The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 343-361

  Merlin, Vincent ^a   Valognes, Fabrice ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU HAVRE   (France)

Author keywords

Indifference; Probabilities; Voting Rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 5444233043     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.04.002     Document Type: Article

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