Analysis of an international environmental matching agreement

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-31

  Rübbelke, Dirk T G ^a  

^a CHEMNITZ UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

benefits; Collective action; International agreements; Matching; Secondary

Indexed keywords

EID: 53649089750     PISSN: 1432847X     EISSN: 1867383X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF03353991     Document Type: Article

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