Logic of knowledge and utterance and the liar

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 85-108

  Tzouvaras, Athanassios ^a  

^a ARISTOTLE UNIVERSITY OF THESSALONIKI   (Greece)

Author keywords

Liar paradox; Logic of knowledge; Utterance operator

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649085008     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017946620987     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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5. Moses, Y.: Resource-bounded Knowledge, Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge 1988 (TARK-2), M. Vardi (ed), Morgan-Kaufmann, 1988, 261-275.
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