Behavioral decision making at 50: Achievements, prospects, and challenges

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Volumn 590, Issue , 2007, Pages 35-58

  Hogarth, Robin M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 53749083165     PISSN: 00758442     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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