Pascal's Wager is a possible bet (but not a very good one): Reply to Harmon Holcomb III

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 101-116

  Oppy, Graham ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 53349102311     PISSN: 00207047     EISSN: 15728684     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00140081     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 35 (1995), pp. 65-79. All subsequent numbered references are to this work.
2. pp. 65-66.
3. p. 66.
4. p. 66.
5. 'On Rescher on Pascal's Wager', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1990), pp. 159-168.
6. p. 67.
7. p. 68.
8. p. 68.
9. p. 77.
10. 'Pascal's Wager and infinite utilities' Analysis (1986), pp. 107-109.
11. See Alan Hajek's excellent 'Waging war on Pascal's Wager', unpublished, for further discussion of this theme.
12. Again, see Hajek's 'Waging war on Pascal's Wager' for further discussion.
13. There is much more which I could say about Holcomb's arguments in favour of the claim that Pascal's Wager conflates 'what one bets' with 'what one bets on'. In particular, Holcomb's use of the expression 'what one bets' itself involves a conflation between (i) what one bets with (i.e. the stakes or the costs); and (ii) what one bets by (i.e. what one does in order to make the bet). Moreover, his claim that one bets on belief in God, and not on God's existence, simply ignores the distinction between (i) the ideal case, in which one can simply choose to believe; and (ii) the realistic case, in which the kind of belief in question is not simply and straightforwardly subject to the will. Finally, his distinction between 'betting on the scenario "I believe the bus will come"' and 'betting on the scenario "the bus will come'" pays insufficient attention to the 'disquotational' properties of the belief-operator in this context. Armed with these distinctions, one should find it easy to construct replies to the arguments given in Sections 3 and 4 of his paper (discussion of which I have foregone for lack of space, time and world.)
14. pp. 73-74.
15. My 'Weak agnosticism defended', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (1994), pp. 147-167, provides a discussion and defence of a kind of agnosticism from a broadly 'pragmatist' perspective. This paper marks a departure from the kind of position which I was previously disposed to defend; in particular, it marks a departure from the position which I assumed in 'On Rescher on Pascal's Wager'. I agree with Holcomb that I there exhibited some tendency towards a 'logicist' criticism of the reasonableness of theistic belief. However, while this tendency now seems to me to be mistaken, this fact has no bearing on the cogency of my criticism of Pascal's Wager considered as an argument which is intended to make atheists and agnostics change their minds. It is one question what reasonable atheists and agnostics typically believe; it is a quite different question whether reasonable theists should believe this too.