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Volumn 26, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 257-266

Eliminative induction and Bayesian confirmation theory

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EID: 52849086251     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.1996.10717453     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (3)

References (11)
  • 2
    • 0003893658 scopus 로고
    • Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
    • Earman, John. 1992. Bayes or Bust? Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (
    • (1992) Bayes or Bust?
    • Earman, J.1
  • 3
    • 85064021263 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • scientific progress is quite complex, often involving changes language, background hypotheses, explanatory model, and methods of experimentation and analysis
    • Kitcher, For. scientific progress is quite complex, often involving changes in language, background hypotheses, explanatory model, and methods of experimentation and analysis.
    • Kitcher, F.1
  • 4
    • 85064026059 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Of course, in practice it may not be possible to pare down the alternatives to one.
    • Of course, in practice it may not be possible to pare down the alternatives to one.
  • 6
    • 0003453832 scopus 로고
    • Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, For details see Earman, or Merrilee Salmon, et al
    • 1992. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. For details see Earman, or Merrilee Salmon, et al.
    • (1992) Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
  • 7
    • 85064029722 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Clearly, Philosophical Topics 21 (1993,–138. What I deny is that the Bayesian conception of confirmation entails that for evidence E to confirm a theory T, E must deductively or probabilistically eliminate some explicitly formulated, non-trivial rival of T
    • Kitcher's brand of eliminativism differs from Bayesian confirmation theory, since Kitcher's approach does not suppose that probabilities are assigned to hypotheses. However, it could be suggested that confirmation in accordance with Bayesian theory does involve a kind of elimination of alternative theories. Of course on the Bayesian view, confirmation of H by evidence E would not necessarily involve strict elimination of an alternative hypothesis, but whenever the probability of H is increased, there must be a decrease in probability for some alternative to H, although the alternative theory could simply be not H. For a technical discussion of the sense in which Bayesian confirmation involves eliminative induction see James Hawthorne, ‘Bayesian Induction is Eliminative Induction,’. 99 Clearly, Philosophical Topics 21 (1993,–138. What I deny is that the Bayesian conception of confirmation entails that for evidence E to confirm a theory T, E must deductively or probabilistically eliminate some explicitly formulated, non-trivial rival of T.
  • 8
    • 34247529903 scopus 로고
    • Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability
    • See and ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,’ Science1851974 1124–31; and Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social judgment (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1980)., and
    • Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel. 1973. ‘Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,’. Cognitive Psychology, 5: 207–32. See and ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,’ Science1851974 1124–31; and Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social judgment (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1980).
    • (1973) Cognitive Psychology , vol.5 , pp. 207-232
    • Tversky, A.1    Kahneman, D.2
  • 10
    • 0004169012 scopus 로고
    • Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, For details, see Richard Jeffrey, (and Mark Kaplan, ‘Bayesianism without the Black Box,’ Philosophy of Science56 (1989) 48–69
    • 1992. Probability and the Art of Judgment Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For details, see Richard Jeffrey, (and Mark Kaplan, ‘Bayesianism without the Black Box,’ Philosophy of Science56 (1989) 48–69.
    • (1992) Probability and the Art of Judgment


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