Participative democracy and local environmental issues

Ecological Economics

Volumn 68, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 68-79

  Martinez, Emmanuel ^a   Tazdaït, Tarik ^b   Tovar, Elisabeth ^b,c  

^a EPE   (France)

^b Centre International de Recherche sur lEnvironnement et le Developpement   (France)

^c University of Evry and EPEE   (France)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Coalitions; Participative democracy; Pollutant emissions; Transfer

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; DEMOCRACY; ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; EXHAUST EMISSION; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH;

EID: 53649107907     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.01.025     Document Type: Article

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