Anti-individualism and fregeanism

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 48, Issue 193, 1998, Pages 470-482

  Kimbrough, Scott ^a  

^a JACKSONVILLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51349165061     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00115     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. T. Burge, 'Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind', Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), pp. 697-720 (hereafter INFM), at p. 697
2. see p. 79 of his 'Individualism and the Mental' (hereafter IM), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4 (1979), pp. 73-121, for similar formulations of the anti-individualistic conclusion of his thought-experiments
3. His defence of this position features thought-experiments similar to those first presented by Hilary Putnam in 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', repr. in Putnam's Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge UP, 1975), pp. 215-71
4. Burge, 'Belief and Synonymy', Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1978), pp. 119-38
5. This argument may be blocked by appealing to 'guises' or 'ways of believing' a content, as in N. Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (MIT Press, 1986). But my concern here is not with Russellians like Salmon, but with traditional Fregeans like Burge, who have no truck with 'guises'
6. G. Frege, 'On Sense and Meaning' (1892), in Collected Papers, ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 157-77
7. For Burge's explicit adoption of this commitment, see INFM pp. 715ff
8. A case of this kind is presented in B. Loar, 'Social Content and Psychological Content', in R. Grimm and D. Merrill (eds), The Contents of Thought (Univ. of Arizona Press, 1988), pp. 99-110, though in the service of a different point
9. For discussions of concept-possession and the related issue of self-knowledge within an anti-individualistic framework, see K. Falvey and J. Owens, 'Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism', Philosophical Review, 103 (1994), pp. 107-37
10. and G. Ebbs, 'Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56 (1996), pp. 499-530