From speculation to security: Practical and efficient information flow tracking using speculative hardware

Proceedings - International Symposium on Computer Architecture

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 401-412

  Chen, Haibo ^a   Wu, Xi ^a   Yuan, Liwei ^a   Zang, Binyu ^a   Yew, Pen Chung ^b   Chong, Frederic T ^c  

^a FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b University of Minnesota   (United States)

^c University of California   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARCHITECTURAL IMPROVEMENTS; ARCHITECTURAL SUPPORT; DECOUPLING MECHANISMS; DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW TRACKING; FALSE POSITIVES; HARDWARE SUPPORTS; INFORMATION FLOWS; INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM; ITANIUM PROCESSOR; MEMORY CORRUPTION; PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS; SECURITY ASSESSMENT; SECURITY ATTACKS; SECURITY POLICIES; SERVER APPLICATIONS; SOFTWARE-BASED; SPECULATIVE EXECUTION;

COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTER SYSTEMS; COMPUTERS; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION THEORY; RETAIL STORES; SEMANTICS;

COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE;

EID: 52649112833     PISSN: 10636897     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ISCA.2008.18     Document Type: Conference Paper

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