Converse-Erie: The key to federalism in an increasingly administrative State

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 76, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1372-1391

  Oliveri, Joseph R ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 54549083270     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (138)

1. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 50-54 (2006).
3. Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 612 n.2 (2007).
4. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Clermont, supra note 2, at 2.
6. This doctrine is also referred to by scholars as "reverse- Erie," e.g., id., or "inverse-Erie," e.g., Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 941 n.10, 963 n.76 (1988).
7. See Clermont, supra note 2, at 2 & n.5. The first article to note and describe the converse-Erie phenomenon, Alfred Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions - The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384 (1956), was not written until 1956, and relatively few commentaries devoted significant analysis to this new doctrine prior to Kevin M. Clermont's thorough analysis, published in 2006. See Clermont, supra note 2.
8. Id. at 2; see, e.g., Shelly F. Spansel, Comment, Robins Dry Dock Versus State Laws Governing Liability for Pure Economic Loss: How the Maritime Circuit Should Resolve the Preemption Conflict, 51 LOY. L. REV. 165, 176 n.60 (2005) (describing reverse-Erie as a "doctrine [that] requires state courts, when adjudicating a maritime case, to apply the applicable substantive maritime law rather than state law").
9. See, e.g., Peter Thompson, State Courts and State Law: A New Force in Admiralty?, 8 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 223, 230-32 (1996).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.; see, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1784 (1992) (describing reverse-Erie cases as "simply an extension of the supremacy line of cases" and indistinguishable from both supremacy and preemption cases).
11. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see, e.g., Reza Dibadj, From Incongruity to Cooperative Federalism, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 845, 874 (2006) (referring to the "reverse-Erie principle, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Testa v. Katt").
12. See Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 100 (1998).
13. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392-93 (1879) (noting the supremacy of federal law over state law); see also Testa, 330 U.S. at 390-91 (stating that, because of the supremacy of federal law, the policy of a federal law is the policy of every state, and a state cannot refuse to comply with the mandates of federal law).
14. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 12, at 105.
15. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954).
16. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.5 (4th ed. 2003).
17. See Clermont, supra note 2, at 14, 43.
18. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century . . . ."). See generally Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1994).
19. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
20. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 400 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2005).
21. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (noting the great importance of this concept, which provides that "the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States").
22. Unsurprisingly, the problem of converse-Erie, like that of Erie, predates the case from which it takes its name. Clermont, supra note 2, at 23; see, e.g., Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923) ("Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.").
23. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). A comprehensive examination and analysis of the Erie doctrine is beyond the scope of this Essay. For a thorough examination of the doctrine, see generally, for example, John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
24. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1842).
25. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Subsequent decisions have refined the Court's analysis in Erie. With regard to substantive state laws, the Court has held that state law should be applied only if outcome determinative, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), with outcome determination viewed in light of Erie's twin aims of avoiding forum-shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws, Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 747 (1980) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)), but that state law might not be applied if there is a sufficient countervailing federal interest, see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-39 (1958). With regard to rules of procedure, the Court has held that if a federal statute dictating procedure conflicts with a state rule of procedure, the federal statute will preempt the state rule, see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988), and a federal rule of procedure will displace a state rule if the federal rule is consistent with the federal Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000), Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965); see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (holding that a rule is procedural if it "really regulates procedure, - the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them").
26. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
27. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting), partially superseded by statute on other grounds, Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2000).
28. Indeed, on the same day that the Supreme Court announced its opinion in Erie, it decided Hindernder v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), in which it created and applied federal common law to determine whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between neighboring states. See id. at 110.
29. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) ("This Court has consistently held that federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide federal programs."); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) ("The duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it . . . find their roots in the same federal sources. In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards." (internal citations omitted)).
30. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
31. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 ("[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.").
32. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (explaining that, in "the penumbra of express statutory mandates" where "express statutory sanction" is lacking, courts must "fashion[] a remedy to effectuate [federal] policy"). The Constitution itself may provide such implicit instructions. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co., 244 U.S. at 214-15 (holding that the admiralty jurisdiction clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides implicit authority for federal courts to create federal common law).
33. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
34. See id. at 463-64, 473-74 (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not state law, governed the method for service of process in federal courts).
35. See supra note 13.
36. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 12, at 100.
37. Id. at 100-01; see also supra note 13.
38. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 12, at 100.
39. Id. at 101. It is clear that state courts may not always employ their own procedures when adjudicating federal rights. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (holding that state procedure cannot apply when it "burdens the exercise of [a] federal right" in such a way that is "inconsistent in both design and effect with the . . . aims" of a federal law), partially superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000), as recognized in Higgason v. Stogsdill, 818 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, § 3.5 (noting that state courts must follow federal procedures if state procedures would "unduly burden" federal rights).
40. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 12, at 105.
41. Id. at 106.
42. Hart, supra note 15, at 508.
43. Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999)
44. (citing Margaret G. Stewart, Federalism and Supremacy: Control of State Judicial Decision-Making, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 437 (1992)).
45. See Hart, supra note 15, at 508.
46. This is precisely the situation in Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 400 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2005). See infra Part II.B.
47. See supra note 39.
48. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
49. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
50. Dice, 342 U.S. at 360.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 360-61.
54. Id. at 361.
55. Id. at 363 (citing Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949)).
56. Id. at 363.
57. New Orleans & Ne. R.R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367, 372 (1918); see Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White. 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915).
58. See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949).
59. See White, 238 U.S. at 512.
60. Brown, 338 U.S. at 299.
61. Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
62. Id. at 298.
63. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
64. Id. at 245.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
66. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, § 3.5; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
67. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), partially superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000), as recognized in Higgason v. Stogsdill, 818 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
68. Id. at 135.
69. Id. at 135-36. The Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute "provides that no action may be brought or maintained against any state governmental subdivision, agency, or officer unless the claimant either provides written notice of the claim within 120 days of the alleged injury, or demonstrates that the relevant subdivision, agency, or officer had actual notice of the claim and was not prejudiced by the lack of written notice." Id. at 136; see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West 2006).
70. Felder, 487 U.S. at 138.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 141.
73. Id. at 151.
74. Howlett v. Rose, 4% U.S. 356 (1990).
75. See id. at 383.
76. Id. at 372 (quoting Hart, supra note 15, at 508); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
77. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372 (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 372-73.
79. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
80. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C §§ 1400-1482 (2000).
81. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 51 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)).
84. Id. at 53 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)).
85. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. 11415(f)). School districts may also seek such a hearing. Id
86. id. at 54 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 54-55.
90. In Maryland, IEP hearings are presided over by ALJs. MD. CODE. ANN., EDUC. § 8-413(d)(5) (LexisNexis 2006).
91. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 55.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004), aff'd, 546 U.S. 49 (2005)).
94. See id. at 56-62.
95. Id. at 56.
96. See id. at 57.
97. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000); see Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
98. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); see Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57 (citing Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999)).
99. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
100. See id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
101. See id. (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999)).
102. Id. at 54 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2000)).
103. Cf. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) ("Our cases indicate that a court should endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal rules only when the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards, or when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand. Otherwise, we have indicated that federal courts should incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of decision, unless application of [the particular] state law [in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs." (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
104. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61.
105. Id. at 61 (citing such laws in Minnesota, Alabama, Alaska, and Delaware).
106. Id. at 61-62.
107. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 12 (1842).
108. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
109. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
110. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 69-71 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 70.
112. See id. at 71.
113. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
114. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 71 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002) (noting that when interpreting statutes "designed to advance cooperative federalism . . ., we have not been reluctant to leave a range of permissible choices to the States").
115. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The school district bears the burden, by statute or regulation, in Alaska, Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, and West Virginia; the moving party bears the burden by statute or regulation in Indiana and Kentucky; and the burden varies depending upon the remedy sought in Georgia and Minnesota. Id. (listing statutory references).
116. Id. at 71.
117. See id. ("Indeed, in today's technologically and legally complex world, whether court decisions embody that kind of judicial respect [for congressional determinations to defer to state law] may represent the true test of federalist principle."); cf. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 420 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]hen faced with [linguistic] ambiguity, we are to interpret statutes of this kind on the assumption that Congress intended to preserve local authority.").
118. Clean Air Act ("CAA"), tit. 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (2000). The CAA directs the EPA to promulgate regulations governing such programs and establish minimum requirements for them. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 400 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)).
119. Id. at 1279-80 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6)). The EPA promulgated regulations incorporating this state judicial review requirement. Id. at 1280 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(3)(x) (2007)). According to the statutory and regulatory regime, to obtain judicial review, a non-applicant, non-commenter must satisfy state standing requirements.
120. Id. at 1280 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(i)(1), (2), (4)).
121. Id. at 1280-81.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1281 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 1281-82.
125. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
126. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
127. Id.
128. See supra text accompanying note 23.
129. See supra note 18.
130. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990).
131. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
132. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.