Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions

Computational Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 245-278

  Gayle, Wayne Roy ^a   Richard, Jean Francois ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric first price; Auctions; Collusion; Ex ante heterogeneity; Expected revenues; Independent private values; Numerical solution; Optimal reserve

Indexed keywords

EID: 51849136558     PISSN: 09277099     EISSN: 15729974     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10614-008-9125-7     Document Type: Article

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