Calculation of self-interest and constitutional consensus: The role of ideology

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 323-333

  Sutter, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649083783     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009043420573     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Brainard, W. (1967) "Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy. American Economic Review 57: 11-25.
2. Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J. M. (1985) The Reason of Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Buchanan, J. M. (1977) Freedom in Constitutional Contract. College Station TX: Texas A&M Press.
4. Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
5. Buchanan, J. M., and Vanberg, V. (1989) "A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction." Public Choice 61: 15-28.
6. Buchanan, J. M., and Wagner, R. E. (1977) Democracy in Deficit. London: Institute for Economic Affairs.
7. Colander, D. C., and Klamer, A. (1987) "The Making of an Economist." Journal of Economic Perspectives 1(2): 95-111.
8. Ehrlich, P. R., and Ehrlich, A. H. (1996) Betrayal of Science and Reason. Washington DC: Island Press.
9. Eichberger, J., and Pethig, R. (1994) "Constitutional Choice of Rules." European Journal of Political Economy 10: 311-37.
10. Fernandez, R., and Rodrik, D. (1991) "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty." American Economic Review 81(5): 1146-55.
11. Frankel, J. A., and Rockett, K. E. (1988) "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policy Makers Do Not Agree on the True Model." American Economic Review 78(3): 318-40.
12. Frey, B. S., Pommerehne, W. W., Schneider, F., and Gilbert, G. (1984) "Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry." American Economic Review 74(5): 986-94.
13. Heiner, R. A. (1983) "The Origin of Predictable Behavior." American Economic Review 73(4): 560-86.
14. Higgs, R. (1987) Crisis and Leviathan. New York: Oxford University Press.
15. Hinich, M., and Munger, M. (1994) Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
16. Kau, J. B., and Rubin, P. H. (1979) "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting." Journal of Law and Economics 22: 365-84.
17. Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J., and Behrens III, W. W. (1972) The Limits to Growth. New York: Potomac Association.
18. Moore, S. (1995) "The Coming Age of Abundance." In: Bailey, R. (ed.) The True State of the Planet, pp. 109-39. New York: Free Press.
19. Müller, C. (1998) "The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled." Constitutional Political Economy 9(1): 5-17.
20. Pinto Barbosa, A. S. (1994) "Manipulating Uncertainty." Constitutional Political Economy 5(3): 255-71.
21. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
22. Roemer, J. E. (1994) "The Strategic Role of Party Ideology when Voters are Uncertain About How the Economy Works." American Political Science Review 88(2): 327-35.
23. Schweizer, U. (1990) "Calculus of Consent: A Game-Theoretic Approach." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 28-54.
24. Simon, J. (1981) The Ultimate Resource. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
25. Sowell, T. (1987) A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles. New York: William and Morrow.
26. Swank, O. (1994) "Partisan Views of the Economy." Public Choice 81: 137-50.
27. Tabarrok, A. (1995) "Irrelevance Propositions are Irrelevant. Kyklos 48: 409-17.
28. Tietenberg, T. (1996) Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 4th edition. New York: Harper Collins.
29. Tullock, G. (1959) "Some Problems of Majority Voting." Journal of Political Economy 67: 571-79.
30. Vanberg, V., and Buchanan, J. M. (1994) "Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice." In: Vanberg, V. (ed.) Rules and Choice in Economics, 167-77. New York: Routledge.
31. Wagner, R. E. (1993) Parchment, Guns and Constitutional Order. Brookfield VT: Edward Elgar.
32. Wicksell, K. [1958 (1896)] "A New Principle of Just Taxation." In: Musgrave, R.A., and Peacock, A.T. (eds.) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pp. 72-118. London: Macmillan.
33. Wittman, D. (1989) "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results." Journal of Political Economy 97(6): 1395-424. 335-338