A note on marriage market clearing

Economics Letters

Volumn 101, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 103-105

  Neelakantan, Urvi ^a,d   Tertilt, Michèle ^b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^d CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Age gap; Marriage market; Mortality; Polygyny; Sex ratio

Indexed keywords

EID: 51949086105     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.06.017     Document Type: Article

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