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Volumn 98, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1619-1628

All-or-nothing monitoring

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EID: 53349141596     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1619     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (29)

References (14)
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    • Abreu, D.1    Milgrom, P.2    Pearce, D.G.3
  • 2
    • 84933494162 scopus 로고
    • Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
    • Baker, George P. 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement." Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 598-614.
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    • Baker, G.P.1
  • 3
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    • Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
    • Baker, George P., Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1988. "Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory." Journal of Finance, 43(3): 593-616.
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    • Baker, G.P.1    Jensen, M.C.2    Murphy, K.J.3
  • 4
    • 35348887273 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations
    • Fuchs, William. 2007. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations." American Economic Review, 97(4): 1432-48.
    • (2007) American Economic Review , vol.97 , Issue.4 , pp. 1432-1448
    • Fuchs, W.1
  • 6
    • 0000139691 scopus 로고
    • Moral Hazard and Observability
    • Holmström, Bengt. 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1): 74-91.
    • (1979) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.10 , Issue.1 , pp. 74-91
    • Holmström, B.1
  • 7
    • 0002430504 scopus 로고
    • Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
    • Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7: 24-52.
    • (1991) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , vol.7 , pp. 24-52
    • Holmström, B.1    Milgrom, P.2
  • 8
    • 0000325512 scopus 로고
    • Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
    • Khalil, Fahad, and Jacques Lawarrée. 1995. "Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?" Journal of Economic Theory, 66(1): 139-57.
    • (1995) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.66 , Issue.1 , pp. 139-157
    • Khalil, F.1    Lawarrée, J.2
  • 9
    • 0039423815 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Power of Incentives
    • Lazear, Edward P. 2000. "The Power of Incentives." American Economic Review, 90(2): 410-14.
    • (2000) American Economic Review , vol.90 , Issue.2 , pp. 410-414
    • Lazear, E.P.1
  • 10
    • 2642542249 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Relational Incentive Contracts
    • Levin, Jonathan. 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts." American Economic Review, 93(3): 835-57.
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    • Levin, J.1
  • 12
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    • The Tenuous Trade-Off between Risk and Incentives
    • Prendergast, Canice. 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-Off between Risk and Incentives." Journal of Political Economy, 110(5): 1071-1102.
    • (2002) Journal of Political Economy , vol.110 , Issue.5 , pp. 1071-1102
    • Prendergast, C.1
  • 13
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    • Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement
    • Unpublished
    • Raith, Michael. 2005. "Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement." Unpublished.
    • (2005)
    • Raith, M.1
  • 14
    • 0000959684 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
    • Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device." American Economic Review, 74(3): 433-44.
    • (1984) American Economic Review , vol.74 , Issue.3 , pp. 433-444
    • Shapiro, C.1    Stiglitz, J.E.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.