Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis

Mathematical and Computer Modelling

Volumn 48, Issue 9-10, 2008, Pages 1570-1589

  Duggan, John ^a   Kalandrakis, Tasos ^a   Manjunath, Vikram ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational equilibrium analysis; Dynamic game; Gridlock; Presidential veto; Stationary equilibria; Status quo

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS; TWO DIMENSIONAL;

COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSES; COMPUTATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; DYNAMIC GAME; DYNAMIC POLICY; ENDOGENEITY; GOVERNMENT IS; GRIDLOCK; IN-CONTROL; INSTITUTIONAL RULES; NON-MONOTONIC; POLICY CHANGES; POLICY CHOICES; PRESIDENTIAL VETO; STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA; STATUS QUO; TWO DIMENSIONAL SPACES;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

EID: 52949107206     PISSN: 08957177     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.019     Document Type: Article

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