Debt and currency crises - Complements or substitutes?

Review of International Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 955-970

  Herz, Bernhard ^a   Tong, Hui ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BAYREUTH   (Germany)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BUDGET DEFICIT; CURRENCY; DEBT CRISIS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST; PROBABILITY; STOCK MARKET;

EID: 55449100017     PISSN: 09657576     EISSN: 14679396     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00760.x     Document Type: Article

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