Favoritism in asymmetric procurement auctions

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1407-1424

  Lee, Joon Suk ^a  

^a BOWDOIN COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Favoritism; Right of first refusal

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

AUCTIONS; FAVORITISM; PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS; RESERVE PRICES; RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL;

COSTS;

EID: 53249134874     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.02.002     Document Type: Article

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