Multicultural education in the zionist state - The Mizrahi challenge

Studies in Philosophy and Education

Volumn 19, Issue 5-6, 2000, Pages 445-464

  Dahan, Yossi ^a   Levy, G A L ^b  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY OF ISRAEL   (Israel)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Equality; Ethnic relations; Fundamentalism; Identity; Integration; Multiculturalism; Oriental Jews; Zionism

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849097616     PISSN: 00393746     EISSN: 1573191X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. Gellner presents the Israeli case as a distinctive example of Diaspora nationalism. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, London: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983, Ch. 7.
2. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995;
3. Charles Taylor, "The Politices of Recognition", in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multi-culturalism and 'The Politics of Recongition', Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
4. In this paper, however, we do not address the Arab claim for multiculturalism. It is important to note, though, that politically the issue of Arab education cannot be separated from that of Hebrew education. Yet, the Arab minority's claim for autonomy in education is not unique compared to similar demands in multi-ethnic and multi-national states. For further discussion of Arab education, see Sami K. Mar'i, Arab Education in Israel, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1978;
5. Majid Al-Haj, Education, Empowerment, and Control: The Case of the Arabs in Israel, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995.
6. Throughout this paper, we shall refer to Jews from Arab and Oriental countries as Mizrahi (plural: Mizrahim) Jews, and to Jews from Lurope and America (but mostly from Central and Lastern) as Ashkenazi (plural: Ashkenazim) Jews. These terms reflect the common social and political discourse in Israel and are meant to emphasize our understanding of these collectivities in a non-essentialist manner. Accordingly, the existence of these social groupings and their political significance are derived from the particular encounter between those immigrants from various countries within the Israeli polity.
7. See also, Gal Levy and Zeev Lmmerich, 'From "Natural Workers" to "Sephardic Ultra-Religious": The Politics of Lthnicity between Labeling and Identification', forthcoming in Shas - The First Fifteen Years, Yoav Peled (ed.) (Jerusalem: The Israeli Democracy Institute Press).
8. In general terms, the Zionist movement was intolerant of groups that advocated conceptions of nationalism which did not recognize and emphasize the primacy of Jewish nationhood. In this respect, the hegemonic national ideology rejected civic and democratic conceptions of nationalism, or types of nationalism that were based on other definitions of the national collective, namely those that rejected the emphasis on Jewish ethnic and cultural traits.6 Humphrey Bowman, Middle East Window, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1942, pp. 252-4;
9. Noah Nardi, Education in Palestine, 1920-1945, Washington, DC: Zionist Organization of America, 1945, p. 23.
10. See, Nardi, Education in Palestine, 1920-1945 op. cit.
11. Indeed, the one group that rejected this authority, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox community, appealed to the British government to obtain the authority to run its own educational system. See Menachem Friedman, Society and Religion: The Non-Zionist Orthodox in Eretz-Israel, 1918-1936, Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1977.
12. Mamlakhtiut literally means "kingdomship", in reference to ancient Hebrew sovereignty. Figur-atively, it means ètatism, but also the unification of society and the de-politicization of the various functions of the state. See Eliezer Don-Yehia "Co-operation and Conflict between Political Camps: The Religious Camp and the Labour Movement and the Crisis in Education in Israel", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977, p. 461.
13. For a critical account of this concept, see Yagil Levy, Trial and Error: Israel's Route from War to De-escalation, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997, pp. 36-39.
14. This conflict was mainly motivated by the will of each of the political parties to gain control over the new immigrants by enrolling immigrant children in their educational institutions. See Don-Yehia op. cit.',
15. Zvi Zameret, Across A Narrow Bridge: Shaping the Education System During the Great Aliya, Sede Boker: The Ben-Gurion Research Center - The Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 1997.
16. 11This coalition included the dominant social-democratic Mapai party, the liberal Genreal Zionist party and the Zionist-Religious parties. The need for such a coalition stemmed not only from the education crisis but also and more importantly from economic developments that enabled those opposing parties to resolve the legitimacy crisis that the ruling political elite had faced; Levy, Across a Narrow Bridge: Shaping the Education System during the Great Aliya op. cit., p. 29.
17. See also Shlomo Swirski, Education in Israel: Schooling for Inequality, Tel-Aviv: Breirot Publishers, 1990, pp. 40.
18. The Jewish population of Palestine in 1948 was 716,700. Between 1948 and 1953, some 719,500 immigrants arrived to Israel - 351,800 of whom came from Asian and African countries. Deborah Hacohen, Immigrants in Turmoil: The Great Wave of Immigration to Israel and its Absorption, 1948-1953, Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1994, pp. 323-324.
19. See also Uri Ram, "Zionist Historiography and the Invention of Modern Jewish Nationhood: the Case of Ben Zion Dinur." History and Memroy, 1, 1995, pp. 91-124.
20. See for example Moshe Smilansky and David Nevo, The Gifted Disadvantaged: A Ten Year Longitudinal Study of Compensatory Education in Israel, London, New York & Paris: Gordon and Breach, 1979.
21. In fact, those immigrants were the only population segment that actually accomplished the aims of this policy. Although government plans had not specified who would settle in peripheral areas, immigrants from Arab countries populated those areas for the most part, aside from a small number of Kibbutzim. See Oren Yifatchel, "The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel', in O. Yiftachel and A. Meir (eds.), Ethnic Frontiers and Peripheries: Landscapes of Devel-opment and Inequality in Israel, Boulder CO.: Westview Press, 1998.
22. Schooling conditions in the periphery were harsh throughout the first decade and even later. The inadequacy of the teachers' training was felt primarily in the development towns, as documented in a 1966 report from the Ministry of Education on one development town, which states that, out of a total of 86 teachers in elementary education (there was no secondary school there at the time), 23 were unqualified solider-teachers and another 24 had less than 2 years of experience (State of Israel Archive, G5599/104). See also Zameret, Ethnic Frontiers and Peripheries: Landscapes of Devel-opment and Inequality in Israel op. cit., p. 54;
23. Aharon F. Kleinberger, Society, Schools and Progress in Israel, Oxford, UK: Pergamon Press, 1969, p. 60.
24. Abraham Yogev and Hanna Ayalon, "High School Attendance in a Sponsored Multi-Ethnic System: The Case of Israel" in E. Krausz, (ed.) Education in a Comparative Context, (Vol. IV of the series, Studies of Israeli Society), New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1989,p. 222.
25. On the role of schooling in reproducing social inequalities, see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, NY: Basic Books 1976.
26. The Arab-Israel conflict had certainly played a central role in justifying governmental neglect of social problems. Security concerns were systematically used as an excuse to avoid dealing with other burning issues. See for example Yonathan Shapiro and Lev L. Grinberg, The Full Employment Crisis, 1957-1965: A Chapter on Israel Political Economy, Discussion Paper No. 45, Tel-Aviv: Golda Meir Institute for Social and Labour Research, December 1988.
27. For an exploration of the various educational policies from the 1950s to the 1970s, with special reference to the definition of disadvantaged children, see Smilansky and Nevo, The Full Employment Crisis, 1957-1965: A Chapter on Israel Political Economy op. cit.
28. Jeff Halper, Moshe Shokeid and Alex Weingrod, "Communities, Schools and Integration", in Y Amir, S. Sharan, and R. Ben-Ari (eds.), School Desegregation: Cross Cultural Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ & London: Lawrence Lrlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1984.
29. See Shlomo Swirski, Seeds of Inequality, Tel-Aviv: Breirot Publications, 1995, pp. 72-75.
30. At first, this principle was understood as meaning "equality in inputs". A new conception of "equality in outputs" was developed by the ministry of education only in the late 1950s. It was then argued that educational resources should be allocated differentially to the various groups in accordance with their specific cultural characteristics, and supposedly, provide the "backward" groups with more opportunities. See Smilansky and Nevo, Seeds of Inequality op. cit., pp. 50-55.
31. David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 119-154.
32. See Ram, On Nationality op. cit., 1995, on the role of Dinur as an historian of Jewish nationalism and as minister of education in promoting the role of the Israeli school in this respect. For a curricular analysis,
33. see Ruth Firer, The Agents of Zionist Education, Haifa: Sifriat Ha-poalim, 1985; for the curriculum in History Studies in reference to the Mizrahi Jews,
34. see Avner Ben-Amos, "An Impossible Pluralism? European Jews and Oriental Jews in the Israeli History Curriculum", History of European Ideas, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1994, pp. 41-51.
35. For a discussion of the Zionist attitude regarding the memory of the exile and the implications of the Eurocentric perspective on the denial and repression of the history of Oriental Jews in Israel, see Amnon Raz-Karkozkin, "Exile within Sovereignty: Toward a Critique of the 'Negation of Exile' in Israeli Culture", Teoria U-bikoret (Theory and Criticism: An Israeli Forum), No. 4, 1993 (part I) and No. 5, 1994 (part II).
36. See, for example, Karl Frankenstein, "On the Problem of Ethnic Differences" Megamot, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1951, pp. 261-76;
37. ShmuelN. Eisenstadt, The Oriental Jews in Israel: a report on a preliminary study in culture contacts, New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1950.
38. For a critical account of the Zionist, Orientalist approach towards Mizrahi Jews, see Ella Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the standpoint of its Jewish Victims", Social Text, Vol. 7, No. 1-2, 1988.
39. See Lev L. Grinberg, Split Corporatism in Israel, NY: SUNY Press, 1991.
40. On the emergence of the Ashkenazi middle class, see Henry Rosenfeld and Shulamit Carmi, "The Privatization of Public Means, the State-made Middle Class, and the Realization of Family Values in Israel", in Kinship and Modernization: Mediterranean Society, Rome: American Universities Field Staff, 1976.
41. It is important to emphasize that the reform was primarily intended to restructure the school system. This change aimed at improving the schooling process in preparing children for higher education. The notion of integration was a byproduct of this process. See Swirski, Kinship and Modernization: Mediterranean Society op. cit, 1990, pp. 143-51;
42. David Levi, The dynamics of Agenda Building: Case Study - Reform in Israel Educational System, unpublished MA thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, 1987, p. 102.
43. It must also be noted that, in contrast to other places where desegregation was adopted, this plan did not encompass the entire Israeli school system but only the higher levels of education. See Harold B. Gerard, "Introduction", in Y Amir, S. Sharan and R. Ben-Ari (eds.), School Desegregation: Cross Cultural Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1984, p. xii.
44. As a result, the encounter between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi children in mixed educational institutions occurred at a relatively late stage. Some critics have argued that integration at that point was "too little too late". Swirski, School Desegregation: Cross Cultural Perspectives op. cit., 1990, p. 144.29
45. On the educational and social goals of the reform, see Nachum Blass and Benyamin Amir, "Integration in Education: The Development of a Policy",
46. and Yehuda Amir, Shlomo Sharan and Rachel Ben-Ari "Why Integration", both published in Y. Amir, S. Sharan, and R. Ben-Ari (eds.), School Desegregation: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ & London: Lawrence Lrlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1984.
47. Swirski, School Desegregation: Cross-Cultural Perspectives op. cit. 1990, p. 151.
48. Among such practices, the authors mention encouraging "weak" students to drop out, instituting tracking and selection processes in order to create homogeneous classes, and the formation of study groups within classes. Also, there was an increase in the number of students who were referred to special education schools. Michael Chen, Drora Kfir and Arie Lewy, "Coping with a Heterogeneous School Population in the Junior High School", Megamot, Vol. 22, 1976, pp. 385. Lthnic composition of the study body in comprehensive schools was divided, with Mizrahi students attending mainly vocational classes, while Ashkenazi students were predominant in academic classes.
49. For an analysis of educational gaps in Israel, see Yitzhak Haberfeld and Yinon Cohen, Schooling and Income gaps between Western and Eastern Jews in Israel, 1975-1992, Discussion paper No. 80, Go Ida Meir Institute for Social and Labour Research, Tel-Aviv University, August 1995.
50. See Idit Al-Hanani, "On the Nature of Feelings of Ethnic Discrimination in Two Development Towns", Megamot, Vol. 28, No. 1, June 1983, pp. 97-99.
51. On integration in state religious schools and its effect on inter-ethnic relations, see Joseph Schwarzwald, "Integration as a Situational Contingent: Secular versus Religious Public Education", in Y Amir, S. Sharan, and R. Ben-Ari (eds.), School Desegregation: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Hilsdale, NJ & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1984.
52. For further discussion of the problematic aspect of the integration plan, see also Gal Levy and Tamar Barkey, "A Progressive View of Yom Ha-Shoah: Ethnicity, Class and Education in Israel", Politika - The Israeli Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 33-36 [for an English short version of this article,
53. see Barkay and Levy "Kedma School", News from Within, Vol. XV, No. 6, June 1999, pp. 26-32J.
54. The outcomes of the integration plan are evidenced, for example, in the following figures from Tel-Aviv: in 1990, some 46.5% of the children who had begun at a specific junior high school continued in the same school until 12th grade. Of those who had left, 74% moved to lower levels, and 10% percent dropped out; most of them, from lower socio-economic background. Shmuel Dorfman, Flor Haymann, Rina Shapira, and Rona Shavit, "Local education Reform: The Case of Tel-AvivJaffa", Boston University Journal of Education, Vol. 176, No. 2, 1994, p. 19.
55. Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dyanmics of Citizenship in Israel, 1948-93", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, August 1996, pp. 391413.
56. Also, Michael Shalev, "Have Globalization and Liberalization 'Normalized' Israel's Political Economy?", Israel Affairs, 5.3, 1999.
57. In 1993/94, "gray education" existed in 63% of the schools, mostly in the more affluent areas where parents can privately subsidize additional education. See Erik Cohen and Einat Cohen, Gray Education in Israel: Supplemental Curricula in Israel Schools in the 1990s, Jerusalem: Institute for the Study of Educational Systems, 1996.
58. One committee, headed by Arnon Gafni, the former General Director of the Ministry of Finance, recommended that schools be allowed to look for private funding sources such as sponsorhsips and advertising in order to maintain their own budgets. The other, headed by Wollansky head of planning at the Ministry of Education, examined the concept of autonomous schools, and recommended a strategy aimed at tranforming schools into self-managed autonomous units. For a critical evaluation of the findings of these committees, see Yossi Dahan and Barbara Swirski, "The Recommendations of the Gafni Committee (October 1993) and the Wollansky Committee (August 1993) 37 The position of the Adva Center", Tel-Aviv: Adva Center, 1993.
59. The Kashti Committee for the examination of Magnet schools, 1993.
60. Cohen and Cohen, op. cit., 1996.
61. Rina Shapira, Social-educational Uniqueness: Magnet Schools - Background, Development and Problems, Discussion Paper No. 4.88, The School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, August 1988.
62. Dorfman et al. Social-educational Uniqueness: Magnet Schools - Background, Development and Problems Op. cit.
63. Peled and Shafir, Social-educational Uniqueness: Magnet Schools - Background, Development and Problems op. cit.
64. For an analysis of Shas as a social movement, see Aaron Willis, "Shas - The Sephardic Torah Guardians: Religious 'movement' and Political Power", in A. Arian and M. Shamir (eds.), The elections in Israel - 1992, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1995.
65. In order to understand the background to the establishment of Kedma schools in low-income neighborhoods, it must be stressed that Mizrahi neighborhoods had no academic high schools, and that a high percentage of students from those areas who were bussed to integrated schools failed to complete their studies, or to pass the matriculation exams. Many of these children had experienced failure and alienation in the existing school system. A report from the education department of the Tel Aviv municipality states that some 80% of the children who were bussed to integrated schools dropped out during their studies (see fn. 33 above).
66. One of the ways in which the educational system seeks to remedy the low achievements of students at the elementary level is to assign the students to special education schools. A study reveals that assignment of students to those schools has been exceeding 30% (Joseph Bashi, A Report on Kiryat-Malachi and Sderot, Jerusalem: Van Leer, 1984;
67. A Report on Afula, Mo'ach Eser - The 30 Localities Project, 1998)) .
68. For a critical analysis of Israeli, and in particular Zionist, historiography, see also Gabriel Piterberg, "The Nation and its Raconteurs: Orientalism and Nationalist Historiography", Teoria U-bikoret (Theory and Criticism: An Israeli Forum), No. 6, Spring 1995, pp. 81-10
69. For a critique of history textbooks from this perspective, see Yehuda Shenhav, "The History Textbooks of the People of Israel", Mitzad Sheni, No. 18, August 1999, pp. 22-25. Shenhav aptly suggests that those textbooks, entitled "History of the People of Israel", ought in fact to be entitled "History of the European Zionist Movement", or "History of European Jewry". See also Ben-Amos, op. cit., and Piterberg, op. cit.
70. See, Yossef Algazi, "The Chance to Succeed", Ha'aretz - Daily Newspaper, 24.2.1995. This part is also based on personal interviews with Ms. Klara Yona, principal of Kedma School, Jerusalem (7.10.1997), Dr. Shlomo Swirski, chair and founder of Kedma Association (16.9.1997) and Sami S. Chetrit, ex-principal of Kedma, Tel-Aviv (16.7.1996).
71. See Dvora Hacohen, The Million Plan - Ben-Gurion 's Plan of Mass Immigration, 1942-43, TelAviv: Am-Oved, 1994.
72. "Integration" had thus been a one-way process, since only children from poorer communities were required to move to schools outside their own neighborhoods. See Levy and Barkay, op. cit., pp. 33-36.
73. This bias was evident in another educational project, which predated the integration policy and had underprivileged children (80% of whom were Mizrahim) transferred to boarding schools where they would "enjoy a better educational environment" (Smilansky and Nevo, op. cit. pp. 97-119). This approach still exists today toward Ethiopian immigrant children, who are massively directed to boarding schools. In dealing with the education of these immigrants, absorption state agencies have virtually the same attitude as they did toward Mizrahi immigants decades ago. In both cases, parents are viewed as a "lost" generation that has nothing to contribute to the children and is referred to as the "desert generation".
74. Yoav Peled, "Toward a Redefinition of Jewish Nationalism in Israel? The Enigma of Shas", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21:4, July 1998;
75. Eliezer Don-Yehia, "Religiosity and Ethnicity in Israeli Politics: the Religious Parties and the Elections for the 12th Knesset", Medina, Mimshal Ve-yahsim Benleumi 'im, No. 32, Spring 1990, pp. 11-54.
76. For several studies on Shas, see also Yoav Peled (ed.), Shas - The First fifteen Years (forthcoming) (Jerusalem: The Israeli Democracy Institute Press).
77. For data on Shas's educational network, see Shlomo Swirski, Etti Konur and Yaron Yecheskel,Government Allocations to the Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Sector in Israel, Tel-Aviv: Adva Center, 1998;
78. Varda Shifer, The Haredi Education System: Allocation, Regulation and Control (Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies), 1998. According to recent publications, 13,000 children are enrolled in 140 schools in 1999, and the network anticipates a 27% increase in the number of students next year (Yediot Ahronot, 9.8.1999). A report issued by the Ne'eman Committee (set up to investigate the network's financial deficits) mentions a total number of 30 to 35,000 children attending Shas's schools (Ha'aretz, 22.7.1999).
79. Unsurprisingly, Shas's voters are mostly concentrated in those areas. In several development towns, Shas received most of the votes in the 1999 general election. Yet Shas's successful results in this election seem to cut across socioeconomic divisions, since the party also performed well in other cities. Michael Shalev, Yoav Peled, and Oren Yiftachel, The Political Impact of Inequality: Social Cleavages and Voting in the 1999 Elections, Discussion Paper No. 2-2000, The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development, Tel-Aviv University, February 2000.
80. The Ne'eman Committee, headed by Prof. Ya'acov Ne'eman - then treasury minister - was formed with the consent of Shas's chairperson (Haaren, 22.7.1999).
81. Ironically, this teacher-political activist archetype is reminiscent of similar archetype in the prestate Zionist educational system, and especially in the Labour movement.
82. Only a minority of the Mizrahi population has been brought up in the ultra-Orthodox community. In fact, until the end of the 1970s, Mizrahi students were predominant in the religious state schools that were controlled by the Zionist-religious parties. See, Swirski, op. cit., 1990, p. 40.In 1995, two thirds of Shas students attended ultra-Orthodox schools. In most cases, these students came from previously secular families who became ultra-Orthodox, sometimes under the influence of Shas. The other third were enrolled in the less religious schools.
83. See Ezra Chen, The Orientation and goals of Shas 's Educational system, as reflected in daily context of "Talmud Torah " and a "Boys' School", unpublished MA thesis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology and School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, 1995, p. 19.
84. Here we refer to the school system for boys and its sub-division into ultra-Orthodox and "regular" schools.
85. Chen, The Orientation and goals of Shas 's Educational system, as reflected in daily context of "Talmud Torah " and a "Boys' School" ibid.
86. The Orientation and goals of Shas 's Educational system, as reflected in daily context of "Talmud Torah " and a "Boys' School" Ibid., p. 20.
87. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
88. See, ibid., p. 34.
89. Shas recently announced its intention to extend the teaching of general - as opposed to religious - subjects in its schools. This includes the introduction of computer skills. Shas activists also attend classes at the Israeli branch of an American college in order to achieve academic qualifications that will allow them to hold positions in the public sector (Yediot Ahronot, 18.1.1999).
90. It must be noted that the Shas school system, because of its strictly observant character, is also divided into boys' and girls' schools. This separation of the sexes applies to teachers as well. Eiberal and feminist critiques of fundamentalist movements claim that the latter tend to repress and marginalize women. But a recent study on the role of women in the Shas movement points to the reverse trend (Anat Feldman, Shas's Feminism, Ha'aretz 10.6.1999). The study shows that Shas has changed the status of Mizrahi women, who had been confined to the traditional female roles when the Mizrahim were controlled by the Ashkenazi orthodoxy. These women have joined the work force in the different social and economic systems controlled by Shas. Some were given the opportunity to study and acquire a variety of professional skills. Many are employed in Shas's educational system. Given the high dropout rate in development towns and poor neighborhoods and the high failure rate in the formal school system, some of the girls enrolled in the Shas system seem in fact to have benefited from the network both in terms of education and employment opportunities.
91. Hacohen, Ha'aretz 10.6 op. cit., 1994, p. 212.
92. Bhikhu Parekh, "National Culture and Multiculturalism", in K. Thompson (ed.), Media and Cultural Regulation, Eondon: Sage Publications and The Open University, 1997, p. 184.
93. Media and Cultural Regulation Ibid., p. 184.
94. Shas was not the first movement to challenge the Zionist national order from the perspective of Judaism. Some Zionist religious parties and the ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox parties were and still are in conflict with the Zionist, secular conception of Jewish nationalism. On the other hand, the question of how to relate to Judaism as a religion has not been resolved within secular Zionism itself. Our point here is that every conflict which involves a religious-secular schism can become deadlocked in a struggle for hegemony.
95. In Israeli public discussions on ethnic relations, raising the issue of discrimination against the Mizrahim is disapproved and looked upon as a divisive act, traditionally referred to as "releasing the ethnic genie from the bottle".
96. It is noteworthy that Shas acquired political power through its capacity to mobilize these resources and build social networks and institutions.
97. Support for Kedma relied upon the new registration policy that was enacted in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This policy reflected the ideology of privatization and liberalization of the 1980s as applied to the educational system. The introduction of parental choice was thus crucial to the development of Kedma, which became one expression of an overall policy of democratization. The policy offered parents from low-income background the option of academic education in their own neighborhood.
98. Another main reason for the closure of the school was ongoing infighting among Kedma founders.
99. For a detailed analysis of this incident and of its implications on the relation between universalism and particularism in the educational system and, specifically, in Kedma, see Levy and Barkay, op. cit.
100. This stance was partly supported by a negative portrayal of Kedma in the media, especially in Tel Aviv's local newspapers.
101. The declining enrollment at Kedma in Tel Aviv was one factor that determined the school's closure in 1999.
102. Personal interview with Ms. Klara Yona, principal of the school.
103. As illustrated by the decision of municipal officials in Ramat-Gan, one of Israel's largest cities, to prohibit Shas recruiters from soliciting children near school gates (Yediot Ahronot, 9.8.1999).
104. This was also the case in the local elections of November 1998. Several political movements campaigned specifically against the expansion of Shas's educational system.
105. The publication of the Ne'eman committee report in July 1999 also fueled public resentment. The recently appointed minister of education, from the anti-religious Meretz party, used the report to impose the ministry's control and supervision on Shas's educational institutions and network.