Open method of coordination: A new stepping stone in the legal order of international and European relations

Nordic Journal of International Law

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 235-251

  Ter Haar, Beryl ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Gap thesis; New governance; Open method of coordination; Soft law; Theory of hybrid structures between soft law and hard law

Indexed keywords

EID: 53849101851     PISSN: 09027351     EISSN: 15718107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181008X323993     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. E.g. W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University Press, New York, 1964);
2. and F. Scharpf, "The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity", 40 Journal of Common Markets (2002) pp. 649-653.
3. Cf. D. M. Trubek et al., '"Soft law", "Hard law", and EU Integration', in G. De Búrca and J. Scott, Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) p. 77.
4. See more generally J. Scott and D. M. Trubek, 'Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union', 8:2 European Law Journal (2002);
5. and G. de Búrca and J. Scott, Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006), pp. 2-6.
6. De Búrca and Scott, ibid., p. 3.
7. E.g. J. Zeitlin, 'The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action. Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, Reform Strategy', in J. Zeitlin and Ph. Pochet (eds.)
8. with L. Magnussen, The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action. The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies (P.I.E.P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005) pp. 448 and 470-476.
9. See also European Council's Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000, paras. 37-39.
10. For more elaboration, see section 2 of this paper.
11. Those scholars that examine the legal aspects of the OMC do this either based on a theoretical perspective or based on case-studies of the practice. See for two major works in this field: C. Joerges, I-J. Sand and G. Teubner, Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004);
12. and de Búrca and Scott, supra note 2.
13. E.g. D. Thürer, '"Soft law" eine neue From von Völkerrecht', 104:1 Revue de Droit Suisse (1985) pp. 429-453;
14. and J. Klabbers, 'The Redundancy of Soft Law', 65:2 Nordic Journal of International Law (1996) pp. 167-182.
15. K. W. Abbott et al., 'The Concept of Legalization', 50:3 International Organization (2000) pp. 401-419.
16. See among others R. R. Baxter, 'International Law in "Her Infinite Variety"', 29 International & Comparative Law Quarterly (1980) p. 563;
17. and Abbott et al., ibid., pp. 404-408.
18. Cf. C. Lipson, 'Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?', 45:4 International Organization (1991) p. 502;
19. Abbott et al., supra note 8, pp. 401, 402;
20. and D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance. The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) p. 30.
21. See for further elaboration Abbott et al., supra note 8, pp. 404-408.
22. E.g. K. C. Wellens and G. M. Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community Law', 14 European Law Review (1989) p. 274.
23. E.g. Abbott et al., supra note 8.
24. This can also be deduced from the above given definition of the ideal-type of international hard law. Just like Abbott et al., I choose not to introduce the possibility of enforcement by sanctions as a common characteristic since there is in relation to international law no general agreement about its necessity in order to create hard law.
25. Cf. M. Bothe, 'Legal and Non-legal norms - A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?', 11 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1980) p. 66;
26. Wellens and Borchardt, supra note 12, p. 274;
27. Abbott et al., supra note 8, p. 401; and A. Schäfer, 'Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organisations Introduce Soft Law', 12:2 European Law Journal (2006) p. 195.
28. See especially Bothe, ibid., p. 85,
29. J. L. Charney, 'Commentary: Compliance With International Soft Law', in Shelton, supra note 10, pp. 115-118.
30. See also C. M. Chinkin, "The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law', 38 International &" Comparative Law Quarterly (1989) p. 861;
31. and Schäfer, supra note 15, p. 208.
32. See Abbott et al., supra note 8, pp. 416-418,
33. which is repeated by Schäfer, supra note 15, p. 195.
34. See among others Bothe, supra note 15, p. 87;
35. and Abbott et al., supra note 8.
36. See Friedmann, supra note 1, chs. 1 and 6, and pp. 365-368.
37. U. Mört (ed.), Soft Law in Governance and Regulation. An Interdisciplinary Analysis (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2004) p. 1;
38. and Friedmann, supra note 1, pp. 68-71.
39. Mört, ibid.
40. See also B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Palgrave, London, 2000).
41. Cf C. M. Radaelli, The Open Method of Coordination: A New Governance Architecture for the European Union? (SIEPS, Stockholm, 2003) pp. 17 and 31-38;
42. and B. Laffan and C. Shaw, 'Classifying and Mapping OMC in Different Policy Areas', paper for NEWGOV- New Modes of Governance (2005) pp. 11-14.
43. The OMC is more widely used, but is best developed and structured in the EC.
44. Laffan and Shaw, supra note 23, p. 15. Emphasis added.
45. Cf. Baxter, supra note 9, p. 565.
46. Articles 99 and 128 EC-Treaty, respectively.
47. Cf. Abbott et al., supra note 8, p. 406.
48. See also L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) pp. 190-193.
49. Based on Article 5 EC-Treaty.
50. Cf. Senden, supra note 29, pp. 190-193.
51. Cf. Article 99(2) and Article 128(1) of the EC-Treaty with para. 7 of the European Council's Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000.
52. A conclusion I deduce from the subsequent actions from the European institutions involved and the Member States. For an impression of the action undertaken based on the mandating European Council Presidential Conclusions concerning non-treaty-based OMCs, see the websites of the Social Protection Committee concerning the OMC Pensions, 〈ec.europa.eu/ employment_social/ social_protection/pensions_en.htm〉, and OMC Social Inclusion 〈ec.europa.eu/employment _social/social_inclusion/index_en. htm〉, both visited on 3 October 2007.
53. E.g. European Council's Presidency Conclusions, Stockholm, 23-24 March 2001, paras. 27 and 29.
54. The Joint or Synthesis Reports of the Council and Commission are submitted to the annual Spring Council, which in turn uses them for new impetus. See for instance European Council's Presidency Conclusions, 7775/1/06, Brussels, 18 May 2006, para. 19.
55. See also Baxter, supra note 9, pp. 564, 565.
56. This definition is based on the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of EC law. See for further elaboration P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) chs. 5 and 7, pp. 178-229 and 275-316, respectively.
57. See for further elaboration on the gap-thesis and its terminology, Scott and Trubek, supra note 2, p. 8;
58. S. Borrás and K. Jacobsson, 'The Open Method of Co-ordination and New Governance Patterns in the EU', 11:2 Journal of 'European Public Policy (2004) pp. 187-189;
59. and de Búrca and Scott, supra note 2, pp. 5, 6.
60. See also Radaelli, supra note 23, p. 32;
61. and E. Szyszczak, 'Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination", 12:4 European Law Journal (2006) pp. 489-491.
62. Article 5(2) EC-Treaty. Cf. also Szyszczak,
63. ibid.
64. E.g. Article 137(l)(a) EC-Treaty (SI and pensions); Article 149(4) EC-Treaty (youth); and Article 152(4)(c) EC-Treaty (health).
65. Eg. Article 137(2) (a) EC-Treaty.
66. As argued in section 3.1 of this paper.
67. For instance the OMC Health is based on Article 2 and Article 137(l)(k) EC-Treaty (social protection).
68. See Table 1, characteristic "precision", aspect "result".
69. Article 10 EC-Treaty. See also K. Jacobsson, 'Between Deliberation and Discipline: Soft Governance in EU Employment Policy',
70. in Mört, supra note 21, p. 85. This especially applies to the BEPG and the EES since they have their legal basis directly in the EC-Treaty.
71. Trubek et al., supra note 2, p. 16.
72. Ibid.
73. See for instance 〈ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment
74. See also Scott and Trubek, supra note 2, p. 5.
75. European Council's Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000, para. 37.
76. See for further elaboration the next section of this paper.
77. This follows from the principle of attributed competence as stipulated by Article 5 EC-treaty.
78. See Abbott et al., supra note 8, p. 416, Table 4b.
79. Ibid., p. 416, Table 4a.
80. Cf. D.M. Trubek and L. Trubek, 'The Open Method of Coordination and the Debate over "Hard" and "Soft" Law', in Zeitlin et. al., supra note 4.
81. J. Goetschy, "The European Employment Stratey, Multi-level Governance, and Policy Coordination: Past, Present and Future', in J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (eds.), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy. European and American Experiments (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) pp. 75 and 83.
82. Cf. Goetschy, ibid, pp. 59-87. This can even go so far as to the adjustment of the common objectives or guidelines,
83. see for instance 〈ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment
84. Cf. J. Zeitlin, 'Introduction', in Zeitlin and Trubek, supra note 57, p. 5.
85. E.g. Schäfer, supra note 15.
86. European Council's Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000, para. 37.
87. E.g. D. M. Trubek and J. S. Mosher, 'New Governance, EU Employment Policy, and the European Social Model', 6/01 Jean Monnet Working Paper (2001) p. 3.
88. De Búrca and Scott, supra note 2, p. 2.
89. Ibid, p. 3.
90. Ibid, pp. 4-6.
91. See the contributions in de Búrca and Scott, supra note 2.
92. Cf Trubek et al., supra note 2, p. 33;
93. and de Búrca and Scott, supra note 2, pp. 6-9.
94. Trubek et al., supra note 2, pp. 33, 34; and D.M. Trubek and L. Trubek, 'The Coexistence of New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementary or Rivalry?', LTFIa/D2b, paper for NEWGOV- New Modes of Governance Project (2005) p. 5.
95. Trubek and Trubek, ibid., pp. 6, 7;
96. and de Búrca and Scott, supra note 2, pp. 6-8. Note: For the readability of this paper, I replace the words "New Governance" with "OMC".
97. Cf. de Búrca and Scott, supra note 2, pp. 8, 9. An example of this is the EES: the iterative procedure and the institutional decision-making environment are constituted in hard law, i.e. Article 128 EC-Treaty, while the specific goals are defined in the OMC soft law instruments, i.e. the guidelines, indicators and country-specific recommendations.
98. De Búrca and Scott, supra note 2, p. 9.
99. Trubek and Trubek, supra note 56, p. 7.
100. For the readability of the figure, I have left out the international political order and the other soft law instruments.