Estimating demand for cellular phone service under nonlinear pricing

Quantitative Marketing and Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 371-413

  Huang, Ching I ^a  

^a NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Cellular phone service; Optional rate plans; Structural estimation; Termination based price discrimination; Three part tariffs

Indexed keywords

EID: 53149102809     PISSN: 15707156     EISSN: 1573711X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11129-008-9040-1     Document Type: Article

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