When worlds collide! Competing visions of the relationship between direct effect and supremacy

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 931-963

  Dougan, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 51249161225     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (161)

1. Case 152/84, Marshall, [1986] ECR 723;
2. Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, [1994] ECR I-3325. The situation is different where the relevant directive merely embodies a directly effective Community obligation imposed either under the Treaty itself (e.g. Case C-381/99, Brunnhofer, [2001] ECR I-4961) or through the general principles of Community law (e.g. Case C-144/04, Mangold, [2005] ECR I-9981).
3. Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, [1996] ECR I-2201;
4. Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia v. Central Food, [2000] ECR I-7535.
5. Directive 83/189, O.J. 1983, L 109/8. Now repealed and replaced by Directive 98/34, O.J. 1998, L 204/37.
6. This is not to deny the existence of other conceptual models concerning the relationship between direct effect and supremacy; it is merely to focus attention on the two models most prominent in debate about the "incidental effects" case law, and which are most relevant to our present discussion.
7. The author previously used the terms "civil law" and "common law" models (respectively): see Dougan, "Legal Developments" in Miles (Ed.), Journal of Common Market Studies: The European Union Annual Review 2004/2005 (Blackwell Publishing, 2005). This was intended simply to play on the old stereotype that civil lawyers think in principles, common lawyers through remedies; but in hindsight, the terminology is perhaps unhelpful, insofar as it suggests that the "primacy" and "trigger" models should be associated with the civil and common law traditions (respectively) in any more meaningful juridical sense.
8. Joined Cases C-397-403/01, Pfeiffer, [2004] ECR I-8835.
9. Joined Cases C-387, 391 & 403/02, Berlusconi, [2005] ECR I-3565.
10. Or at least, of its First Pillar; and possibly also its Third Pillar (as discussed further below).
11. For ease of discussion, we shall refer only to the national judicial authorities; but analogous reasoning applies when other public authorities are bound by the implications of supremacy and direct effect in the exercise of their regulatory/administrative powers. Cf. Schütze, "The morphology of legislative power in the European Community: Legal instruments and the federal division of powers", 26 YEL (2007), forthcoming.
12. E.g. Lenz, Sif Tynes and Young, "Horizontal what? Back to basics", 25 EL Rev. (2000), 509;
13. Tridimas, "Black, white and shades of grey: Horizontality of directives revisited", 21 YEL (2002), 327;
14. Figueroa Regueiro, "Invocability of substitution and invocability of exclusion: Bringing legal realism to the current developments of the case-law of 'horizontal' direct effect of directives", Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/02 (available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org);
15. Lenaerts and Corthaut, "Of Birds and Hedges: The role of primacy in invoking norms of EU Law", 31 EL Rev. (2006), 287. Other commentators have constructed analyses which appear closely related to this "primacy" model, e.g. Betlem, "The doctrine of consistent interpretation: Managing legal uncertainty", 22 OJLS (2002), 397;
16. nd ed. (OUP, 2005) Ch 9.
17. The importance of subjective individual rights to the concept of direct effect seems to have been a strong preoccupation particularly in German academic writing: further, e.g. Ruffert, "Rights and remedies in European Community law: A comparative view", 34 CML Rev. (1997), 307;
18. van Gerven, "Of rights, remedies and procedures", 37 CML Rev. (2000), 501. Cf. the Member State's submissions in Case C-431/92, Commission v. Germany, [1995] ECR I-2189.
19. Again, analogous reasoning applies to other public authorities in the exercise of their regulatory or administrative powers.
20. E.g. Case C-72/95, Kraaijeveld, [1996] ECR I-5403;
21. Case C-435/97, World Wildlife Fund, [1999] ECR I-5613;
22. Case C-287/98, Linster, [2000] ECR I-6917;
23. Case C-201/02, Delena Wells, [2004] ECR I-723.
24. Further: Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, 2004) pp. 40-45. Also, e.g. Edwards, "Direct effect: Myth, mess or mystery?" in Prinssen and Schrauwen (Eds.), Direct Effect: Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing, 2002). Contrast with, e.g. Prechal and Hancher, "Individual environmental rights: Conceptual pollution in EU environmental law?", 2 YEL (2001), 89. In this light, attempts to find a new vocabulary for the ability of individuals to rely (say) upon environmental protection directives before the domestic courts - such as the idea of a special "public law effect" - might seem unnecessary and/or misguided: Cf. Scott, EC Environmental Law (Longman, 1998) Ch 8;
25. Hilson and Downes, "Making sense of rights: Community rights in EC Law", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 121.
26. E.g. neither model need commit the error of confusing the disapplication of national law (in an enforceability sense) with its alleged invalidity (in a competence sense). Cf. Schütze, "Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slowly emergent doctrine of Community preemption", 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1023.
27. E.g. neither model offers any resolution of the sovereignty problem, defining the circumstances (if any) in which national courts are entitled to refuse to recognize the supremacy of Community law. See further: infra section 3.3.
28. Of course, the directive might still have legal implications for the two private parties indirectly, i.e. through national law as construed in accordance with Community law.
29. See further: infra section 4.3.
30. Or least that most commonly articulated in the academic literature; other versions of the "primacy" model might reach the same conclusion as the "trigger" model, albeit by very different reasoning: see infra section 4.1.
31. Only the duty of consistent interpretation (see Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285), which the "trigger" model treats as an autonomous obligation binding on the national courts as a general principle of Union law, itself capable of having direct effect within the domestic legal order: see infra section 3.3.2.
32. It is assumed, for this example, that the principle of supremacy applies more or less equally within the Third Pillar, if not necessarily in all non-EC areas of Union law.
33. Again, reasoning on the basis of the "primacy" model most commonly articulated in the academic literature; Cf. A.G. Kokott in Berlusconi, cited supra note 7;
34. Biondi and Mastroianni, Annotation of Berlusconi, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 553. This is despite the rule that directives (and by analogy framework decisions) should not aggravate criminal liability, e.g. Case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, [1987] ECR 3969;
35. Case C-168/95, Luciano Arcaro, [1996] ECR I-4705;
36. Case C-60/02, Criminal Proceedings Against X, [2004] ECR I-651. But for a different viewpoint, see infra section 4.1.
37. Subject to the possibility that the same result might be achieved via the duty of consistent interpretation (after Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285). On judicial protection in the Third Pillar in general, see further: Peers, "Salvation Outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar After the Pupino and Segi Judgments", in this Review.
38. E.g. A.G. Kokott in Case C-457/02, Niselli, [2004] ECR I-10853;
39. and in Berlusconi, supra note 7.
40. See further Dougan, Annotation of Unilever Italia, 38 CML Rev. (2001), 1503, 1514.
41. It is perhaps interesting to note that, in Lenz, Sif Tynes and Young, op. cit. supra note 10, 520, the ruling in Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 1 is treated as a case involving "pure substitution"; one might reasonably have considered the relevant Treaty provision to be a prime candidate rather for purely exclusionary effects.
42. Overlooking, for the purposes of the example, any issues relating to Arts. 28 or 49 EC.
43. See Dougan, Annotation of Unilever Italia, 38 CML Rev. (2001), 1503, 1513.
44. Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, [1994] ECR I-3325.
45. Case C-441/93, Pafitis, [1996] ECR I-1347.
46. See, to similar effect, A.G. Tizzano in Case C-144/04, Mangold, [2005] ECR I-9981, paras 99-122 Opinion.
47. Cf. the ruling in Case C-233/01, Lo Bue, [2002] ECR I-9411, paras 18-22. Also: Editorial, "Horizontal Direct Effect: A Law of Diminishing Coherence?", 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1.
48. E.g. contrast Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, [1991] ECR I-5357 with Case C-441/99, Gharehveran, [2001] ECR I-7687.
49. See also Case C-278/05, Robins, judgment of 25 Jan. 2007, nyr.
50. Cf. MacCormick, "The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now", 1 ELJ (1995), 259;
51. Eleftheriadis, "Aspects of European Constitutionalism", 21 EL Rev. (1996), 32;
52. Weiler and Haltern, "Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal Order" in Slaughter, Stone, Sweet and Weiler (Eds.), The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, 1998);
53. Curtin and Dekker, "The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reflections on Vertical Unity-In-Diversity" in Beaumont, Lyons and Walker (Eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart Publishing, 2002);
54. Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (Kluwer Law International, 2004) Ch 5.
55. That explanation is effectively universal: e.g. it applies also to regulations, which may be "directly applicable" according to Art. 249 EC (e.g. Case C-379/04, Dahms, [2005] ECR I-8723), but can still only have direct effect if they satisfy the threshold criteria (e.g. Case C-403/98, Monte Arcosu, [2001] ECR I-103). Cf. the critique that direct effect has become too broad and diluted: Prechal, "Does direct effect still matter?", 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1047 and "Direct effect reconsidered, redefined and rejected" in Prinssen and Schrauwen (Eds.), Direct Effect: Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing, 2002).
56. And in certain analyses, even the regime of international law: consider Lenaerts and Corthaut, op. cit. supra note 10.
57. See, e.g. Tridimas, op. cit. supra note 10, 327;
58. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 235.
59. Cf. Pescatore, "The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An infant disease of Community Law", 8 EL Rev. (1983), 155;
60. Allott, "Preliminary Rulings: Another infant disease", 25 EL Rev. (2000), 538.
61. Further, e.g. Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler op. cit. supra note 34;
62. de Witte, "Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal order" in Craig and be Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999);
63. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: the Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (OUP, 2001);
64. Claes, The National Courts' Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2006).
65. Francovich, cited. supra note 33.
66. Consider, e.g. Steiner, "From Direct Effects to Francovich: Shifting Means of Enforcement of Community Law", 18 EL Rev. (1993), 3;
67. Ross, "Beyond Francovich", 56 MLR (1993), 55.
68. Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III, [1996] ECR I-1029;
69. Joined Cases C-178, 179 & 188-190/94, Dillenkofer, [1996] ECR I-4845.
70. The system of Member State liability (as with the duty of consistent interpretation) sometimes being derived from Art. 10 EC and sometimes described as "inherent in the system of the Treaty", e.g. Francovich, cited. supra note 33, paras 31-37.
71. Further: Dougan, op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 56-59. Consider also: Prechal, "Member State Liability and Direct Effect: What's the Difference After All?" (2006) EBLR 299.
72. Consider, e.g. Claes, op. cit. supra note 39, p. 117.
73. Further: Arnull, Dashwood, Dougan, Ross, Spaventa and Wyatt, Wyatt & Dashwood's EU Law 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) paras 5-004 to 5-005.
74. E.g. Case 14/83, Von Colson, [1984] ECR 1891;
75. Case C-106/89, Marleasing, [1990] ECR I-4135.
76. Consider, e.g. Case C-160/01, Mau, [2003] ECR I-4791;
77. Pfeiffer, cited supra note 6;
78. Case C-212/04, Adeneler, [2006] ECR I-6057.
79. And indeed, a general principle of Union law: Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285.
80. Further: Drake, "Twenty Years After Von Colson: The Impact of 'Indirect Effect' on the Protection of the Individual's Community Rights", 30 EL Rev. (2005), 329.
81. E.g. Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, [1997] ECR I-4961.
82. Whether in the context of horizontal disputes (e.g. Case C-2/97, Borsana, [1998] ECR I-8597;
83. Case C-343/98, Collino, [2000] ECR I-6659;
84. Pfeiffer, cited supra note 6) or indeed vertical ones (e.g. Case C-142/04, Aslanidou, [2005] ECR I-7181). Or where the TEU itself rules out the direct effect of Third Pillar framework decisions.
85. Or the direct effect of the general principles of Union law, in relation to the Third Pillar.
86. E.g. Case C-213/89, Factortame, [1990] ECR I-2433;
87. Case C-228/98, Dounias, [2000] ECR I-577;
88. Case C-34/02, Pasquini, [2003] ECR I-6515;
89. Case C-125/01, Pflücke, [2003] ECR I-9375.
90. See, e.g. Lenaerts and Corthaut, op. cit. supra note 10, 293. Cf. Tridimas, op. cit. supra note 10, 347. Note that Claes, op. cit. supra note 39, sees supremacy as the foundation of the duty of consistent interpretation, but admits that this is rarely acknowledged as such by the ECJ (at p. 116).
91. See further: infra section 4.1.
92. E.g. Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285;
93. Case C-212/04, Adeneler, [2006] ECR I-6057.
94. Cf. the situation as regards directly effective Treaty articles: if the duty of consistent interpretation does not avoid a conflict between Community and national law, the latter must be disapplied by the domestic court, e.g. Case C-262/97, Engelbrecht, [2000] ECR I-7321;
95. Case C-208/05, Innovative Technology Centre, (Judgment of 11 Jan. 2007, nyr). Similarly with directives in vertical situations, e.g. Case C-462/99, Connect Austria, [2003] ECR I-5197.
96. CIA Security and Unilever Italia, both cited supra note 2.
97. Case C-441/93, Pafitis, [1996] ECR I-1347.
98. Case C-129/94, Ruiz Bernáldez, [1996] ECR I-1829.
99. See also Case C-537/03, Candolin, [2005] ECR I-5745.
100. E.g. A.G. Saggio in Cases C-240-4/98, Océano Grupo Editorial, [2000] ECR I-4941;
101. A.G. Alber in Collino, cited supra note 50;
102. A.G. Léger in Case C-287/98, Linster, [2000] ECR I-6917.
103. Further: Stuyck, Annotation of Ruiz Bernáldez, 33 CML Rev. (1996), 1261;
104. Arnull, "The Incidental Effect of Directives", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 1;
105. Betlem, "The Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation: Managing Legal Uncertainty", 22 OJLS (2002), 397. Cf. Case C-348/98, Ferreira, [2000] ECR I-6711, where the issue was expressly raised but unfortunately not addressed.
106. Consider, in particular, Case C-215/97, Bellone, [1998] ECR I-2191;
107. read in the light of Case C-456/98, Centrosteel, [2000] ECR I-6007. Similarly, Case C-481/99, Heininger, [2001] ECR I-9945;
108. read in the light of Case C-350/03, Schulte, [2005] ECR I-9215.
109. E.g. Collino, cited supra note 50;
110. Case C-233/01, Lo Bue, [2002] ECR I-9411.
111. In a similar sense, e.g. Skouris, "Effet Utile Versus Legal Certainty: The Case-Law of the Court of Justice on the Direct Effect of Directives", (2006) EBLR 243.
112. E.g. Tridimas, "Horizontal effect of directives: a missed opportunity?", 19 EL Rev. (1994), 621;
113. Coppel, "Rights, Duties and the End of Marshall", 57 MLR (1994), 859;
114. Craig, "Directives: Direct effect, indirect effect and the construction of national legislation", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 519;
115. Mastroianni, "On the distinction between vertical and horizontal direct effects of Community Directives: What role for the principle of equality?", 5 EPL (1999), 417.
116. This dilemma can be seen reflected in the analyses of, e.g. Lenz, Sif Tynes and Young, op. cit. supra note 10;
117. and Lenaerts and Corthaut, op. cit. supra note 10.
118. Just to be clear: the following observations concern the limitations on the principle of supremacy imposed/recognized within the Community legal order itself; they are not examples of national courts challenging the status of Community law, judged against provisions of purely domestic law, in defiance of the ECJ's jurisprudence.
119. E.g. Case C-108/01, Asda Stores, [2003] ECR I-5121.
120. E.g. Case C-234/04, Kapferer, [2006] ECR I-2585;
121. Joined Cases C-392 & 422/04, Arcor, [2006] ECR I-8559;
122. Cf. Case C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, [2004] ECR I-837.
123. Assuming the latter satisfies the principles of equivalence and effectiveness: e.g. Case C-188/95, Fantask, [1997] ECR I-6783.
124. To be fair, this problem has been (implicitly) acknowledged by certain "primacy" commentators, e.g. Lenz, Sif Tynes and Young, op. cit. supra note 10, 518;
125. Lenaerts and Corthaut, op. cit. supra note 10, 306.
126. Pfeiffer, cited supra note 6.
127. Directive 93/104, O.J. 1993, L 307/18.
128. See the Opinion of 6 May 2003, paras 56-58. Cf. the A.G.'s second Opinion of 27 April 2004: it seems to prefer a resolution based on the duty of consistent interpretation alone (though the reasoning remains ambiguous).
129. On which, see further: Prechal, Annotation of Pfeiffer, 42 CML Rev. (2005), 1445.
130. nd ed. (OUP 2006) pp. 246-250.
131. Cf. Case C-304/94, Tombesi, [1997] ECR I-3561.
132. See A.G. Kokott in Niselli, cited supra note 24, paras 52-75 Opinion.
133. Berlusconi, supra note 7.
134. See Opinion of 14 Oct. 2004. See also: Biondi and Mastroianni, Annotation of Berlusconi, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 553.
135. Directive 68/151, O.J. English Special Edition (I) 1968, p. 41.
136. Cf. Case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, [1987] ECR 3969;
137. Luciano Arcaro, cited supra note 22;
138. Case C-60/02, Criminal Proceedings Against X, cited supra note 22;
139. Case C-384/02, Grøngaard, [2005] ECR I-9939.
140. For a critique, see Dougan, "Legal Developments" in Sedelmeier and Young (Eds.), Journal of Common Market Studies: The European Union Annual Review 2005/2006 (Blackwell, 2006).
141. Other recent affirmations of the Faccini Dori case law include Case C-235/03, QDQ Media, [2005] ECR I-1937;
142. Case C-196/02, Nikoloudi, [2005] ECR I-1789;
143. Case C-350/03, Schulte, [2005] ECR I-9215.
144. Indeed, one assumes that the "substantial procedural defect" reasoning developed in CIA Security and Unilever Italia will be extended by the ECJ to cover other, exactly analogous, "inter- institutional" directives.
145. Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia, [2000] ECR I-7535, paras 50-51.
146. See Dougan, Annotation of Unilever Italia, 38 CML Rev. (2001), 1503, 1509. Note the Court's rather self-contradictory reference, in Case C-159/00, Sapod Audic, [2002] ECR I-5031, to the possibility that individuals whose interests are adversely affected by the Member State's breach of Directive 83/189 may seek reparation under the Francovich case law, even though the latter requires that the Community provisions whose breach provides the basis for liability were intended to confer rights on individuals - a criterion Directive 83/189, as construed by the ECJ in Unilever Italia, would appear inherently unable to fulfil.
147. Delena Wells cited supra note 13, paras 55-58. Cf. Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo, [1989] ECR 1839;
148. Case C-201/94, Medicines Control Agency, [1996] ECR I-5819. Also the English Court of Appeal in R v. Durham County Council, ex parte Huddleston, [2000] 2 CMLR 313. On such "triangular" disputes, see further: Lackhoff and Nyssens, "Direct Effect of Directives in Triangular Situations", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 397;
149. Colgan, "Triangular Situations: The Coup de Grâce for the denial of horizontal direct effect of Community directives", 8 EPL (2002), 545.
150. A view supported by Lenaerts and Corthaut, op. cit. supra note 10, 306-307. See also: Arnull, op. cit. supra note 76, pp. 250-252.
151. Further: Dougan, "The 'disguised' vertical direct effect of directives?", (2000) CLJ 586.
152. See Dougan, Annotation of Unilever Italia, 38 CML Rev. (2001), 1503, 1507.
153. E.g. Weatherill, "Breach of Directives and Breach of Contract", 26 EL Rev. (2001), 177.
154. E.g. Case 120/73, Lorenz, [1973] ECR 1471;
155. Case 121/73, Markmann, [1973] ECR 1495;
156. Case 122/73, Nordsee, [1973] ECR 1511.
157. Further: Slot, Annotation of CIA Security, 33 CML Rev. (1996), 1035;
158. Weatherill, "A Case-Study in Judicial Activism in the 1990s: The Status Before National Courts of Measures Wrongfully Un-Notified to the Commission" in O'Keeffe and Bavasso (Eds.), Judicial Review in European Union Law (Kluwer, 2000);
159. Jans, "National Legislative Autonomy? The Procedural Constraints of European Law", (1998) LIEI, 25.
160. Similarly, e.g. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 10, pp. 261-262. For an interesting alternative approach to understanding the Court's jurisprudence on decentralized enforcement,
161. see Ross, "Effectiveness in the European Legal Order(s): Beyond supremacy to constitutional proportionality?", 31 EL Rev. (2006), 476.