The Proposed abolition of de facto unions in Tanzania: A case of sailing against the social current

Journal of African Law

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 187-214

  Rwezaura, Bart ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

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EID: 51749087842     PISSN: 00218553     EISSN: 14643731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0021855300011827     Document Type: Article

References (125)

1. Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Report of the Law Reform Commission on Law of Marriage Act (No. 5, 1971). Presented to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 1994. 33, (LRC).
2. In one case Mkwawa, J., wrote: “I must confess that this case caused considerable concern and anxiety in me. I did not at all find it easy to determine the appeal this way or that way. Were its lamentable facts put into a novel or portrayed on the stage they would be taken as being improbable as to be worthy of serious attention” See Krisantus Matembo v. Adu Kinunda (Mtwara) High Court Civ Appeal No. 112 of 1991 (unreported, 16/7/92).
3. And in Elizabeth Ismail v. Melikizedek Harun [1982] TLR 322, Mfalila, J., noted that “the District Court Magistrate was clearly confused, he did not know what law to apply, customary or national law. In the end he applied both … ” (at 323).
4. See LRC, above, n. 1, 33.
5. LRC noted that the LMA “was enacted with the view of unifying and harmonizing the then existing multiple regime[s] of law of marriage. It aimed at bringing the law of marriage into accord with TANU's aspirations of fostering equality, individual dignity, freedom and respect to the people; to provide for freedom of marriage and equal recognition of all marriages however celebrated, whether … Christian, Islamic, civil or customary.” See LRC, above, n. 1, 1.
6. The acronym TANU refers to the ruling political party. The Court of Appeal of Tanzania has also declared that “the mischief which the LMA, 1971 sought to cure … was … the traditional exploitation and oppression of married women by their husbands … by reducing the … inequality between them … in so far as their respective domestic rights and duties are concerned.” See Bi Hawa Mohamed v. Ally Sefu, Court of Appeal Civ App No. 9 of 1983, (unreported) at 13–14.
7. See G. R. Woodman, “The peculiar policy of recognition of indigenous law in British colonial Africa: a preliminary discussion,” (1989) 22 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 3, 273
8. B. Rwezaura, “Tanzania: building a new family law out of a plural legal system,” in M. D. A. Freeman (ed.), Annual Survey of Family Law (1994/1995) 33 Journal of Family Law, 423–450
9. S. Poulter, Legal Dualism in Lesotho: A Study of the Choice of Law Question in Family Matters, Morija, 1981, 14
10. C. N. Himonga, Family Succession Laws in Gambia, Munster, 1995, 265
11. W. Ncube, “Released from legal minority: the Legal Age of Majority Act in Zimbabwe,” in A. Armstrong and W. Ncube (eds.), Women and Law in Southern Africa, Harare, 1987, 193.
12. See C. R. Cutshall, Justice for the People: Community Courts and Legal Transformation in Zimbabwe, Harare 1991
13. A. Sachs and G. H. Welch, Liberating the Law: Creating Justice in Mozambique, London, 1990
14. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, Nairobi, 1968
15. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Commission on Marriage, Divorce and the Status of Women, Entebbe, 1965.
16. See J. S. Read, “A milestone in the integration of personal laws: the new law of marriage and divorce in Tanzania,” [1972] J.A.L., 19–39
17. B. Rwezaura and U. Wanitzek “Family law reform in Tanzania: a socio-legal report,” (1988) 2 International Journal of Law and the Family 1–26.
18. See Raphael Dibogo v. Frabianus Wambura [1975] LRT at n. 42
19. Ramadhani Mohamed v. Oman Ramadhani [1976] LRT at n. 8. But as we shall see below, the continuing social importance of bridewealth accounts in part for the failure of certain couples to complete their marriage procedures before commencing cohabitation. Moreover, the fact that the law of bridewealth was reformed without at the same time making corresponding changes in the law of child legitimacy has continued to generate conflict between customary law and the general law. In an attempt to perhaps bridge the gap between the two systems, the High Court has, in recent years, successfully extended the “welfare of the child” principle, contained in s. 125 (LMA), to all children irrespective of the marital status of the parents.
20. See, Rwezaura, LRT. above at n. 6, 523.
21. According to s. 20(2) (b), an objection to an intended marriage may be made by an existing wife, or one of the wives, to the registrar of marriages or registration officer on the grounds that “the intended wife is of notoriously bad character or is suffering from an infectious or otherwise communicable disease or is likely to introduce grave discord into the household.” As noted below, this statutory provision is now used by women cohabitants as a bargaining device to secure financial support from men who wish to marry other women. Indeed the right of the first wife to object to a later additional marriage of her husband is now being seriously considered by the South African Law Commission as a possible improvement on their system of polygyny. See South African Law Reform Commission, Harmonization of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law (Customary Marriages), Project No. 90, Issue Paper 3, 1996, 5.
22. See B. Rwezaura, “The integration of marriage laws with special reference to Tanzania,” in J. M. Abun-Nasr. U. Spelleberg and U. Wanitzck (eds.), Law, Society, and National Identity, Hamburg. 1990, 139–161.
23. See United Republic of Tanzania, The Government White Paper No. 1 of 1969: Proposals on Uniform Law of Marriage, Dar es Salaam, 1969, 13.
24. The Government White Paper No. 1 of 1969: Proposals on Uniform Law of Marriage, at 13.
25. See C. O. Kaisi, Women under Presumption of Marriage: A Critical Analysis of the Law, Practice and Social Implications of S. 160 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971, LLM Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1994, 129.
26. Also C. Blesoe, Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society, Stanford, 1980
27. U. Wanitzck, “Bulsa marriage law and practice: women as social actors in a patriarchal society,” forthcoming in W. Zips and E. A. B. van Rouveroy van Niewaal (eds.), Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Power in West African Societies: Perspectives from Legal Anthropology, Munster, 1998.
28. As Kyando, J., noted, the parties' “[a]ttempts to marry were thwarted by their respective family members …” See Yonathan Gwandenga v. Kasiani Daniel (DSM) High Court Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1991. Kaisi has correctly noted that socio-economic conditions in Tanzania “have changed tremendously especially in the mid-eighties to date. [M]any people cannot afford high bride price payments and the expensive showing-off of ceremonies of marriages. And with more men and women moving into urban areas in search for jobs, many people just take each other and live together or ‘put up’ house together.”
29. See Kaisi, Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Power in West African Societies: Perspectives from Legal Anthropology. 39. See also below, n. 76.
30. See Kaisi, Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Power in West African Societies: Perspectives from Legal Anthropology. 129.
31. The 1985 European figures for de facto unions expressed as a proportion of all legally married couples were as follows: Sweden (19.9%), Finland (11.4%), Norway (10.8%) France (8.6%), Netherlands (7.7%), Great Britain (6.2%), Germany (4.7%), Austria (4.2%), Hungary (2.9%) and Italy (1.4%). See C. Prinz, Cohabiting, Married, or Single, Aldershot, 1995, 75. The fact that the proportion of de facto unions in Tanzania far exceeds that of Sweden and of other European jurisdictions may be a consequence of how de facto unions are defined for the particular study and a result of the differences in the law and social conditions producing the European version of de facto unions.
32. On the other hand, the Mozambique figure of 90% reflects a different kind of legal history whereby the Portuguese colonial legal system neither recognized nor prohibited customary unions. Such non-recognition resulted in these unions being defined as “de facto unions” instead of valid customary marriages: see Sachs and Welch, Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Power in West African Societies: Perspectives from Legal Anthropology. 103.
33. See J. Kabeberi-Macharia and C. Nyamu, “Marriage by affidavit: developing alternative laws on cohabitation,” unpublished paper presented at the 9th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, Durban, 28–31 July, 1997.
34. See Kaisi, unpublished paper presented at the 9th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law. 141.
35. According to Kaisi, the average period of cohabitation in her sample was 5.4 years. See Kaisi unpublished paper presented at the 9th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law. 129.
36. A free translation from Kiswahili of Art. 13(1) states, inter alia, that “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without discrimination to equal protection of the law.” The principle of non-discrimination should extend to protect de facto unions in appropriate cases. For the generous legal acknowledgement of de facto unions in the Mozambique family law project “brings within the terms of the Project the great majority of Mozambican families—estimated at 90%—who have not registered their marriages. It is accordingly an important device for narrowing the gap between registered and unregistered unions and thereby materialising the constitutional principle of treating all citizens alike independently of background. As such it is both democratic in its range and unifying in its operation.” See Sachs and Welch, unpublished paper presented at the 9th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law., 103.
37. See M. Olmesdhl, “Marriage and cohabitation: cross-cultural comparisons” in J. Eekelaar and S. Katz (eds.), Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies, Toronto, 1980, 46–56.
38. See O. Jessep, “De facto relationships and the law in Papua New Guinea,” (1992) 41 I.C.L.Q 460–471, 462.
39. For example, the male partner might assert that the woman is his girlfriend while the woman believes that she is his wife. Thus most cases show a tendency for women claiming under s. 160 to cite a longer period of cohabitation than men. In some cases the women use their children's age to corroborate their story. See Leticia Bagumba v. Thadeo Magoma and Anor, (Mwanza) High Court Civ App No. 8 of 1989 (unreported) where the man testified that between 1977 and 1980 he regularly had sexual intercourse with the appellant but they were living separately.
40. This evidence was contradicted by the appellant who contended that the two had started cohabitation together in 1976. Similar denials by men have also been reported in Kenya (see Kabeberi-Macharia and Nyamu, (Mwanza) High Court Civ App No. 8 of 1989 (unreported). 12).
41. Thus, as noted by Bledsoe, “[w]hen brought to court, cases involving disputes over marital statuses invariably end in a tangle of contradictory testimonies from numerous witnesses” (Bledsoe, (Mwanza) High Court Civ App No. 8 of 1989 (unreported). 8). In these circumstances courts have to be alert to the manipulation of personal status and the possible underlying motives for such conduct.
42. See M. F. Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples, Harare, 1991, 320.
43. The Shona Peoples, at 320.
44. Kaisi notes that a number of male cohabitants in this category who are still married to their “church wives”, either in name or otherwise, are quick to produce their old marriage certificates to prove that they are not married to the claimant partners but to the other women. See Kaisi, The Shona Peoples. 135.
45. In the matter of Mwanjesa Albert, (DSM) High Court Probate and Admin Case No. 23 of 1989, the deceased had two wives. The first was a church-wife and the other was either “just a cohabiter” (as noted in Kaisi) or probably a customary law wife. There were eight children from each of these unions.
46. See Kaisi, The Shona Peoples. 171.
47. In the matter of Shekilango R. Hoossein, (DSM) High Court Probate and Admin Case No. 222 of 1980 (unreported), the deceased, a prominent Tanzanian politician, was previously married in accordance with Islamic law. He subsequently cohabited with another woman, a Christian, with whom he had two children. On his death intestate, the first wife successfully challenged the validity of the second union and was able to prevent the two children from inheriting their father's property.
48. See Kaisi, (DSM) High Court Probate and Admin Case No. 222 of 1980 (unreported). 170.
49. As noted by Kabeberi-Macharia and Nyamu, “[t]he way in which marriage ceremonies are conducted among Kenyan Africans in the contemporary setting provides further evidence of the fluidity of boundaries [between different forms of marriage valid under the law]”. See Kabeberi-Macharia and Nyamu, (DSM) High Court Probate and Admin Case No. 222 of 1980 (unreported). 16.
50. See Poulter, (DSM) High Court Probate and Admin Case No. 222 of 1980 (unreported). 34.
51. See R. T. Nhlapo “No cause for optimism: bigamy and dual marriage in Swaziland,” in Armstrong and Ncube (eds.), (DSM) High Court Probate and Admin Case No. 222 of 1980 (unreported). 125.
52. In Angelina Mutalemwa v. Benedict Mutalemwa [1978] LRT n. 44, the applicant was first married in 1946 in accordance with Roman Catholic rites. Following an informal divorce under customary law, the applicant remarried (presumably under customary law). The second marriage lasted for 21 years, during which five children were born to the union. The wife's application for maintenance was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that her marriage was void.
53. See also Violet Ishengoma Kahangwa v. Adm'r Gen'l, Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1989 (16/7/90 unreported) per Makame, Kisanga, Mfalila,JJ.A., in which comparable facts resulted in the children of the second marriage losing their inheritance rights following the intestate death of their father.
54. For more details on Violet see Rwezaura, Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1989. 123.
55. This appears, for example, from the judgments of Kazimoto, J. in Anastasia Mapunda v. Agathon Mbepera (Mtwara) High Court Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1992
56. Daniel Millinga v. Imelda Hyera (Songea) High Court Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1992, where the appellate judge stated that although the parties had lived together for more than two years and had acquired the reputation of husband and wife, still they were not married because they did not go through any form of marriage. Rather, they were concubines and were free to come and go as they wished and the courts had no power to grant a decree of divorce. Unfortunately such an erroneous interpretation of s. 160 (LMA) has the effect of increasing, rather than reducing the number of children born out of wedlock.
57. Leticia Bagumba, High Court Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1992.
58. This is the test applied by Nyalali, J., (as then he was) in Elizabeth Salwiba v. Peter Obara [1975] LRT 52.
59. In my view, s. 160 could be amended to permit parties to such unions to apply jointly for the registration of the marriage once they have fulfilled the conditions laid down by s. 160 (LMA). At the moment one or both parties can apply to the court (s. 94 LMA) for a declaratory decree that they were validly married. However, such a remedy is hardly affordable by most couples and, seemingly, it is only pursued when there is a marital problem. See Yonathan Gwandenga v. Kastanti Daniel (DSM) High Court Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1994 (unreported), per Kyando, J. In this case a man applied to the court to be declared a husband “by virtue of long cohabitation together, and secondly, and perhaps mainly, that he be given a share of the house.” This is one of the very few cases where the man moved into his partner's house and sought to rely on s. 160 to secure division of assets.
60. [1982] TLR 333.
61. Interestingly, the court in Salum Itandala does not discuss the welfare of the child as stipulated under s. 125 (LMA). Chipeta, J., merely held that the “appellant, therefore, is entitled to claim custody of those children. The respondent has no right over them.” This looks like an application of the customary rules of guardianship whereby all legitimate children belong to the husband's clan. See Declaration of Customary Law, Rule 175, Government Notice No. 279 of 1963. This was indeed a fitting case for the application of the best interests of the child principle as provided under s. 125 (LMA).’
62. [1975] LRT 225.
63. [1982] TLR 304, 306.
64. TLR. “If any evidence is adduced showing that either of the parties lacked capacity, the presumption in favour of the validity of the marriage disappears and the question has to be decided on a balance of probability in the light of all the available evidence.” Based on the English authorities, see P. M. Bromley and N. V. Love, Bromley's Family Law, London, 1992, 68. But, as I have argued elsewhere in this article, the injustice arising from the inapplicability of s. 160(2) (LMA) to couples lacking the initial capacity to marry can be avoided by amending the LMA to grant courts the jurisdiction to order division of assets, maintenance and child custody, in all cases of void marriages.
65. See also B. Rwezaura, “Presumption of marriage in Tanzania,” (1985) 18 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, 169–179, 179.
66. Thadeo Mutarubukwa v. Hermalinda Herman (Mwanza) High Court Civil Appeal No. 60 of 1991. In this case, the woman cohabitant had contracted a Christian marriage in 1949 and thereafter she believed that she had been validly divorced under customary law. On that basis she remarried in 1961 and the second marriage lasted till 1991 when she petitioned for divorce and division of matrimonial assets. This was therefore a “class three1’ union. The lower court, with the full knowledge of all the facts, held that the parties had acquired the reputation of having been married to each other as stipulated under s. 160, but that their marriage had broken down irreparably and therefore s. 160(2) was applicable. The lower court seems to have found an ingenious way of doing substantive justice by trying to involve s. 160(2) but for the fact that lack of initial capacity to marry which effectively blocks the application of s. 160(2).
67. Francis Leo v. Paschal Simon Maganga [1976] LRT n. 22. The facts in Francis Leo are comparable to those in Salum Itandala (see above, n. 47). In this case the action was also brought by a father-in-law claiming legitimation fee in respect of five children born during a ten-year period of cohabitation between the respondent and the claimant's daughter. As in Salum Itandala, it became necessary to determine whether the respondent was married to the claimant's daughter.
68. See for example, Elizabeth Salwiba v. Peter Obara [1975] LRT, 52
69. Ramadhani Mohamed w. Omari Ramadham [1976] LRT 8
70. Leticia Bagumba (see n. 30). Mfaula, J., accepted this position in Elizabeth Email v. Melikizedek Haruni [1982] TLR 322.
71. See also Rwezaura, “Presumption of Marriage in Tanzania,” TLR. 169 179, 169.
72. Joseph Sindo v. Pasaka Mkondola (Mtwara) High Court Civil App No. 132 of 1991 (unreported).
73. See Salum Itandala, above, n. 46, 335.
74. (1971) High Court Digest n. 257. In this case the husband applied for custody of children born during the marriage. The children's mother denied the existence of the marriage on the ground that the husband had not paid any bridewealth to her natal family. The lower court held for the wife but the husband successfully appealed to the District Court where it was held that long cohabitation raises a strong presumption of marriage.
75. (1971) High Court Digest, n. 33. In this case the parties cohabited for six years during which the husband was not able to complete the payment of the whole bridewealth. Thereafter the wife's natal family tried to break up the union unless the husband paid up the outstanding balance. It was held by the High Court (Kwikima, J.) that the strong presumption in favour of the marriage had not been rebutted by the wife's natal family.
76. Governor's Appeal Board No. 7 of 1944.
77. See Government Notice No. 279 of 1963, Rule No. 5.
78. See R. S. Katapa, “Arranged marriages,” in Z. Tumbo and R. Liljestrom (eds.), Chekwa Chekwa: The Dilemma of Teenage Girls, Ostersund, 1994, 76–95.
79. See Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P & D 130, at 133.
80. This is in contrast to the law in England after 1973 when lack of consent, previously a ground for making a marriage void, now makes a marriage only voidable. See s. 12(c) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
81. Bromley and Lowe, Matrimonial Causes Act. 90.
82. See United Republic of Tanzania, above, n. 16, 7.
83. See LRC above, n. 1, 25.
84. See Kaisi, LRC. 130.
85. See G. F. A. Sawyerr, ‘Judicial manipulation of customary family law in Tanzania,” in S. Roberts (ed.), Law and the Family in Africa, The Hague, 1977, 115–128, 115
86. A. Armstrong et al, “Uncovering reality: excavating women's rights in African family law,” (1993) 7 International Journal of Law and the Family, 314–369.
87. Sec LRC, above, n. 1, 22.
88. Most people in rural communities do not have the time or inclination to travel a long way to register their marriage with a state official. It has therefore been recommended by the LRC that a village-level official be appointed as the registration officer to achieve greater efficiency in the registration process. In Mozambique, the Family Law Project recommended the establishment of a mobile registration centre to enable a more efficient system of registration. See Sachs and Welch, LRC. 103.
89. During the late 1980s, in the Kagera region of Tanzania, one Roman Catholic priest who had observed that several young Christians were eloping and simply living together without undergoing a church wedding decided to convene a parish meeting at which he inquired why young people were not celebrating their marriage in church. He was told that parents could not afford marriage expenses associated with a church wedding. After some discussion it was agreed that all the existing cohabitants should be married at one ceremony, followed by a wedding party at the parish. In more recent years certain members of the clergy have spoken against lavish wedding parties which, apart from being wasteful, also tend to discourage other less affluent couples from marrying. Archbishop Kakobe of the Full Gospel Faith Bible Fellowship joined 50 couples into matrimony in a single ceremony at Mwenge, in Dar es Salaam. Previously in 1996, he is also reported to have “staged a joint wedding ritual for 60 couples” at the same church. See Robert Rweyemamu, “Bringing costcutting to the wedding day,” The Nation, 2 October, 1997. It is suggested that the law ought to be amended to permit a joint application for registration by couples falling in “class one” and “class two” unions as soon as they have complied with the requirements of s. 160(1) (LMA). Those who do not wish to register because they prefer to retain their status as cohabitants could still benefit from s. 160(2) at the termination of their unions.
90. See Kabeberi-Macharia and Nyamu, above, n. 23, 22.
91. The Nation, at 3.
92. The Nation, at 24.
93. Bi Hawa Mohamed, above, n. 5.
94. See Amida Shabani v. Alfani Mtenga [1981] TLR 232. Indeed, it is uncertain whether the court has the power to order custody of children in such circumstances. Yet as noted below, this problem has now been addressed by judicially extending the principle of the welfare of the child to all children irrespective of the marital status of their parents.
95. See Rwezaura, above, n. 6, 323. In my view, since a voidable marriage “is for all purposes a valid marriage until it is annulled by a decree of the court” (s. 40 LMA), there is in principle no reason why a decree of nullity in such circumstances should not be construed as analogous to a decree of divorce. Note that Amida Shabani was also a “class three” de facto union involving a woman who, it seems, did not formally divorce her first husband before “purporting to marry” her second husband.
96. See S. Cretney, Elements of Family Law, London, 1992, 28
97. Bromley and Love, Elements of Family Law. 720.
98. A number of interesting changes intended to improve the status of all children (including illegitimate children) have been proposed to the government recently by the LRC but these have yet to be widely debated and enacted. See United Republic of Tanzania, Hotubaya Waziri wa Sheria na Mambo ya Katiba (The Budget Speech by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for Year 1997/98 to the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania), Dar es Salaam, 1997, at 59–88. Furthermore, unlike Uganda which has made an effort to update and integrate existing child law in line with its international obligations, the recent Tanzanian proposals have merely added new provisions to existing laws on the child without making major reforms. See also J. S. Read, “Protecting Uganda's children: a new model child law for an African state?” (1993) 5 Journal of Child Law, 170–177.
99. Kaisi found a marriage register at a Roman Catholic Church in Dar es Salaam showing that between 1986 and 1992, a total of 120 couples had lived together as husband and wife before celebrating their marriages in church. See Kaisi, Journal of Child Law. 144.
100. See Halima Rashidi v. Amon Peter, High Court Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1993 (22/3/93) per Maina, J.
101. See also Rwezaura High Court Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1993. above, n. 6, 534.
102. The law of inheritance is currently under review and it is believed that the intended reforms will further narrow the gap between marital and non-marital children in the area of intestate succession. See Rwezaura, High Court Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1993. 523
103. Tanzania, above, n. 86, 69.
104. See for example, Eves v. Eves [1975] 3 All ER 768
105. Grant v. Edwards [1986] 2 All ER 426
106. and more generally Bromley and Lowe, All ER. 555–584.
107. See LRC, above, n. 1, 31.
108. LRC, at 31.
109. LRC, at 31.
110. Theresia Msiwao v. Mwamba Mohamed (DSM) High Court (PC) Civ App No. 10 of 1978 (unreported).
111. “The Commission is not certain whether or not this is the correct interpretation … contemplated in the Government Paper No 1 of 1969.” See LRC, above n. 1, 33.
112. LRC, at 144.
113. LRC, at 145.
114. LRC, at 146.
115. LRC at 51.
116. The elders stated that, “as things are nowadays, our children do not even care whether their parents are informed of their intended marriage or not. As a result they don't even marry but end up in cohabitation only on ‘flimsy excuses’ such as hard economic situations, or they have no dowry or that they are not yet economically ready to marry, of which we had never heard of in the past.” See Kaisi, LRC. 151. Clearly therefore, there is a wide gap between the views of the elders and those of the youth.
117. LRC, at 147.
118. LRC, at 147.
119. LRC, at 138.
120. See Kaisi, LRC. Mwaikasu, J., the former chairman of the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, did not chair the committee which recommended the repeal of s. 160 (LMA). This committee was chaired by Nsekela, J., a former chief corporation counsel of the Tanzania Legal Corporation who is now a judge of the High Court.
121. LRC, at 139.
122. See B. Rwezaura “Changing community obligations to the elderly in contemporary Africa,” in J. M. Eekelaar and D. Pearl (eds.), An Aging World: Dilemmas and Challenges for Law and Social Policy, Oxford, 1989, 113.
123. See Kaisi, An Aging World: Dilemmas and Challenges for Law and Social Policy. 139.
124. See Wanitzek, An Aging World: Dilemmas and Challenges for Law and Social Policy.
125. See L. Stone, Road to Divorce: A History of the Making and Breaking of Marriage in England, Oxford 1995, 121–137.