Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 44, Issue 12, 2008, Pages 1302-1311

  Carmona, Guilherme ^a  

^a NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Bayesian games; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Pure strategies; Purification

Indexed keywords

EID: 55949101980     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.002     Document Type: Article

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