Ultramaximalist minimalism!

Analysis

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 10-22

  Weir, Alan ^a  

^a QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849134937     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/analys/56.1.10     Document Type: Review

References (17)

1. Divers, J. and A. Miller. 1994. Why expressivists about value should not love minimalism about truth. Analysis 54: 12-19
2. Divers, J. and A. Miller. 1995. Platitudes and attitudes: a minimalist conception of belief. Analysis 55: 37-44
3. Feferman, S. 1984. Toward useful type-free theories I. Journal of Symbolic Logic 49: 75-111. Reprinted in Martin 1984
4. Horwich, P. 1990. Truth Oxford: Blackwell
5. Horwich, P. 1994. The essence of expressivism. Analysis 54: 19-20
6. Jackson, F., G. Oppy and M. Smith. 1994. Minimalism and truth aptness. Mind 101: 287-302
7. Kripke, S. 1975. Outline of a theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy 72: 690-716. Page references to reprint in Martin 1984
8. Martin, R., ed. 1984. Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Oxford: Clarendon Press
9. McGee, V. 1991. Truth, Vagueness and Paradox. Indianapolis: Hackett
10. McGee, V. 1992. Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema (T). Journal of Philosophical Logic 21: 235-41
11. Priest, G. 1984. Semantic closure. Studia Logica 43:117-129
12. Priest, G. 1994. Review of McGee 1991. Mind 103: 387-91
13. Read, S. 1988. Relevant Logic. Oxford: Blackwell
14. Smith, M. 1994a. Why expressivists about value should love minimalism about truth. Analysis 54: 1-11
15. Williamson, T. 1994. Critical Notice of Wright 1992. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2: 130-44
16. Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
17. Wright, C. 1994. Realism, pure and simple? A reply to Timothy Williamson. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2: 327-41