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Volumn 344, Issue 1-2, 2004, Pages 24-29

Minority mechanisms in models of agents learning collectively a resource level

Author keywords

Competition; Credit risk models; El Farol; Global ultimatum game; Minority game; Minority mechanisms; Resource level

Indexed keywords

BANK PROTECTION; COMPETITION; FINANCE; GAME THEORY; LEARNING SYSTEMS; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 5444268853     PISSN: 03784371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2004.06.082     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (6)

References (14)
  • 1
    • 0031333279 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • preprint adap-org/9708006
    • D. Challet, Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A 246 (1997) 407 preprint adap-org/9708006.
    • (1997) Physica A , vol.246 , pp. 407
    • Challet, D.1    Zhang, Y.-C.2
  • 6
    • 85008794154 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • preprint cond-mat/0101351
    • J. Berg, et al., Quant. Finance 1, 203-221, preprint cond-mat/0101351.
    • Quant. Finance , vol.1 , pp. 203-221
    • Berg, J.1
  • 11
    • 0001998145 scopus 로고
    • Bargaining experiments
    • J. Kagel, A.E. Roth (Eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
    • A.E. Roth, Bargaining experiments, in: J. Kagel, A.E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995, pp. 171-202.
    • (1995) Handbook of Experimental Economics , pp. 171-202
    • Roth, A.E.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.