Authoritarian elections in Egypt: Formal institutions and informal mechanisms of rule

Democratization

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 974-990

  Koehler, Kevin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Authoritarianism; Egypt; Elections; Informal institutions; Middle East

Indexed keywords

EID: 56349118118     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340802362612     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. Thomas Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002), p. 10.
2. See the contributions in Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
3. Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié (eds), Elections Without Choice (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. vii.
4. Richard Snyder, 'Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes', in Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism (note 2), pp. 220-4.
5. For the concept of (neo)patrimonialism see Guenther Roth, 'Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States', World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1968), pp. 194-206
6. and Samuel N. Eisenstadt, Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1970).
7. The best elaboration of the consequences of neopatrimonial rule in Egypt is to be found in Peter Pawelka, Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ä gypten (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1985)
8. also see Robert Springborg, 'Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt: Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure Policy for Reclaimed Lands', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1979), pp. 49-69
9. for a regional perspective see James Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990).
10. For a conceptualization of neopatrimonialism as a set of informal institutions, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 61-8.
11. Bratton and Van de Walle (note 5), p. 63.
12. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 5.
13. Cf. Bratton and Van de Walle (note 5), pp. 65-8. The distinction between systematic clientelism and the use of state resources for legitimation may be blurred in reality. Still, it is useful to differentiate between personal relationships among individuals (clientelism) on the side and on the other side more impersonal relations between the elite and the populace.
14. The most important items subsidized in Egypt include food (bread, flour, cooking oil, sugar) and energy. In fiscal year 2004, according to World Bank data, 10.8 per cent of Gross Domestic Product, or 30 per cent of public expenditure, was spent on social welfare (including subsidies and transfer payments). In addition, the inflated size of the administrative system and public sector (around 5.5 million employees in 2005 or approximately 25 per cent of the labour force, according to the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, CAPMAS) must be interpreted as part of the 'social pact', serving to secure the acquiescence of parts of the populace; see World Bank, Egypt: Toward a More Effective Social Policy, World Bank Document No. 33550-EG, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005) and http://www.capmas.gov.eg/eng_ver/homeE.htm.
15. Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 239.
16. This has unanimously been reported by all members of parliament interviewed, regardless of their political affiliation with the NDP or the opposition. (Author's personal conversations with several deputies during August-October 2005 and September-November 2007.)
17. However, there are plans to replace the emergency law with anti-terrorism legislation in 2008.
18. See Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 68
19. and Joshua A. Stacher, 'Parties Over: The Demise of Egypt's Opposition Parties', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2004), pp. 215-33.
20. For a general overview of the 'menu of manipulation' at the disposal of authoritarian elites see Andreas Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation'v, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 36-50.
21. Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, '"Waiting for Godot": Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East', International Political Science Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2004), pp. 371-92.
22. For an excellent overview see Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, 'Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda', Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2004), pp. 725-40.
23. See ibid., p. 728, for a useful typology of the relationship between formal and informal institutions.
24. To be more precise, the term 'ineffectiveness' as employed here refers to the fact that, although there is a formal system of institutions (such as elections, a legislature, oppositional parties and so on), the rules and procedures set up by this formal institutional framework fail to determine the courses of action pursued by the principal actors.
25. Helmke and Levitsky (note 16), p. 729.
26. Author's personal conversation with former NDP deputy (1987-2005) and former president of a parliamentary committee, 17 November 2007. See also: Maye Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 76-82
27. and Ellen Lust-Okar, 'Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan', Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006), pp. 456-71, for similar observations on Jordan.
28. Author's personal conversation with NDP deputy, 4 October 2007.
29. Author's personal conversation with NDP deputy, 17 October 2005. This phenomenon of individualized service provision by deputies was referred to by all MPs (from both the NDP and the opposition) interviewed during two field research phases. The same phenomenon is also reported by Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy (note 20), p. 82-8.
30. Author's personal conversation with Muhammad Sherdy, 27 October 2007.
31. Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 80.
32. Lust-Okar (note 20), p. 463.
33. Author's personal conversation with NDP deputy, 17 October 2005.
34. Author's personal conversation with deputy for Hizb al-Wafd, 27 October 2007.
35. Holger Albrecht, 'How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt', Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2005), pp. 378-97.
36. Stacher (note 13);
37. Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy (note 20), pp. 92-7.
38. Stacher (note 13), p. 227.
39. This section on the events around Hizb al-'Amal draws heavily on Stacher (note 13), pp. 227-30, as well as Essam Fawzi and Ivesa Lübben, 'Zensur und Inquisition in Ä gypten. Das Dilemma des ägyptischen Legitimationsdiskurses', INAMO, Vol. 23/24 (2000), pp. 54-59, and several interviews conducted by the author in autumn 2005 and in September-December 2007.
40. Magdi Hussayn, the party's secretary general, maintains that his organization received no less then 14 court rulings favouring the reinstatement of al-'Amal (Author's personal conversation with Hussayn, 17 September 2007).
41. Author's personal conversations with Moussa, 6 October 2005 and 23 September 2007.
42. Moussa himself speaks rather openly about his personal contacts to the regime (author's personal conversations with Moussa, 8 October 2005 and 23 September 2007). This view of Moussa is, of course, shared by the Nour faction of Hizb al-Ghad (author's personal conversations with Wa'el Nawarra, member of Hizb al-Ghad [Nour faction], 16 October 2005), but also by independent observers (author's personal conversation with Amr Shoubaki, analyst at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 11 November 2007).
43. Author's personal conversation with Moussa, 23 September 2007. Although this legally put an end to two years of internal struggle, most Egyptian opposition figures still consider Ihab al-Kholi, the successor of Ayman Nour, as the legitimate president of Hizb al-Ghad, a view which is shared by independent analysts (personal conversation with Amr Shubaki, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 11 November 2007).
44. Kassem, Egyptian Politics (note 24), pp. 59-65
45. Mona El-Ghobashy, 'Egypt's Paradoxical Elections', Middle East Report, 238 (2006), pp. 20-9.
46. Kassem, Egyptian Politics (note 24), p. 63.
47. El-Gobashy (note 37), pp. 20-9.
48. In fact, in a rather unusual show of unity, opposition against the constitutional amendments united the Muslim Brotherhood with the remaining independent members of parliament and the representatives of the formal oppositional parties (author's personal conversation with Muhammad Saad al-Katatny, president of the MB's bloc in parliament, 28 November 2007).
49. See Wizara al-'Ilamat, Nusus al-Ta'dilat allati Turihat li-l-Istifta' (Cairo: Wizara al-'Ilamat, 2007) for the text of the amendments.
50. Persons close to the government and representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood both affirm the view that the constitutional changes primarily targeted the Brotherhood (author's personal conversations with former NDP deputy, 17 October 2007 and with Muhammad Saad al-Katatny, president of the MB's parliamentary bloc, 28 November 2007).
51. Author's personal conversation with Muhammad Sherdy, MP for Hizb al-Wafd, 27 October 2007.
52. Data is compiled from Moheb Zaki, Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994, (Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung/Ibn Khaldoun Center, 1994), p. 96
53. Jason Brownlee, Durable Authoritarianism in an Age of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 131-7
54. Gamal Zahran, 'Al-mustaqqilun wa al-munashiqun', in Amr Hashem Rabi' (ed.), Al-Intikhabat Maglis al-Sha'b 2005 (Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa al-Istratigiyya lil-Ahram, 2006), p. 180.
55. Mona Makram-Ebeid, 'Egypt's 2000 Parliamentary Elections', Middle East Policy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2001), p. 38.
56. Gamal Essam El-Din, 'Party's Old Guard Prevails', Al-Ahram Weekly, Vol. 765 (20-26 October 2005)
57. Zahran (note 44), p. 180. Although this number does not include members of the Muslim Brotherhood running as independents, not all remaining independents were necessarily associated with the NDP. Of the 195 candidates winning as independents (Muslim Brotherhood excluded), however, 170 subsequently joined the NDP, which can be taken as a clue to the overall proportion of independent candidates ready to (re)join the NDP.
58. Brownlee (note 44), p. 145 for the 2000 elections; author's personal conversation with Muhammad Kamal, member of the NDP's policies secretariat, 15 October 2005, for the 2005 elections.
59. Brownlee (note 44), pp. 134-7.
60. Author's personal communication with several NDP representatives in October 2005. On the selection process see also Virgine Collombier, 'The Internal Stakes of the 2005 Elections: The Struggle for Influence in Egypt's National Democratic Party', Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007), pp. 95-111.
61. Author's personal conversation with Muhammad Kamal, 15 October 2005.
62. Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy (note 20), pp. 76-9.
63. This is most visible in those constituencies where the NDP failed to nominate official candidates at all, but had different prominent members of the party competing against each other.
64. Author's personal conversations with NDP-deputies, 17 October 2005 and 4 November 2007. Similar
65. Terry Lynn Karl, 'Electoralism', in Richard Rose (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Elections (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000).