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Volumn 89, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 513-526

Testing limits to policy reversal: Evidence from Indian privatizations

Author keywords

Electoral turnover; Emerging markets; Government commitment; Government policy credibility; Layoffs

Indexed keywords


EID: 52049106356     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.09.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (17)

References (15)
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  • 3
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    • Bertrand, M., Kramarz, F., Schoar, A., Thesmar, D., 2007. Politically connected CEOs and economic outcomes: evidence from France. Working paper, University of Chicago.
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  • 5
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    • State-owned and privately owned firms: an empirical analysis of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity
    • DeWenter K.L., and Malatesta P.H. State-owned and privately owned firms: an empirical analysis of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity. American Economic Review 91 (2001) 320-334
    • (2001) American Economic Review , vol.91 , pp. 320-334
    • DeWenter, K.L.1    Malatesta, P.H.2
  • 6
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    • Dinc, S., Gupta, N., 2007. The decision to privatize: the role of political competition and patronage. Working paper, Indiana University.
    • Dinc, S., Gupta, N., 2007. The decision to privatize: the role of political competition and patronage. Working paper, Indiana University.
  • 7
    • 52049087929 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Economic Times of India, 2000. Tall claims, very little privatisation, March 1.
    • Economic Times of India, 2000. Tall claims, very little privatisation, March 1.
  • 8
    • 33645727687 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Politically connected firms
    • Faccio M. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review 96 (2006) 369-386
    • (2006) American Economic Review , vol.96 , pp. 369-386
    • Faccio, M.1
  • 9
    • 0001609111 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Estimating the value of political connections
    • Fisman R. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91 (2001) 1095-1102
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    • Fisman, R.1
  • 10
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    • Partial privatization and firm performance
    • Gupta N. Partial privatization and firm performance. Journal of Finance 60 (2005) 987-1015
    • (2005) Journal of Finance , vol.60 , pp. 987-1015
    • Gupta, N.1
  • 11
    • 52049108586 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gupta, N., Ham, J., Svejnar, J., 2007. Priorities and sequencing in privatization: evidence from Czech firm panel cata. Working paper, Indiana University.
    • Gupta, N., Ham, J., Svejnar, J., 2007. Priorities and sequencing in privatization: evidence from Czech firm panel cata. Working paper, Indiana University.
  • 12
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    • From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on privatization
    • Megginson W.L., and Netter J.M. From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on privatization. Journal of Economic Literature 39 (2001) 321-389
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    • Megginson, W.L.1    Netter, J.M.2
  • 14
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    • Ramalho, R., 2005. The effects of anti-corruption campaigns: evidence from the 1992 presidential impeachment in Brazil. Working paper, International Monetary Fund.
    • Ramalho, R., 2005. The effects of anti-corruption campaigns: evidence from the 1992 presidential impeachment in Brazil. Working paper, International Monetary Fund.


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.