Thailand since the coup

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 140-153

  Pongsudhirak, Thitinan ^a  

^a CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY   (Thailand)

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EID: 56049091280     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. In one of the many ironies of contemporary Thai politics, Samak is a veteran right-wing politician who played a significant role in inciting mob violence against student and other left-leaning activists in the mid-1970s. On 9 September 2008, the Constitutional Court of Thailand disqualified Samak from the premiership on the basis of a minor conflict-of-interest charge stemming from payments that he had collected as the host of two televised cooking shows. At the time of this writing, shortly after the disqualification ruling came down, it is possible that the PPP's near-majority in parliament may vote to return Samak to the premiership; may hand the office over to another candidate (probably, but not necessarily, from PPP ranks); may dissolve the current parliament in order to make way for new elections; or may accommodate a government of national unity led by a current MP or a respected outsider (in which case the suspension or revision of certain clauses of the 2007 Constitution would become necessary). Whatever happens, it seems unlikely that the PAD will abandon its campaign based on street demonstrations and the recent illegal takeover of the Government House complex. In short, the fundamental showdown that now grips Thai politics will continue, even if its shape shifts somewhat or the precise cast of characters changes.
2. See Allen Hicken, "Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai," Journal of East Asian Studies 6 (September 2006): 381-408;
3. Erik Martinez Kuhonta, "The Paradox of Thailand's 1997 'People's Constitution': Be Careful What You Wish For," Asian Survey 48 (May-June 2008): 373-92;
4. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution," in John Funston, ed., Thailand's Continuing Crises: The Coup and Violence in the South (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008);
5. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2003 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
6. For a critique of the "good coup" argument, see Michael K. Connors and Kevin Hewison, "Introduction: Thailand and the 'Good Coup,'" Journal of Contemporary Asia 38 (February 2008): 1-10.
7. For an elaboration, see Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Thaksin: Competitive Authoritarian and Flawed Dissident," in John Kane, Haig Patapan, and Benjamin Wong, eds., Dissident Democrats: The Challenge of Democratic Leadership in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008);
8. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Thaksin's Political Zenith and Nadir," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).
9. For a book-length exposition on Thaksin, see Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm, 2004).
10. In the event, the CNS leadership wanted to delay the elections until 2008 but was constrained by Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont's insistence on sticking to the original timetable. Author's interviews with two CNS members, 6 June and 5 August 2008.
11. For more details on the PAD, see Oliver Pye and Wolfram Schaffar, "The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement in Thailand: An Analysis," Journal of Contemporary Asia 38 (February 2008): 38-61.
12. The PAD called for a lower-house ratio of 70 percent appointees and 30 percent elected members of parliament. It also openly invited the military to intervene and put an end to the Samak government. See Matichon Sutsapda (Bangkok), 27 June-3 July 2008, 9.
13. Under the 1997 Constitution, one MP represented each of the 400 constituencies, whereas the 100 places on the party-lists were based on proportional representation nationwide. The 2007 charter reverted to the older practice of apportioning two or three seats to each constituency, and the party-list MPs were reduced to 80 and divided into 8 voting zones of 10 seats each, allowing some of the northeast provinces to be grouped with those of the central region to lessen the impact of northeastern voters' heavy support for the PPP.
14. General Surayud stepped down from the 19-member Privy Council, which advises the King on state affairs, to assume the premiership, and was reinstated to the Council in a matter of days after the Samak cabinet was sworn in.
15. See UN Development Programme, Sufficiency Economy and Human Development (Bangkok: UNDP, 2007).
16. Paul M. Handley, The King Never Smiles, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
17. For an assessment of this book's political implications, see Kevin Hewison, "A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup," Journal of Contemporary Asia 38 (February 2008): 190-11.