Quality of group decisions;Qualität von gruppenentscheidungen

OR Spectrum

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 165-177

  Lindstädt, Hagen ^a  

^a GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Game theory; Group decisions; Simulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649085184     PISSN: 01716468     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s002910050065     Document Type: Article

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