Hume and the (false) luster of justice

Political Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 628-655

  Krause, Sharon R ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

David Hume; Justice; Motives; Norms; Utility

Indexed keywords

EID: 5644221725     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591704264465     Document Type: Review

References (141)

1. Donald Hubin, "What's Special about Humeanism," Nous 33, no. 1 (1999): 31. Patrick Yarnell notes that much of the interest in the Humean approach to motivation follows from the fact that "non-Humeans have failed to provide an explanation of the motivating capacity of desire-independent rational deliberation." Yarnell, "Humean Instrumentalism and the Motivational Capacity of Reason," Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 500.
2. Donald Hubin, "What's Special about Humeanism," Nous 33, no. 1 (1999): 31. Patrick Yarnell notes that much of the interest in the Humean approach to motivation follows from the fact that "non-Humeans have failed to provide an explanation of the motivating capacity of desire-independent rational deliberation." Yarnell, "Humean Instrumentalism and the Motivational Capacity of Reason," Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 500.
3. Although it should be noted that this association has been called into question by several recent readings of Hobbes, which stress the humanistic dimensions of his theory. See, for example, Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).
4. Although it should be noted that this association has been called into question by several recent readings of Hobbes, which stress the humanistic dimensions of his theory. See, for example, Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5. As Elizabeth Radcliffe puts it, for Hume "moral justification and moral motivation depend on the same set of facts," which are facts about what gives us pleasure. Elizabeth Radcliffe, "How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate?" Journal of the History of Philosophy 34, no. 3 (July 1996): 393. On these grounds, Hume's account should be classified as an internalist one, since in his view the reasons for action, as John Rawls says, "must connect up with our existing passions." Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 34.
6. As Elizabeth Radcliffe puts it, for Hume "moral justification and moral motivation depend on the same set of facts," which are facts about what gives us pleasure. Elizabeth Radcliffe, "How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate?" Journal of the History of Philosophy 34, no. 3 (July 1996): 393. On these grounds, Hume's account should be classified as an internalist one, since in his view the reasons for action, as John Rawls says, "must connect up with our existing passions." Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 34.
7. See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1968); and Robert Solomon, A Passion for Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
8. See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1968); and Robert Solomon, A Passion for Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
9. See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1968); and Robert Solomon, A Passion for Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
10. See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1968); and Robert Solomon, A Passion for Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
11. See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1968); and Robert Solomon, A Passion for Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
12. See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1968); and Robert Solomon, A Passion for Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
13. See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1968); and Robert Solomon, A Passion for Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
14. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (hereafter, E) (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1966), 97.
15. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (hereafter, T), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1968), 620.
16. Terence Penelhum, David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System (W. Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1992), 141.
17. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
18. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
19. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
20. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
21. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
22. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
23. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
24. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
25. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
26. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
27. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
28. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
29. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
30. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
31. Jeremy Bentham credited Hume with having inspired him to think through the problem of political obligation in terms of utility (Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison [Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967], 49-56), and Hume is often characterized as a utilitarian or proto-utilitarian philosopher. See, for example, John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1958), 22-45; William Davie, "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1985): 337; Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), viii; and D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Utility (1 & II)," in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 158. Those who resist the utilitarian reading of Hume usually point to features of his category of "the useful" that do not fit the model of classical utilitarianism. For instance, he offers no concept of the maximization of utility and no model for the rational calculation of utility, still less one than would sacrifice the happiness of the individual to that of the greatest number. See Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 168; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 205; Aryeh Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology: A Study in the Unity of Hume's Thought (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 123, 136f., and "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (October 1977): 423-435; Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," in David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11; David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88, no. 1 (January 1979): 3, 10, 17; H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 81; John B. Stewart, "The Public Interest vs. Old Rights," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995), 171; Andrew Sabl, "When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume's Political Ethics of Revolution," Polity 35, no. 1 (fall): 82; and J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), vii.
32. Penelhum, David Hume, 145. See also Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, vii.
33. Penelhum, David Hume, 145. See also Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, vii.
34. For an account of Hume's thoughts on these tendencies, see "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," in David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1987). He does say that enthusiasm, in contrast to superstition, is naturally "a friend" to civil liberty, mainly because it is destructive of ecclesiastical power and because enthusiasts are marked by "bold and ambitious tempers," which suit them to "a spirit of liberty." In contrast, superstition "renders men tame and abject, and fits them for slavery" (p. 78). Yet the "presumptuous boldness of character" found among enthusiasts "naturally begets the most extreme resolutions" (p. 77), and extremism is Hume's greatest concern in political matters. Consequently, he classifies enthusiasm and superstition as equally "pernicious" (p. 73).
35. Thus Hume links political protest to religious enthusiasm. See Geoffrey Marshall, "David Hume and Political Skepticism," Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1954): 248; and Knud Haakonssen, "The Structure of Hume's Political Theory," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 183, 186. Although it was the Whigs who defended natural rights, Hume was equally critical of the Tory notion of the divine right of kings, which he regarded as shot through with superstition. Duncan Forbes has argued that Hume directed most of his critical energy toward refuting the Whig contract theory because the Tory ideals of divine right and passive obedience "had been discredited already by what Hume called 'the progress of learning and liberty' and by the practice of the Tories themselves in 1688." Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 92.
36. Thus Hume links political protest to religious enthusiasm. See Geoffrey Marshall, "David Hume and Political Skepticism," Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1954): 248; and Knud Haakonssen, "The Structure of Hume's Political Theory," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 183, 186. Although it was the Whigs who defended natural rights, Hume was equally critical of the Tory notion of the divine right of kings, which he regarded as shot through with superstition. Duncan Forbes has argued that Hume directed most of his critical energy toward refuting the Whig contract theory because the Tory ideals of divine right and passive obedience "had been discredited already by what Hume called 'the progress of learning and liberty' and by the practice of the Tories themselves in 1688." Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 92.
37. Thus Hume links political protest to religious enthusiasm. See Geoffrey Marshall, "David Hume and Political Skepticism," Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1954): 248; and Knud Haakonssen, "The Structure of Hume's Political Theory," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 183, 186. Although it was the Whigs who defended natural rights, Hume was equally critical of the Tory notion of the divine right of kings, which he regarded as shot through with superstition. Duncan Forbes has argued that Hume directed most of his critical energy toward refuting the Whig contract theory because the Tory ideals of divine right and passive obedience "had been discredited already by what Hume called 'the progress of learning and liberty' and by the practice of the Tories themselves in 1688." Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 92.
38. Donald W. Livingston, "On Hume's Conservatism," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995): 151-164; and see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, vol. 3 (New York: Norton, 1996), 452.
39. Donald W. Livingston, "On Hume's Conservatism," Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (November 1995): 151-164; and see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, vol. 3 (New York: Norton, 1996), 452.
40. Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 205f.
41. A. J. Ayer, Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 109; Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 153, 158f, 164f.; Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology, 30, 35; Penelhum, David Hume, 137; Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), 70, n. 17; and Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 2000), 192f.
42. A. J. Ayer, Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 109; Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 153, 158f, 164f.; Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology, 30, 35; Penelhum, David Hume, 137; Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), 70, n. 17; and Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 2000), 192f.
43. A. J. Ayer, Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 109; Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 153, 158f, 164f.; Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology, 30, 35; Penelhum, David Hume, 137; Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), 70, n. 17; and Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 2000), 192f.
44. A. J. Ayer, Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 109; Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 153, 158f, 164f.; Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology, 30, 35; Penelhum, David Hume, 137; Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), 70, n. 17; and Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 2000), 192f.
45. A. J. Ayer, Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 109; Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 153, 158f, 164f.; Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology, 30, 35; Penelhum, David Hume, 137; Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), 70, n. 17; and Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 2000), 192f.
46. A. J. Ayer, Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 109; Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 153, 158f, 164f.; Botwinick, Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology, 30, 35; Penelhum, David Hume, 137; Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), 70, n. 17; and Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 2000), 192f.
47. In view of this interaction, Baier refers to "Hume's philosophy of reflection-assisted passion." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 2, 58. Similarly, Stewart notes that Hume "does not separate thinking and feeling." John B. Stewart, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 24. For further discussion see Jacqueline Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," in Feminist Interpretations of David Hume, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000).
48. In view of this interaction, Baier refers to "Hume's philosophy of reflection-assisted passion." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 2, 58. Similarly, Stewart notes that Hume "does not separate thinking and feeling." John B. Stewart, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 24. For further discussion see Jacqueline Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," in Feminist Interpretations of David Hume, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000).
49. In view of this interaction, Baier refers to "Hume's philosophy of reflection-assisted passion." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 2, 58. Similarly, Stewart notes that Hume "does not separate thinking and feeling." John B. Stewart, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 24. For further discussion see Jacqueline Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," in Feminist Interpretations of David Hume, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000).
50. For this reason, Capaldi has emphasized that the moral sentiments are not different in kind from others. See Capaldi, "Hume's Theory of the Passions," in Hume: A Reevaluation, ed. Donald W. Livingston and James T. King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), 187.
51. Larry Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory," American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 389; and see Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989).
52. Larry Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory," American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 389; and see Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989).
53. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 389. For further discussion of the objectivity of moral judgment in Hume, see Charles E. Cottle, "Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 464; M. Jamie Ferriera, "Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and the Other," International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 1994): 51; Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55; and Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," 113f.
54. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 389. For further discussion of the objectivity of moral judgment in Hume, see Charles E. Cottle, "Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 464; M. Jamie Ferriera, "Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and the Other," International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 1994): 51; Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55; and Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," 113f.
55. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 389. For further discussion of the objectivity of moral judgment in Hume, see Charles E. Cottle, "Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 464; M. Jamie Ferriera, "Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and the Other," International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 1994): 51; Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55; and Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," 113f.
56. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 389. For further discussion of the objectivity of moral judgment in Hume, see Charles E. Cottle, "Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 464; M. Jamie Ferriera, "Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and the Other," International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 1994): 51; Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55; and Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," 113f.
57. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 389. For further discussion of the objectivity of moral judgment in Hume, see Charles E. Cottle, "Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 464; M. Jamie Ferriera, "Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and the Other," International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 1994): 51; Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55; and Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," 113f.
58. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 389. For further discussion of the objectivity of moral judgment in Hume, see Charles E. Cottle, "Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 464; M. Jamie Ferriera, "Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and the Other," International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 1994): 51; Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55; and Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," 113f.
59. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 204.
60. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 5; Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, 52.
61. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 5; Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, 52.
62. In this respect, Hume's treatment of the agreeable reflects his recognition of what Nancy Rosenblum has called "the reality of longing" (or the importance of aspiration) for moral and political life, including the political life of liberal societies. Nancy Rosenblum, Another Liberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 189f.
63. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic Press, 1984), 1099a21-22.
64. Several interpreters in recent years have remarked on the similarities between Hume's approach to ethics and that of Aristotle. Arnhart, for instance, notes that the two approaches agree on the primacy of desire in motivating moral action. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 390. Maclntyre also emphasizes their shared commitment to the link between virtue and desire. MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," 263. John Immerwahr has referred to Hume's founding of virtue on happiness as "Hellenistic." Immerwahr, "Hume on Tranquilizing the Passions," Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 298. Mackie calls attention to the more general connection in both thinkers between "the intellectual and the emotional sides of the moral faculty." Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 43. Hume himself remarked on this commonality, saying, "the ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment" (E 2). While noting these similarities, Taylor has stressed the fact that whereas Aristotle's position "emphasizes agent-centered deliberation and future-oriented possible action," Hume's focus is on "the evaluator's point of view," with the result that his account of moral thought is "reactive," concentrated on sentiments of praise and blame rather than deliberation about what to do. She concludes that Hume's moral theory "displaces practical reason and agency" and so is not correctly characterized as an example of virtue ethics. Taylor, "Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment," Topoi 21 (2002): 175f. This insight is a crucial one, and it brings out an irony in the Humean approach. With its emphasis on the interpenetration of reason and affect, and its linkage between moral norms and the passions that effectively motivate us to act, Hume's view seems to promise a vigorous model of moral agency. Yet other features of the theory tend to undercut this promise. Taylor points to some of these features; the present study uncovers others.
65. Several interpreters in recent years have remarked on the similarities between Hume's approach to ethics and that of Aristotle. Arnhart, for instance, notes that the two approaches agree on the primacy of desire in motivating moral action. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 390. Maclntyre also emphasizes their shared commitment to the link between virtue and desire. MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," 263. John Immerwahr has referred to Hume's founding of virtue on happiness as "Hellenistic." Immerwahr, "Hume on Tranquilizing the Passions," Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 298. Mackie calls attention to the more general connection in both thinkers between "the intellectual and the emotional sides of the moral faculty." Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 43. Hume himself remarked on this commonality, saying, "the ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment" (E 2). While noting these similarities, Taylor has stressed the fact that whereas Aristotle's position "emphasizes agent-centered deliberation and future-oriented possible action," Hume's focus is on "the evaluator's point of view," with the result that his account of moral thought is "reactive," concentrated on sentiments of praise and blame rather than deliberation about what to do. She concludes that Hume's moral theory "displaces practical reason and agency" and so is not correctly characterized as an example of virtue ethics. Taylor, "Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment," Topoi 21 (2002): 175f. This insight is a crucial one, and it brings out an irony in the Humean approach. With its emphasis on the interpenetration of reason and affect, and its linkage between moral norms and the passions that effectively motivate us to act, Hume's view seems to promise a vigorous model of moral agency. Yet other features of the theory tend to undercut this promise. Taylor points to some of these features; the present study uncovers others.
66. Several interpreters in recent years have remarked on the similarities between Hume's approach to ethics and that of Aristotle. Arnhart, for instance, notes that the two approaches agree on the primacy of desire in motivating moral action. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 390. Maclntyre also emphasizes their shared commitment to the link between virtue and desire. MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," 263. John Immerwahr has referred to Hume's founding of virtue on happiness as "Hellenistic." Immerwahr, "Hume on Tranquilizing the Passions," Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 298. Mackie calls attention to the more general connection in both thinkers between "the intellectual and the emotional sides of the moral faculty." Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 43. Hume himself remarked on this commonality, saying, "the ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment" (E 2). While noting these similarities, Taylor has stressed the fact that whereas Aristotle's position "emphasizes agent-centered deliberation and future-oriented possible action," Hume's focus is on "the evaluator's point of view," with the result that his account of moral thought is "reactive," concentrated on sentiments of praise and blame rather than deliberation about what to do. She concludes that Hume's moral theory "displaces practical reason and agency" and so is not correctly characterized as an example of virtue ethics. Taylor, "Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment," Topoi 21 (2002): 175f. This insight is a crucial one, and it brings out an irony in the Humean approach. With its emphasis on the interpenetration of reason and affect, and its linkage between moral norms and the passions that effectively motivate us to act, Hume's view seems to promise a vigorous model of moral agency. Yet other features of the theory tend to undercut this promise. Taylor points to some of these features; the present study uncovers others.
67. Several interpreters in recent years have remarked on the similarities between Hume's approach to ethics and that of Aristotle. Arnhart, for instance, notes that the two approaches agree on the primacy of desire in motivating moral action. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 390. Maclntyre also emphasizes their shared commitment to the link between virtue and desire. MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," 263. John Immerwahr has referred to Hume's founding of virtue on happiness as "Hellenistic." Immerwahr, "Hume on Tranquilizing the Passions," Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 298. Mackie calls attention to the more general connection in both thinkers between "the intellectual and the emotional sides of the moral faculty." Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 43. Hume himself remarked on this commonality, saying, "the ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment" (E 2). While noting these similarities, Taylor has stressed the fact that whereas Aristotle's position "emphasizes agent-centered deliberation and future-oriented possible action," Hume's focus is on "the evaluator's point of view," with the result that his account of moral thought is "reactive," concentrated on sentiments of praise and blame rather than deliberation about what to do. She concludes that Hume's moral theory "displaces practical reason and agency" and so is not correctly characterized as an example of virtue ethics. Taylor, "Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment," Topoi 21 (2002): 175f. This insight is a crucial one, and it brings out an irony in the Humean approach. With its emphasis on the interpenetration of reason and affect, and its linkage between moral norms and the passions that effectively motivate us to act, Hume's view seems to promise a vigorous model of moral agency. Yet other features of the theory tend to undercut this promise. Taylor points to some of these features; the present study uncovers others.
68. Several interpreters in recent years have remarked on the similarities between Hume's approach to ethics and that of Aristotle. Arnhart, for instance, notes that the two approaches agree on the primacy of desire in motivating moral action. Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism," 390. Maclntyre also emphasizes their shared commitment to the link between virtue and desire. MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," 263. John Immerwahr has referred to Hume's founding of virtue on happiness as "Hellenistic." Immerwahr, "Hume on Tranquilizing the Passions," Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 298. Mackie calls attention to the more general connection in both thinkers between "the intellectual and the emotional sides of the moral faculty." Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 43. Hume himself remarked on this commonality, saying, "the ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment" (E 2). While noting these similarities, Taylor has stressed the fact that whereas Aristotle's position "emphasizes agent-centered deliberation and future-oriented possible action," Hume's focus is on "the evaluator's point of view," with the result that his account of moral thought is "reactive," concentrated on sentiments of praise and blame rather than deliberation about what to do. She concludes that Hume's moral theory "displaces practical reason and agency" and so is not correctly characterized as an example of virtue ethics. Taylor, "Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment," Topoi 21 (2002): 175f. This insight is a crucial one, and it brings out an irony in the Humean approach. With its emphasis on the interpenetration of reason and affect, and its linkage between moral norms and the passions that effectively motivate us to act, Hume's view seems to promise a vigorous model of moral agency. Yet other features of the theory tend to undercut this promise. Taylor points to some of these features; the present study uncovers others.
69. "I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor'd under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending more upon Invention than Experience" (Hume, A Kind of History of My Life, repr. in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 345-356). For further discussion of Hume's criticism of ancient moral philosophy, see Norton, "Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 148; and Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 9.
70. "I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor'd under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending more upon Invention than Experience" (Hume, A Kind of History of My Life, repr. in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 345-356). For further discussion of Hume's criticism of ancient moral philosophy, see Norton, "Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 148; and Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 9.
71. "I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor'd under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending more upon Invention than Experience" (Hume, A Kind of History of My Life, repr. in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 345-356). For further discussion of Hume's criticism of ancient moral philosophy, see Norton, "Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 148; and Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 9.
72. It is true that the standard of utility is also variable to some degree, as Richard Dees points out. Dees, "Hume and the Contexts of Politics," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (April 1992): 229. See also Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 107. Yet variation in standards of utility is limited by the empirically verifiable necessities of the human organism, especially with respect to survival and security. The standard of agreeableness is not constrained in the same way.
73. It is true that the standard of utility is also variable to some degree, as Richard Dees points out. Dees, "Hume and the Contexts of Politics," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (April 1992): 229. See also Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 107. Yet variation in standards of utility is limited by the empirically verifiable necessities of the human organism, especially with respect to survival and security. The standard of agreeableness is not constrained in the same way.
74. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 206, 212. See also Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 225, 227f., 229; and Robert A. Manzer, "Hume's Constitutionalism and the Identity of Constitutional Democracy," American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 492.
75. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 206, 212. See also Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 225, 227f., 229; and Robert A. Manzer, "Hume's Constitutionalism and the Identity of Constitutional Democracy," American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 492.
76. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 206, 212. See also Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 225, 227f., 229; and Robert A. Manzer, "Hume's Constitutionalism and the Identity of Constitutional Democracy," American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 492.
77. As Kolin notes, "Hume's most basic criticism of Ancient political systems was that they lack effective constitutional safeguards against unrest; without such safeguards, political stability was at best uncertain." Andrew Kolin, The Ethical Foundations of Hume's Theory of Politics (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 91.
78. James Moore, "Hume's Political Science and the Classical Republican Tradition," Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, no. 4 (December 1977): 810, and see 813f., 820. Likewise, Forbes maintains that "Hume has virtually no affinity with Machiavellian moralists." Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 225. Although Pocock, in contrast, treats Hume as a part of the republican tradition, he acknowledges that certain features of Hume's theory make the association "equivocal." G. J. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 472.
79. James Moore, "Hume's Political Science and the Classical Republican Tradition," Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, no. 4 (December 1977): 810, and see 813f., 820. Likewise, Forbes maintains that "Hume has virtually no affinity with Machiavellian moralists." Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 225. Although Pocock, in contrast, treats Hume as a part of the republican tradition, he acknowledges that certain features of Hume's theory make the association "equivocal." G. J. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 472.
80. James Moore, "Hume's Political Science and the Classical Republican Tradition," Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, no. 4 (December 1977): 810, and see 813f., 820. Likewise, Forbes maintains that "Hume has virtually no affinity with Machiavellian moralists." Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 225. Although Pocock, in contrast, treats Hume as a part of the republican tradition, he acknowledges that certain features of Hume's theory make the association "equivocal." G. J. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 472.
81. For discussion of this development, see (for instance) Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and Interests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Cheryl Hall, "Passions and constraint," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 727-748; and Barbara Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000), esp. 157-160.
82. For discussion of this development, see (for instance) Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and Interests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Cheryl Hall, "Passions and constraint," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 727-748; and Barbara Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000), esp. 157-160.
83. For discussion of this development, see (for instance) Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and Interests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Cheryl Hall, "Passions and constraint," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 727-748; and Barbara Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000), esp. 157-160.
84. For discussion of this development, see (for instance) Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and Interests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Cheryl Hall, "Passions and constraint," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 727-748; and Barbara Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000), esp. 157-160.
85. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 212.
86. Baier maintains that Humean justice is "not comprehensive enough." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 221, 224. See also Moore, "Hume's Theory of Justice and Property," Political Studies 24 (June 1976): 117-19; Stewart, Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume, 120; and Raphael, "Justice and Utility," 174. One writer who has hazarded an explanation concludes that justice is especially concerned with property because, for Hume, the object of just laws is individual liberty and "the most obvious and endangered expression of liberty is the acquisition and use of property." Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 198. This explanation is not altogether implausible, but it overstates the "obvious" priority of the connection between property rights and liberty. There are other ways to threaten liberty that are not obviously less significant. Hume was an astute student of politics with a particular interest in French absolutism, where flirtations with tyranny had been open to view and much discussed since the reign of Louis XIV. So he was familiar with the whole range of violations to liberty, including attacks on personal security as well as the freedoms of speech and religion. Thus his concern for liberty cannot by itself explain the narrowness of his concept of justice.
87. Baier maintains that Humean justice is "not comprehensive enough." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 221, 224. See also Moore, "Hume's Theory of Justice and Property," Political Studies 24 (June 1976): 117-19; Stewart, Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume, 120; and Raphael, "Justice and Utility," 174. One writer who has hazarded an explanation concludes that justice is especially concerned with property because, for Hume, the object of just laws is individual liberty and "the most obvious and endangered expression of liberty is the acquisition and use of property." Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 198. This explanation is not altogether implausible, but it overstates the "obvious" priority of the connection between property rights and liberty. There are other ways to threaten liberty that are not obviously less significant. Hume was an astute student of politics with a particular interest in French absolutism, where flirtations with tyranny had been open to view and much discussed since the reign of Louis XIV. So he was familiar with the whole range of violations to liberty, including attacks on personal security as well as the freedoms of speech and religion. Thus his concern for liberty cannot by itself explain the narrowness of his concept of justice.
88. Baier maintains that Humean justice is "not comprehensive enough." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 221, 224. See also Moore, "Hume's Theory of Justice and Property," Political Studies 24 (June 1976): 117-19; Stewart, Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume, 120; and Raphael, "Justice and Utility," 174. One writer who has hazarded an explanation concludes that justice is especially concerned with property because, for Hume, the object of just laws is individual liberty and "the most obvious and endangered expression of liberty is the acquisition and use of property." Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 198. This explanation is not altogether implausible, but it overstates the "obvious" priority of the connection between property rights and liberty. There are other ways to threaten liberty that are not obviously less significant. Hume was an astute student of politics with a particular interest in French absolutism, where flirtations with tyranny had been open to view and much discussed since the reign of Louis XIV. So he was familiar with the whole range of violations to liberty, including attacks on personal security as well as the freedoms of speech and religion. Thus his concern for liberty cannot by itself explain the narrowness of his concept of justice.
89. Baier maintains that Humean justice is "not comprehensive enough." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 221, 224. See also Moore, "Hume's Theory of Justice and Property," Political Studies 24 (June 1976): 117-19; Stewart, Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume, 120; and Raphael, "Justice and Utility," 174. One writer who has hazarded an explanation concludes that justice is especially concerned with property because, for Hume, the object of just laws is individual liberty and "the most obvious and endangered expression of liberty is the acquisition and use of property." Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 198. This explanation is not altogether implausible, but it overstates the "obvious" priority of the connection between property rights and liberty. There are other ways to threaten liberty that are not obviously less significant. Hume was an astute student of politics with a particular interest in French absolutism, where flirtations with tyranny had been open to view and much discussed since the reign of Louis XIV. So he was familiar with the whole range of violations to liberty, including attacks on personal security as well as the freedoms of speech and religion. Thus his concern for liberty cannot by itself explain the narrowness of his concept of justice.
90. Baier maintains that Humean justice is "not comprehensive enough." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 221, 224. See also Moore, "Hume's Theory of Justice and Property," Political Studies 24 (June 1976): 117-19; Stewart, Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume, 120; and Raphael, "Justice and Utility," 174. One writer who has hazarded an explanation concludes that justice is especially concerned with property because, for Hume, the object of just laws is individual liberty and "the most obvious and endangered expression of liberty is the acquisition and use of property." Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 198. This explanation is not altogether implausible, but it overstates the "obvious" priority of the connection between property rights and liberty. There are other ways to threaten liberty that are not obviously less significant. Hume was an astute student of politics with a particular interest in French absolutism, where flirtations with tyranny had been open to view and much discussed since the reign of Louis XIV. So he was familiar with the whole range of violations to liberty, including attacks on personal security as well as the freedoms of speech and religion. Thus his concern for liberty cannot by itself explain the narrowness of his concept of justice.
91. For discussion of Hume's worries about theological interventions into politics and society, see Penelhum, "Hume's Moral Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 136f. Most of the proponents of natural law theory in his day, as Haakonssen has noted, still treated the laws of nature as "part of a teleological and providential scheme of justification." Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 200.
92. For discussion of Hume's worries about theological interventions into politics and society, see Penelhum, "Hume's Moral Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 136f. Most of the proponents of natural law theory in his day, as Haakonssen has noted, still treated the laws of nature as "part of a teleological and providential scheme of justification." Haakonssen, "Structure of Hume's Political Theory," 200.
93. See Manzer, "Hume's Constitutionalism," 490.
94. As Mackie says, Hume thought that we are more likely to get the benefits of morality "without its disadvantages if we see through its claim to absolute or objective authority." Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, 156.
95. In fact, Hume sometimes tried to make common cause with certain strains of natural law theory, saying that his account also derived justice from "the convenience and necessities of mankind" (E 28f.). Likewise, he occasionally refers to the rules of justice as "laws of nature" (T 484). See Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 6, 8, 15.
96. Hume uses the terms "motivation" and "obligation" interchangeably. In itself, this usage is not remarkable, as it was consistent with the common practice of his time. His departure lies in the insistence that we can have no obligation to undertake actions for which a motive in human nature does not independently exist. Stephen Buckle and Dario Castiglione, "Hume's Critique of the Contract Theory," History of Political Thought 12, no. 3 (autumn 1991): 474; and see P. F. Brownsey, "Hume and the Social Contract," Philosophical Quarterly 28 (April 1978): 139, 149. As one commentator has shown, this condition was intended to undercut the supposed obligation to obey divine commands requiring self-abnegation or perverting natural human sentiments. Rawls, Lectures, 56. Hume's innovation would thus nullify what he referred to as the "whole train of monkish virtues" that "stupefy the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper" (E 108). By contrast, his account grounds obligation in human desires, namely the desires for what is useful and what is agreeable. And since desires are also the springs of action, a tight connection is established between obligations and motives.
97. Hume uses the terms "motivation" and "obligation" interchangeably. In itself, this usage is not remarkable, as it was consistent with the common practice of his time. His departure lies in the insistence that we can have no obligation to undertake actions for which a motive in human nature does not independently exist. Stephen Buckle and Dario Castiglione, "Hume's Critique of the Contract Theory," History of Political Thought 12, no. 3 (autumn 1991): 474; and see P. F. Brownsey, "Hume and the Social Contract," Philosophical Quarterly 28 (April 1978): 139, 149. As one commentator has shown, this condition was intended to undercut the supposed obligation to obey divine commands requiring self-abnegation or perverting natural human sentiments. Rawls, Lectures, 56. Hume's innovation would thus nullify what he referred to as the "whole train of monkish virtues" that "stupefy the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper" (E 108). By contrast, his account grounds obligation in human desires, namely the desires for what is useful and what is agreeable. And since desires are also the springs of action, a tight connection is established between obligations and motives.
98. Hume uses the terms "motivation" and "obligation" interchangeably. In itself, this usage is not remarkable, as it was consistent with the common practice of his time. His departure lies in the insistence that we can have no obligation to undertake actions for which a motive in human nature does not independently exist. Stephen Buckle and Dario Castiglione, "Hume's Critique of the Contract Theory," History of Political Thought 12, no. 3 (autumn 1991): 474; and see P. F. Brownsey, "Hume and the Social Contract," Philosophical Quarterly 28 (April 1978): 139, 149. As one commentator has shown, this condition was intended to undercut the supposed obligation to obey divine commands requiring self-abnegation or perverting natural human sentiments. Rawls, Lectures, 56. Hume's innovation would thus nullify what he referred to as the "whole train of monkish virtues" that "stupefy the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper" (E 108). By contrast, his account grounds obligation in human desires, namely the desires for what is useful and what is agreeable. And since desires are also the springs of action, a tight connection is established between obligations and motives.
99. For this reason, some have described him as the first rule utilitarian. See, for example, Raphael, "Justice and Utility," 171.
100. In a related vein, Kemp Smith emphasizes that grounding the motivation for justice in self-interest would mean (for reasons noted above) basing it on calculations of reason. Hume's insistence on the impotency of reason in this respect renders such an explanation inadequate. Norman Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," in The Credibility of Divine Existence: The Collected Papers of Norman Kemp Smith, ed. A. Portens, A. MacLennan, and G. Davie (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 134.
101. On this point, see Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice, 2.
102. Hume (E, app. II, "Of Self-Love"). See also Ferriera, "Hume and Imagination," 44f.
103. Perhaps in recognition of this difficulty Hume sometimes describes the motivation to act justly in terms that appear to put less pressure on sympathy. Thus he says that even if we do not reliably feel an overriding concern for the good of society as a whole, we always feel the pain that comes from being on the receiving end of injustice (T 499). See Penelhum, "Hume's Moral Psychology," 136. Our own pain causes us to disapprove injustice and motivates us to avoid it. But it is one thing to avoid being the recipient of injustice and another thing to avoid acting unjustly toward others. While it is certainly possible to move from the former to the latter, from a Humean standpoint the link between them can only be through an extensive sympathy. Thus the ostensibly less demanding "negative" formulation of the motive to justice turns out to be virtually indistinguishable from the positive variant.
104. Barry Stroud, Hume, 209-217; and see Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 89.
105. Barry Stroud, Hume, 209-217; and see Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, 89.
106. As Hume says, "the notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to the general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it" (E 110). Taylor points out that Hume's presumption of consensus is not something that is available to us today. Taylor, "Hume and the Reality of Value," 128f. The above considerations suggest that the presumption may not have been a sound one even for Hume.
107. Hume uses the terms "character" and "integrity" interchangeably, and I have adopted his usage in the pages that follow.
108. Rawls agrees that it is integrity or "the desire for a character," which he regards as the strongest motive in Hume, that "supports duty and the sense of justice." Rawls, Lectures, 68, 93f. See also Árdal, Passion and Value, 186f.
109. Rawls agrees that it is integrity or "the desire for a character," which he regards as the strongest motive in Hume, that "supports duty and the sense of justice." Rawls, Lectures, 68, 93f. See also Árdal, Passion and Value, 186f.
110. In this respect, and despite his rejection of the politics of heroic virtue noted previously, Hume's treatment of justice suggests more common ground between his political theory and the modern tradition of civic republicanism than may first appear to be the case.
111. On Hume's account, the generalized perspective that attends the moral sentiments distinguishes them from other types of sentiment, but it does not give them greater value.
112. Jane L. McIntyre, "Character: A Humean Account," History of Philosophy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (April 1990): 202; and see Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," 5. Mounce offers a somewhat different interpretation, arguing that Hume's vision combines mechanistic and teleological conceptions of human nature, although he admits that these elements do not always sit easily alongside one another. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism, esp. 7f., 75-88. The view I am defending here suggests that Hume does sometimes appeal to teleological conceptions of human nature, and that his theory of justice relies on such an appeal, but that this appeal ultimately cannot be sustained in the face of the balance of his thought, which opposes it.
113. Jane L. McIntyre, "Character: A Humean Account," History of Philosophy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (April 1990): 202; and see Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," 5. Mounce offers a somewhat different interpretation, arguing that Hume's vision combines mechanistic and teleological conceptions of human nature, although he admits that these elements do not always sit easily alongside one another. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism, esp. 7f., 75-88. The view I am defending here suggests that Hume does sometimes appeal to teleological conceptions of human nature, and that his theory of justice relies on such an appeal, but that this appeal ultimately cannot be sustained in the face of the balance of his thought, which opposes it.
114. Jane L. McIntyre, "Character: A Humean Account," History of Philosophy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (April 1990): 202; and see Capaldi, "Hume as Social Scientist," 5. Mounce offers a somewhat different interpretation, arguing that Hume's vision combines mechanistic and teleological conceptions of human nature, although he admits that these elements do not always sit easily alongside one another. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism, esp. 7f., 75-88. The view I am defending here suggests that Hume does sometimes appeal to teleological conceptions of human nature, and that his theory of justice relies on such an appeal, but that this appeal ultimately cannot be sustained in the face of the balance of his thought, which opposes it.
115. Hume announced his opposition to the teleological approach in a letter to Francis Hutcheson, in which he specifically criticized Hutcheson for adopting such an approach: I cannot agree to your Sense of Natural. Tis founded on final Causes; which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or for the next? For himself or for his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends upon solving these Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose. (Hume, Letter to Francis Hutcheson [September 1739], in The Letters of David Hume, vol. I, ed. J. Y. T. Greig [Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1969], 33)
116. Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," in Essays, 234. As Blackburn has noted, the interplay between ethics and aesthetics attracted much interest among philosophers of the eighteenth century, and Hume was no exception. Blackburn, Ruling Passions, 11.
117. Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," in Essays, 234. As Blackburn has noted, the interplay between ethics and aesthetics attracted much interest among philosophers of the eighteenth century, and Hume was no exception. Blackburn, Ruling Passions, 11.
118. Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 228f., 246-249.
119. Ibid., 236.
120. Ibid., 240.
121. As Blackburn has said (in a critical response to the ironism of Richard Rorty), what we should seek is a mean between too much passionate commitment and too little: "You do not want to be a prig or bigot, but neither do you want to be a weightless aesthete, to whom all real commitment is a subject of joke or parody." Blackburn, Ruling Passions, 290.
122. Here I do not mean to equate political agency with civic participation traditionally conceived. In a healthy liberal democracy, agency will take many different forms, some of them outside the regular channels of civic participation. And just exertions of agency - or action in defense of justice - will sometimes involve transgressing the (unjust) laws of one's polity, or transcending them to act for justice in the international arena. Hume's fear of enthusiasm should inform but not paralyze us. In particular, it should not scare us off from the important business of articulating the legitimate grounds of the aspiration to justice. Afraid of inciting controversy and zealotry, liberalism today too often cedes the terrain of aspiration and seeks to neutralize its effects, thus depriving liberal justice of important sources of agency. For this reason, contemporary liberalism ironically risks producing the very outcome it dreads, which is for the most vigorously engaged political agents to be motivated by illiberal commitments. The danger, as Michael Sandel has pointed out, is that "fundamentalists [will] rush in where liberals fear to tread." Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
123. Taylor, "Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment," 176f.
124. Thus Jürgen Habermas has acknowledged the motivational deficit that plagues his own theory of justice as grounded in communicative reason, and he treats the deficit as a hazard endemic to all the contemporary cognitive theories of justice that derive from Kant, including that of Rawls. See Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christina Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 179. In more recent work, Habermas has sought to address the deficit (not altogether successfully) by appealing to the coercive power of the law and the notion of constitutional patriotism. See his Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), and The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo DeGreiff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
125. Thus Jürgen Habermas has acknowledged the motivational deficit that plagues his own theory of justice as grounded in communicative reason, and he treats the deficit as a hazard endemic to all the contemporary cognitive theories of justice that derive from Kant, including that of Rawls. See Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christina Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 179. In more recent work, Habermas has sought to address the deficit (not altogether successfully) by appealing to the coercive power of the law and the notion of constitutional patriotism. See his Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), and The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo DeGreiff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
126. Thus Jürgen Habermas has acknowledged the motivational deficit that plagues his own theory of justice as grounded in communicative reason, and he treats the deficit as a hazard endemic to all the contemporary cognitive theories of justice that derive from Kant, including that of Rawls. See Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christina Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 179. In more recent work, Habermas has sought to address the deficit (not altogether successfully) by appealing to the coercive power of the law and the notion of constitutional patriotism. See his Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), and The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo DeGreiff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
127. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
128. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
129. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
130. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
131. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
132. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
133. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
134. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
135. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
136. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
137. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
138. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
139. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
140. See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion; Cheryl Hall, "Passions and Constraint"; Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 'Constitutional Patriotism,'" Political Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 38-63; Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, "Passion and Politics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2003): 617-633; Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Rosenblum, Another Liberalism; Arash Abizadeh, "Can Habermasian Discourse Shake the Charge of Motivational Impotence? On Constitutional Patriotism, Rhetoric, and Affect" (panel paper for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, Boston); as well as A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Baier, Moral Prejudices; Blackburn, Ruling Passions; Williams, Moral Luck, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Solomon, A Passion for Justice.
141. This paraphrases Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion, 16f.