cracked...so did the Concert" The Concert, in other words, was a fair-weather system that broke down precisely when it was needed.
529. W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe (London: Athlone 1956), 18. See also Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 24, who similarly argues that "the Concert "worked' well only as long as the great powers' disagreements were minor. When consensus cracked...so did the Concert" The Concert, in other words, was a fair-weather system that broke down precisely when it was needed.
530. The self-denying clause in the 1827 London agreement is a case in point For analy-ses of the Concert that tend to focus on discourse (such as texts of treaties) see Lauren, "Crisis Prevention"; Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?"; Daugherty, "System Management"; Holsti, "Governance Without Government" For a related criticism of Schroeder for analyzing the Concert "like a jurist rather than a chronicler of the real world," see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710.
531. The self-denying clause in the 1827 London agreement is a case in point For analy-ses of the Concert that tend to focus on discourse (such as texts of treaties) see Lauren, "Crisis Prevention"; Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?"; Daugherty, "System Management"; Holsti, "Governance Without Government" For a related criticism of Schroeder for analyzing the Concert "like a jurist rather than a chronicler of the real world," see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710.
532. The self-denying clause in the 1827 London agreement is a case in point For analy-ses of the Concert that tend to focus on discourse (such as texts of treaties) see Lauren, "Crisis Prevention"; Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?"; Daugherty, "System Management"; Holsti, "Governance Without Government" For a related criticism of Schroeder for analyzing the Concert "like a jurist rather than a chronicler of the real world," see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710.
533. The self-denying clause in the 1827 London agreement is a case in point For analy-ses of the Concert that tend to focus on discourse (such as texts of treaties) see Lauren, "Crisis Prevention"; Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?"; Daugherty, "System Management"; Holsti, "Governance Without Government" For a related criticism of Schroeder for analyzing the Concert "like a jurist rather than a chronicler of the real world," see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710.
534. The self-denying clause in the 1827 London agreement is a case in point For analy-ses of the Concert that tend to focus on discourse (such as texts of treaties) see Lauren, "Crisis Prevention"; Schroeder, "Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?"; Daugherty, "System Management"; Holsti, "Governance Without Government" For a related criticism of Schroeder for analyzing the Concert "like a jurist rather than a chronicler of the real world," see Kraehe, "Bipolar Balance," 710.
535. Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 427-66.
536. Paul W. Schroeder, Metternicb's Diplomacy at its Zenith (New York: Greenwood, 1969), 238,251-66; and "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," 747-48.
537. Paul W. Schroeder, Metternicb's Diplomacy at its Zenith (New York: Greenwood, 1969), 238,251-66; and "Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response," 747-48.
538. On the need for conscious management for a concert to function, see Jervis, "Security Regimes," 369-71; and "Political Science Perspective," 723-24.
539. On the need for conscious management for a concert to function, see Jervis, "Security Regimes," 369-71; and "Political Science Perspective," 723-24.
540. Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalism," 47 n. 14, claim that "since institutionalists do not argue that institutions always have a major impact on outcomes, finding weak institutions hardly constitutes a refutation of institutionalist theory." If this is the case, then institutionalist theory should proceed beyond the general argument that "institutions matter," and define more clearly under what conditions they are likely to have such a major impact on outcomes. This is a fruitful direction for the development of the realistinstitutionalist debate. On the possibilities for such a development, see Hasenclever et al., "Interests, Power, Knowledge," 217-21.
541. Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalism," 47 n. 14, claim that "since institutionalists do not argue that institutions always have a major impact on outcomes, finding weak institutions hardly constitutes a refutation of institutionalist theory." If this is the case, then institutionalist theory should proceed beyond the general argument that "institutions matter," and define more clearly under what conditions they are likely to have such a major impact on outcomes. This is a fruitful direction for the development of the realistinstitutionalist debate. On the possibilities for such a development, see Hasenclever et al., "Interests, Power, Knowledge," 217-21.
542. This, however, says nothing about the validity of institutionalism in economic and environmental issues. For a realist study that challenges institutionalism on its own economic "home court," see Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
543. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War," 25. The condusion that institutions are unlikdy to have independent effects on state behavior in the security area does not predude them from being important phenomena for study as dependent or intervening variables. As dependent variables, it is interesting to study how different combinations of systemic and domestic factors produce different institution: for example, how the combination of U.S. power and liberal ideology affected the institutions it constructed during the cold war, and is likdy to construct in the post-cold war era. For hypotheses in this vein, see Schweller and Priess, "Tale of Two Realisms." As intervening variables, institutions are important for translating state goals into actual cooperation. See, for example, Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe."
544. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War," 25. The condusion that institutions are unlikdy to have independent effects on state behavior in the security area does not predude them from being important phenomena for study as dependent or intervening variables. As dependent variables, it is interesting to study how different combinations of systemic and domestic factors produce different institution: for example, how the combination of U.S. power and liberal ideology affected the institutions it constructed during the cold war, and is likdy to construct in the post-cold war era. For hypotheses in this vein, see Schweller and Priess, "Tale of Two Realisms." As intervening variables, institutions are important for translating state goals into actual cooperation. See, for example, Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe."
545. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War," 25. The condusion that institutions are unlikdy to have independent effects on state behavior in the security area does not predude them from being important phenomena for study as dependent or intervening variables. As dependent variables, it is interesting to study how different combinations of systemic and domestic factors produce different institution: for example, how the combination of U.S. power and liberal ideology affected the institutions it constructed during the cold war, and is likdy to construct in the post-cold war era. For hypotheses in this vein, see Schweller and Priess, "Tale of Two Realisms." As intervening variables, institutions are important for translating state goals into actual cooperation. See, for example, Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe."