Qi and phenomenology of wind

Continental Philosophy Review

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 321-335

  Ogawa, Tadashi ^a  

^a KYOTO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

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EID: 54649084510     PISSN: 13872842     EISSN: 15731103     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010007218371     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Dogen, Shobo-Genzo, the third book Genjyo-Koan, Iwanami Universal-Bibliothek, Volume One, 87.
2. Yasushi Aizawa, Shinron und Itekihen, Iwanami-Universal-Bibliothek, 260, 272.
3. Aizawa, Shinron und Itekihen, 272.
4. To the concept of intercultural invariance see my article "Translation as a cultural-philosophical problem: Towards a phenomenology of culture, in The Monist, Vol. 78, No. 1, 1995.
5. Plato, Timaeus, 78E-79A.
6. C. Baudelaire, Le Gouffre, Les Fleurs du Mal, Editions Garnier, Paris 1961, p. 189, especially the notebook of Baudelaire, p. 448.
7. English translation by Lewis Piaget Shanks, Les Fleurs du Mal: Baudelaire Complete Poems: "- Alas! I see abysses everywhere:/Dreams, action words! and o'er my lifted hair/Full oft I feel the wind of Horror glide."
8. Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenology, was able to open the fundamental dimension; this is nothing other than the fact that human beings are deeply and definitively rooted in the world. Concerning his phenomenology of passivity it suffices to say the following: In the phenomenology of active constitution, I have the object constituted before me. Generally speaking, objectivity presupposes that the developed ego constitutes formal unification from material complexity as the object as such. Therefore, the crux of the problem in passive phenomenology concerns the realm in which the ego is not yet developed enough as ego, namely, the sphere prior to all activity of the ego. In the passive sphere, the pregivenness prior to the apperception of a unified object as such appears as hyle in the domain of the passivity. This pregivenness, hyle, that works upon the ego Husserl calls "Reiz'' allure, excitation. With this concept, Husserl has in mind the affection of the pre-egoic world on the developing ego. Like the landscape seen by the extremely shortsighted eyes, the unity-formation is withdrawn. Only the hyle, namely, the extension of colors or sounds appear in the phenomenal field. The phenomenology of passivity in Husserl allows us to see this dimension as something structured with logical meaning in which the pre-objective and the pre-subjective interpenetrate. In the background of all predicative logical truth there must be a pre-predicative world which is evidently opened up in the pre-linguistic level. It is the body that plays such an eminent in opening up this prelinguistic world. "The world is constituted in such a way that in it, even the ego emerges as embodied." ["Die Welt ist so konstituiert, daß in ihr selbst das Ich als verleiblichtes auftritt."]. Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Husserliana Vol. XV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 287.
9. Concerning Husserl's notion of passivity, see Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, Hua. XL S 101-102.
10. [English translation by Anthony J. Steinbock, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Husserliana Collected Works (Boston: Kluwer, forthcoming)].
11. See my article: Das Hervorgehen der Sprache (Logos) aus der natürlichen Welterfahrung, in Japanische Beiträge zur Phänomenologie, Alber: Freiburg i.Br. -München 1984. I have thematized there the relation of atmosphere in Schmitz and passivity in Husserl.
12. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927), 136: "Die Stimmung kommt weder von "Außen" noch von "Innen", sondern steigt als Weise des In-der-Welt-seins aus diesem selbst auf. Die Stimmung überfällt."
13. English translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 176: "A mood assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being."
14. Hermann Schmitz, System der Philosophie, Bd. III./2., (Bonn: Bouvier, 1969)
15. Klaus Held, "Die gegenwärtige Lage der Philosophie - Heideggers Phänomenologie der Grundstimmungen, in Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers, eds., Dietrich Papenfuss und Otto Pöggeler, Ffm, 1990.
16. English translation by Anthony J. Steinbock, "Fundamental Moods and Heidegger's Critique of Contemporary Culture," in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed., John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 286-303.
17. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 142: "Verstehen ist immer gestimmtes."
18. Heidegger, Being and Time, 177
19. (translation slightly modified). Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 137-138: "In der Befindlichkeit liegt existenzial eine erschließende Angewiesenheit auf Welt, aus der her Angehendes begegnen kann."
20. Emile Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Paris: PUF, 1968); following the Japanese Translation, Iwanami-Universal-Bibliothek, Vol. I. p. 378-380.
21. Heidegger, M.: Gesamtausgabe Bd. 29/30. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik S 98 ff.
22. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans., William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana, 1995), 65-66 (translation slightly modified). "Die Stimmungen sind erstens kein Seiendes, kein Etwas, das irgendwie in der Seele nur vorkommt; Stimmungen sind zweitens ebensowenig das Unbeständigste und Flüchtigste, wie man meint."
23. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts, 66-67
24. (translation slightly modified). Heidegger, GA 29/30, 100-101: "Die Stimmung ist sowenig darinnen in irgendeiner Seele des anderen und sowenig auch daneben in der unsrigen, daß wir viel eher sagen müssen und sagen: Diese Stimmung legt sich nun über alles, sie ist gar nicht darinnen in einer Innerlichkeit und erscheint dann nur im Blick des Auges; . . . Die Stimmung ist nicht ein Seiendes, das in der Seele als Erlebnis vorkommt, sondern das Wie unseres Miteinander-Daseins" "Die Stimmung steckt an."
25. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts, 66-67
26. (translation slightly modified). Heidegger, GA 29/30, 100-101: "Die Stimmung ist . . . die Grundweise, wie das Dasein als Dasein ist. . . . Die Stimmungen sind die Grundweisen, in denen wir uns so und so befinden."
27. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, ed., Ludwig Landgrebe (Meiner: Hamburg 1972), §§26-29.
28. English translation by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks, Experience and Judgment, ed., Ludwig Landgrebe (Evanston: Northwestern University Press., 1973).
29. See my book, The Logos of Phenomenon, (Tokyo, 1986), 14-47.
30. See Gernot Böhme, Atmosphäre, 1995. Since there are some naturalisitic moments in his concept of atmosphere, I will purify his concept of them and take him to task in the following description.
31. Cf. my book: The Logos of Phenomenon, Tokyo 1986.
32. Aristotle said in his book "On the soul": "aisthanometha ge panton dia tou mesou. " We perceive all things through a medium. De Anima, 423 b 6-7. Loeb Classical Library, 1975, 132-133.
33. According to a Buddhistic school in India, vaisesika, time is conceived as analogous to wind, an element among four fundamental elements (earth, fire, water, and wind). Since they are difficult to objectify and because they are movements that one cannot see, wind and time are not to be seen, but felt. E. Ejima, "Time theory of the Mahayana-Buddhism," in Bukkyo-Shiso, vol. 1. (Tokyo: Riso-sha 1974, 1980), 236 f.
34. I understand under the concept of body-state that of the "Zustand" des Leibs. Zustand is non-intentional way of appearance of a body. Cf. Klaus Held: Heraklit Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft, Berlin-New York 1980. P. 371.
35. "Spreche ich nicht zu einem menschlichen Hörer, so kann ich doch zu allem sprechen, was mich umgibt, ja selbst zum Teilen meines Ich." Hermann Ammann, Die Menschliche Rede (Darmstadt: 1974, fourth edition), 168.