Legal cartels and social contracts: Lessons from the economic foundations of government

International Journal of Social Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 37-46

  Mixon, Franklin G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51749104717     PISSN: 03068293     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/03068299610108863     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. These include Georgia Tech, Florida State, South Carolina, Pennsylvania State, Pittsburgh, and Miami to name a few. In fact, Conference-USA is a new social contract (beginning in 1996) between the athletic departments of Louisville, Southern Mississippi, Tulane, Cincinnati, Memphis and Houston. Television contracts and bowl alliances have already been formed for C-USA, pointing out the lucrative nature of such social contracts/legal cartels.
2. Currently, bowl receipts range from over $750,000 to well over $2,000,000 according to Southeastern Football Conference officials. SEC schools collectively brought in $2,200,000 in bowl receipts for 1982-1983, compared to $4,300,000 in 1991-1992, just ten years later.
3. This concession also dramatically favoured Texas and Texas A&M. Through the 1980s/1990s, Texas had numerous non-SWC televised games against Oklahoma, Hawaii, Auburn, Mississippi State, Notre Dame, Virginia and Pittsburgh. Texas A&M competed against Louisiana State, Colorado and Oklahoma before national television audiences. On the other hand, TCU, Baylor and Texas Tech competed against Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska and Penn State to make up the other non-SWC televised games during the same period. Clearly, this concession favoured the major powers.
4. Buchanan, M. 1975, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
5. Buchanan, J.M. 1990, “The domain of constitutional economics”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 1, pp. 1-18.
6. Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. 1962, The Calculus of Consent, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
7. Ellickson, R.C. 1987, “A critique of economic and sociological theories of social control”, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 16, pp. 67-99.
8. Gibbons, R. 1992, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
9. Gordon, S. 1976, “The new contractarians”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 84, pp. 573-590.
10. Holcombe, R.G. 1983, Public Finance and the Political Process, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, IL.
11. Holcombe, R.G. 1994, The Economic Foundations of Government, New York University Press, Washington Square, NY.
12. Jenkins, S. 1991, “Out of their league”, Sports Illustrated, Vol. 75, 11 November, pp. 82-83.
13. Jenkins, S. 1992, “Sorry state”, Sports Illustrated, Vol. 77, 16 November, pp. 70-76.
14. Nozick, R. 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, New York, NY.
15. Rawls, J. 1971, A Theory of Justice, Belknap Publishers, Cambridge, MA.
16. Sobel, R. 1994, “The League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter: an analysis of two international constitutions”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 5, pp. 173-192.
17. Stigler, G.J. 1971, “A theory of oligopoly”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, pp. 44-61.
18. Tirole, J. 1988, A Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.