McDowell's Kant: Mind and World

Philosophy

Volumn 71, Issue 276, 1996, Pages 219-243

  Bird, Graham ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 54949105697     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100041450     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. J. McDowell, Mind and World (Harvard University Press, 1994). This account of dualism is the most general, and crudest, way of drawing such a distinction. It is, of course, not just the ordinary contrast between what is mental and what is physical, but a philosophical gloss on that distinction, and it should not be thought that I accept its terms. McDowell himself invokes also related, but different, distinctions between the natural and the intentional, and the natural and the normative, in order to canvass more subtle contrasts
2. See my 'Recent Interpretations of the Transcendental Deduction', Kant-Studien, 1974, Akten des 4-ten Kant-Kongresses, Teil I, 1-14
3. 'Kant's Transcendental Idealism' in Idealism - Past and Present, G. Vesey (ed.), (Cambridge University Press, 1982)
4. and 'Tradition and Revolution in Kant', forthcoming in Kant-Studien
5. In 'The Problem of Realism and the A Priori', in P. Parrini (ed.), Kant and Contemporary Epistemology, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994)
6. In Kant's Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 1962), Preface p. ix, I had also indicated that historical parallel
7. Richard Aquila 'Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and Reality in Kant', Archiv fur Geschicte der Philosophie 61 (1979), 293-308
8. Hoke Robinson, 'Two Perspectives on Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves', Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XXXII, July 1994
9. R. Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language (London: Kegan Paul, 1937). Carnap's account is more technical that Kant's, but has also evident weaknesses. One is his insistence that formal and material sentences are equivalent, or equipollent, even though for 'quasi-syntactical' or 'pseudo-object' sentences the material mode of expression is misleading. Another arises from some unplausible analyses, as when he claims that 'Yesterday's lecture was about Babylon' is equivalent to 'In yesterday's lecture either the word "Babylon" or a synonym occurred"'. Kant's account is less formally developed, and rests on a recognition of an intentionality which enables us to speak of apparent objects under different descriptions and without commitment to existence, and of philosophical theories as providing such re-descriptions of familiar objects in experience
10. Quine's form of semantic holism has been influential, and Wittgenstein's later philosophy can be read as a gesture towards some form of holistic view of language. But these notions remain obscure and sometimes controversial. See, for example, Fodor, Psycho-Semantics (MIT Press, 1987)
11. Andy Clark, Microcognition (MIT Press, 1989)
12. Kant's Theory of Knowledge, Ch. 1
13. See my 'Kant's Transcendental Arguments' in Reading Kant, E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl (eds), (Blackwell, 1989), 21-39