Reference and attention: A difficult connection

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 120, Issue 1-3, 2004, Pages 277-286

  Kelly, Sean Dorrance ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55449105953     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033758.28213.2e     Document Type: Review

References (9)

1. See Milner, A. David and Melvin Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2. John Campbell, 'Reference as Attention', p. 4 (in the manuscript).
3. Gareth Evans discusses a case like this in Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 90.
4. See, for instance, Lynn Robertson, Anne Treisman, Stacia Friedman-Hill and Marcia Grabowecky, 'The Interaction of Spatial and Object Pathways: Evidence from Balint's Syndrome', Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 9(3) (1997), 295-317.
5. See, for instance, p. 5 of the manuscript (beginning of section 2).
6. Evans, for one, does seem to impose a track-ability condition on demonstrative thought. See, for instance, Varieties of Reference, section 6.4.
7. See p. 4 of the manuscript.
8. Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Robert Brandom (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 74.
9. The Visual Brain in Action, p. 202.