Truthmaker commitments

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 141, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 7-19

  Schaffer, Jonathan ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Commitment; Fundamental; Grounding; Truthmaker

Indexed keywords

EID: 51749123959     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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