Heidegger's critique of the vulgar notion of time

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 43-66

  Keller, Pierre ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Demonstratives; Heidegger; Temporality; Time; Vulgar

Indexed keywords

EID: 54749117216     PISSN: 09672559     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09672559608570824     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. J. M. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), Bk V, Ch. 33
2. A valuable survey of the current state of the discussion may be found in L. Oaklander and Quentin Smith (eds), The New Theory of Time (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)
3. Cf. the discussion of temporal transcendence and intentionality in Françoise Dastur, 'La constitution ekstatique-horizontale de la temporalité chez Heidegger', Heidegger Studies 2 (1984), pp. 97-110, esp. p. 100
4. M. Heidegger, The Concept of Time, English-German edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 18, 18E
5. M. Bronstein and L. Landau, Soviet Physics 4 (1933), p. 114
6. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Aufbau der Physik (Hamburg: Hanser, 1985), esp. pp. 136-9
7. Another influential account of demonstratives, which conceives of them as involving an immediate reference to their object, may be found in Kaplan in 'On Demonstratives', in Wettstein, Almog and Perry (eds), Themes from Kaplan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989)
8. The evidence for this may be found in Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 556
9. and also by Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time, and Spacetime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 272-5
10. For a defence of the view that special relativity is incompatible with temporal becoming, cf. Hilary Putnam, 'Time and Physical Geometry', Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), pp. 240-7
11. and C. W. Rietdijk, 'A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity', Philosophy of Science 33 (1966), pp. 341-4
12. 'Der Zeitbegriff in der Geisteswissenschaft', (GA 1, pp. 413-4, esp. p. 424.)
13. Eleanore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 'Eternity', Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 429-58, distinguish eternity as atemporal duration from time, but this is because they identify time and the temporal with succession. Heidegger's point is that the putatively atemporal notion of eternity involves a notion of omnipresence that is temporal, although it does not involve succession
14. For an articulation of this view, cf. Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 254 ff. Dreyfus's reconstruction of Heidegger's position as a 'hermeneutical realism' which is opposed to ontological reductionism is, in general, quite plausible. But he cannot get around Heidegger's dual commitment to a notion of being which is identical with what is intelligible to us and a notion of being which is independent of what is intelligible to us
15. M. Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 117
16. 'Zeit und Sein', Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), pp. 10 ff