The multi-class, multi-criterion traffic equilibrium and the efficiency of congestion pricing

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review

Volumn 44, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 753-773

  Han, Deren ^a   Yang, Hai ^b  

^a NANJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Multi class traffic equilibrium; Price of anarchy; Road pricing; System optimum; Value of time

Indexed keywords

MOTOR TRANSPORTATION; TRAFFIC CONGESTION; TRANSPORTATION CHARGES;

CONGESTION PRICING; EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM; MULTI CLASS TRAFFIC; MULTI-CLASS MULTI-CRITERION TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUMS; MULTI-CLASS TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM; PRICE OF ANARCHY; ROAD PRICING; SYSTEM OPTIMUM; TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM; VALUE OF TIME;

COSTS;

ROAD PRICING; TRAFFIC CONGESTION; TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT; TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM;

EID: 52049109658     PISSN: 13665545     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2007.07.011     Document Type: Article

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