Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams: Theory and evidence

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 693-720

  Mohnen, Alwine ^a   Pokorny, Kathrin ^a   Sliwka, Dirk ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51949102720     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/591116     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Admati, Anat R., and Motty Perry. 1991. Joint projects without commitment. Review of Economic Studies 58:259-76.
2. Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review 62: 777-95.
3. Backes-Gellner, Uschi, Alwine Mohnen, and Arndt Werner. 2006. Team size and effort in start-up-teams - another consequence of free-riding and peer pressure in partnerships. Working paper, Department of Management and Economics, University of Cologne; Department of Management and Economics, University of Zurich.
4. Barron, John M., and Kathy P. Gjerde. 1997. Peer pressure in an agency relationship. Journal of Labor Economics 15:234-54.
5. Biel, Pedro R. 2008. Inequity aversion and team incentives. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110, no. 2:297-320.
6. Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels. 2000. ERC - a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review 90:166-93.
7. Che, Yeon-Koo, and Seung-Weon Yoo. 2001. Optimal incentives for teams. American Economic Review 91:525-54.
8. Demougin, Dominique, and Claude Fluet. 2003. Inequality aversion in tournaments. CIRPEE Working Paper no. 03-22, Department of Economics, University of Quebec, Montreal.
9. Englmaier, Florian. 2005. Moral hazard, contracts, and social preferences: A survey. In Psychology, rationality and economic behaviour: Challenging standard assumptions, ed. Bina Agarwal and Alessandro Vercelli. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (for International Economic Association).
10. Englmaier, Florian, and Achim Wambach. 2002. Contracts and inequity aversion. CESifo Working Paper no. 809, Department of Economics, Universität München.
11. Falk, Armin, and Andrea Ichino. 2006. Clean evidence on peer effects. Journal of Labor Economics 24:39-57.
12. Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt. 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:817-68.
13. Fershtman, Chaim, and Shmuel Nitzan. 1991. Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods. European Economic Review 35:1057-67.
14. Fischbacher, Urs. 1999. z-tree - Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments - experimenter's manual. Working Paper no. 21, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.
15. Greiner, Ben. 2003. An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen, ed. K. Kremer and V. Macho. GWDG Bericht 63. Göttingen: Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung.
16. Grund, Christian, and Dirk Sliwka. 2005. Envy and compassion in tournaments. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 14:187-207.
17. Holmström, Bengt. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13:324-40.
18. Huck, Steffen, and Pedro Rey-Biel. 2006. Endogenous leadership in teams. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162:253-61.
19. Ichino, Andrea, and Giovanni Maggi. 2000. Work environment and individual background: Explaining regional shirking differentials in a large Italian firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115:1057-90.
20. Itoh, Hideshi. 2004. Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences. Japanese Economic Review 55:18-45.
21. Kandel, Eugene, and Edward P. Lazear. 1992. Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy 100:801-17.
22. Knez, Marc, and Duncan Simester. 2001. Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at Continental Airlines. Journal of Labor Economics 19: 743-72.
23. Marx, Leslie M., and Steven A. Matthews. 2000. Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project. Review of Economic Studies 67:327-58.
24. Masclet, David. 2002. Peer pressure in work teams: The effects of inequity aversion. GATE Working Paper no. 02-15, Group for Economic Analysis and Theory, University of Lyon.
25. Newhouse, Joseph P. 1973. The economics of group practice. Journal of Human Resources 8:37-56.
26. Prendergast, Canice J. 1999. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature 37:7-63.
27. Sausgruber, Rupert. 2005. Testing for team spirit-an experimental study. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Innsbruck.